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Intellectual functioning of people, particularly in different cultures, has always
been a topic of interest and discussion. In the literature it is often implied that intel-
lectual functioning, especially higher order processes like logical reasoning, is a stable,
trait-like feature of individuals and therefore performance is assumed to be consistent
over siruarions and rime (e.g. Eysenk, 1971; Jensen, 1)80; Herrnstein 8c Murray, 1994;
Vernon, 1979).
However, it appears that people, who have not received any training or schooling
in formal logic, ofren do not have a high score on reasoning tests, but nevertheless they
perform well in daily-life situations that require reasoning abilities. To solve this para-
dox of rationality several solutions have been suggested by psychologists (Johnson-
Laird, 1999). The first states that people are rational but that psychological tests do not
reflect their competence. The second reaction says that logic is the wrong normative
standard, because inferences are required in logic that individuals, other than logicians,
normally do not make. For example, in logic, if a conclusion follows from premises,
then no subsequent premise can invalidate it. In daily human reasoning subsequent
information can undermine a deduction. The third solution takes the view that people
have two sorts of rationality: rationality 1 is a tacit competence for coping with life's
problems and rationality 2 is a conscious mechanism for normative reasoning (Evans 8c
Over, 1996). Johnson-Laird proposes, in his reaction to the paradox, that individuals
without any training in formal logic have at least a modicum of deductive competence:
The persuasiveness of an inference depends on the credibility of its premises
and on the proportion of siruations that satisfy both them and the conclusion.
The process of reasoning can lead reasoners to abandon a premise or assump-
tion or to abandon an inference as invalid.....The modicum of rationality is
important to achieving goals of everyday life and crucial for technical expert-
ise in logic. But it's only a modicum, so it explains why people make mistakes
in reasoning, particularly in the laboratory, and sometimes in life. (Johnson-
Laird, 1999, p. 113)
Context and culture do have an effect on logical reasoning (e.g., Bell, Brown, 8c
Bryant, 1993; Cole 8z Scribner, 1974; Evans, Barston 8c Pollard, 1983; Wason 8c
Johnson-Laird, 1972); yet from a cross-cultural perspective not much research has been
done (however, a few examples can be found, e.g. in the work of Luria, 1976; Scribner,
1979, and Tulviste,l9)1). What we need are logical reasoning tasks "which test the
same cognitive structures, but which are directly relevant to the daily activities and
interest of che subjects" (Dasen, 1977, p. 197). The present project on logical reason-
ing and culture set out to link specific cultural features of a task to logical reasoning.
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Which kinds of culture-related task characteristics lead to more (or less) logically cor-
rect answers'
The theoretical framework of the scudy and the way the tasks were developed will
be described in the following sectíons, but first a description is given of two traditions
in research on cognitive performance, namely the formal and the informal tradition. In
my opinion the distinction makes clear why cross-cultural psychology can play an
important role in the developmenr of our knowledge on cognitive processes, and why
there is a need for research as carried out in this project.
The Formal and the Informal Tradition
Cognitive processes have been studied from two different approaches. In cultural
anthropology cognitive processes always have been studied in their nacural context.
A popular thesis in the anthropological research has been that different environ-
mental demands associated with different culture leads co the development of
different patterns of ability across cultures. (Ceci, 1990, p. 29)
A famous example in cultural anthropology is the work of Gladwin (1964) among
the Truk of the Pulawar atoll in the South Pacific. The navigation of a sailing canoe is
described. The Truk make voyages over hundreds of miles of open ocean, without a
compass, sextant, or star tables and they set their course by, among other things, the
rising and setting of stars, and the wave patterns, and combine this with a vast amount
of data stored in memory. Gladwin (1964) writes: "The Trukese navigator (...) does it
all in his head. This is an astounding intellectual achievement." (p. 32). He argues that
the process of navigating must reflect a high order of intellectual funcrioning. Studies
like this one tell us how important it is to examine how people reason in daily-life sit-
uations. But what does this kind of research tell us about cognitive functioning in gen-
eral? One cannot generalize these results to other cultures.
In experimental and cross-cultural psychology cognitive skills used to be studied
without much concern for the context. Often the validity of the Western instruments,
which were used to assess individuals in all kinds of cultures, was questionable.
Psychologists tried to
.... neutralize the task so that performance reflects "pure process". Evidence
suggests that our ability to control and orchestrate cognítive skills is not an
abstract context-free competence which may be easily transferred across wide-
ly diverse problem domains, but consists rather of cognitive activity ried
specifically to context. (Rogoff 8c Lave, 1)84, p. 3)
In the study of cognition, the dichotomy between these approaches has become
known under labels such as formal versus everyday reasoning, informal versus formal
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reasoning, formal versus pragmatic reasoning, and deductivism versus contexrualism
(Van de Vijver t~ Willemsen, 1))3). Formal and informal reasoning are rhe rerms
adopted here. Within the forrna! tradition research is carried our with tasks rhat have a
closed problem space and a focus on the logical correcrness of the answers (see Table 1).





Focus on corrrctness of solution
Contextindependence
The scientist as the model of the problem solver
Product oriented (psychometric approach) or
process oriented (Piagetian approach)
Cross-cultural comparisons test performances
Algorithmic solurions






Problems with a high ecological validity
Focus on practical value of the
solution (uncertainty reduction)
Context dependence




In-depth assessment of a single problem
Solution requires procedural,
practical knowledge
The formal tradition originally did noc have much eye for the context and the content
of the tasks rhat were presented, but studies like those with the famous four card prob-
lem of Wason showed that task content did have a strong effect on logical reasoning.
Wason (1)66) devised a new reasoning problem, which became known as the Wason's
selection task (see Figure 1).
Rule: If there rJ an A orr orte ridr of tbe rardthen
there iJ a 3 on the rither cide of the card
Figuce l.
An example of Wason's selection task.
s
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In this selection task participants have to decide which cards would logically need to be
turned over in order to check whether the rule is true or false (participants are told that
there is a letter on one side of the card and a digit on the other). This task has proven
to be quite difficult. Many participanrs turn over the A card or the A and the 3 card,
while one should turn over the A and the 5. Wason initially explained this with the
confirmation bias; participants err because they are looking for evidence that confirms
the rule rather than disconfirms it (as in this example the 5 card does). Evans (1989)
indicates thac this bias could be considered an example of a more general positivity bias.
Participants testing hypotheses as in this selection task, think only of positive conse-
yuences or predictions and only of investigating the positively named items on the
selection task. Thus,
reasoning errors arise from a difficulty in generating the correct features for
consideration rather than in a faulty analytic grasp of the logical relationships
involved. (Evans, 1989, p. 58)
Therefore, participants who are presented with evidence that logically falsifies the con-
sidered hypothesis will generally recognize this immediately.
The Wason's selection task has been repeated with conrents that refer to real life
situations. For example, Wason and Shapiro (cf. Wason 8t Johnson-Laird, 1)72) used
the selection task with the rule: Er~ery tinre I go to ~llanrherter 1 travel Gy train, together
with cards representing "Manchester", "Leeds", "train," and "car". Most participants chose
the correct combination, namely "Manchester" and "car". Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, and
Legrenzi (1972) told participants to imagine that they were post-office workers sorting
letters. It was their job to ensure that they confirmed the rule: If a letter r.r realed then it
ba.r u 50 lire rtamp on it. The results showed a striking difference between performance
in the realistic and symbolic (A, D, ~, 5) conditions. In both experiments individuals
seem to have much more insight in the logical strucrure of problems with a realistic
content.
This effect of problem content on logical reasoning with conditional rules like the
Wason selection task, has often been replicated (e.g., Evans, 1989; Griggs át Cox, 1982;
Markovits 8c Lesage, 1990) and several models have been put forward to account for it.
The first can be called the farrarliarity ~ availahility model (Gigerenzer 8c Hug, 1992). It
argues that the participant's past experience has created associations between the propo-
sitions in a conditional rule. Thus, the more exposure a participant has had to these
propositions, the easier they will come to mind (e.g., Griggs t3c Cox, 1)82, 1983;
Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, 8c Legrenzi, 1972; Manktelow 8c Evans, 1979; Wason 8c
Shapiro, 1971). The rule Ifyou are to drink aleohol. therr }'!~i~ nrtut Ge ria~er eighteert, is easier
for participants who are familiar with this rule, or who have had experience in the past
with similar rules, from which they can reason by analogy. Another approach has been
proposed by Cheng and Holyoak (1)85, 1989; Markovits 8c Lesage, 19)0) in their
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praxnaatr~- rea.roning scherna-r nzodel. These authors argue that people reason from " abstract
knowledge structures induced from ordinary life experiences, such as ' permissions',
'obligations', and 'causations"' (Cheng ~sc Holyoak, 1989, p. 286). These knowledge
structures, called pragmatic reasoning schemes, can be defined as a generalizecí set of
rules about classes of goals. Permissions, for example, are represented by rules that yield
the logically correct pattern of responses. The rule [f yorr are to drink alrr~hol. therr yoar
rnrrrt he over eighteerr evokes a permission scheme and this should facilitate reasoning. The
third model, the .roiial ioratract naodel. draws on evolutionary psychology (Cosmides,
1)89). Cosmides starts from a cost-benefit analysis:
A social contract relates perceived benefits to perceived costs, expressing an
exchange in which an individual is required to pay a cost (or meet a require-
ment) to an individual (or group) in order to be eligible to receive a beneFit
from that individual (or group). Cheating is the failure to pay a cost to which
one has obligated oneself by accepting a benefit, and without which the other
person would not have agreed to provide the benefït. (Cosmides, 1989, p. 187)
Social contract rules will facilitate reasoning in the selection task, because they require
the decection of cheaters which is a task with a high ecological validity. A task with the
rule If you are to drink alrohol, then yorr nzrrrt Ge oi~er eighteerr should draw the attention of
the participant to any person who has not paid the required cost and to any person who
has accepted the benefit, in this case any person who has not attained the required age.
"Such a procedure maps directly onto the Wason selecrion task" (Cosmides, 1989, p. 197).
Besides che Wason selection task, much research has been done on syllogistic rea-
soning (e.g. Evans, 1982; Evans, 1989; Evans, Barston, 8c Pollard, 1983; Girotto 8c
Politzer, 1990; Revlin ~ Leirer; 1)78). A consistent finding here is that participants
appear to be influenced by the a priori believabiliry of the conclusion (Evans 8c Over,
1996). People seem to have difficulty in drawing a conclusion from the premises given.
The premises are often judged by real world truth-value.
In summary, much research has been done in the formal tradition on reasoning, and
over the years the content and context of reasoning problems became an important
issue. Performance on logical reasoning tasks is greatly enhanced when the tasks have a
realistic content, but a priori beliefs can interfere with the logical reasoning process and
can make reasoning solely from the premises harder. Several suggestions have been put
forward ro explain the effect of content and context. Unfortunately, most research is
limited to the use of a narrow set of logical rules (either Wason's task or syllogisms) and
to participants in Western cultures. As a consequence, no information is available
about the generaliry and validity of the mechanisms proposed to account for context
effects in Wason's four-card problem and the belief-bias in syllogistic reasoning.
Within the irzfi~rnral traditiorr tasks to be solved have an open problem space and che
focus is on the practical value of a solution (see Table 1). Research in this tradition
12 Logical reasoning and culture
focuses on cognitive processes in real-life situations, as described in the example given
above of the work of Gladwin. Cole, Gay, Click, and Sharp (1971) studied reasoning in
a divorce law case and in a local game often played among the Kpelle, and Hutchins
(1980) examined lawsuits about assignmenr of land use among Trobrianders.
A common topic in research in this tradition is the study of mathematical activi-
ties in daily life. In the Adult Math Project (Lave, 1988) daily arithmetic practices in
different settings were studied. Grocery shoppers were followed through the supermar-
ket and some of the observed behavior was explicated in a simulation experiment. The
central activity in this experiment was to find out how grocery shoppers "determined
the best buy" when comparing similar grocery irems. The everyday mathematical activ-
ities, which were used to derermine the besr buy, were compared with performance on
formal arithmetic tasks. The results showed that there were differences in performanc-
e, error patterns, and strategies between the supermarket on the one hand and test activ-
ities on the other, though the arithmetic problems were formally similar. According to
Lave the results of this project imply that
there may not be just better and worse performances or more and less success-
ful realizations of some basic arithmetic competence. Rather, there appears to
be qualitatively different practices of arithmetic in different settings. (p. 63)
Similar results were obtained by Scribner (1984, 1986) in a study carried out in a
dairy factory in Baltimore, as well as in studies described by Greenfield and Lave (1982)
with weavers in Zinacanteco and tribal tailors in Liberia, in a study by Ceci and Liker
(1986) who have focused on racetrack handicapping, and in work of Carraher (1986)
with construction foremen. In the informal tradition some results are found consistent-
ly. There is little or no correlation between performance in informal tasks and formal
tests, there is little transfer ofcognitive skills from familiar to unfamiliar problem solv-
ing situations, and there are remarkable differences in the accuracy and strategy use
between experts and novices ( cf. Van de Vijver 8c Willemsen, 1993). These studies point
to the relevance of everyday situations for the study of cognitive processes. Despite their
interest, these studies also show some problems. They typically focus on a single event andl
or single cultural group. In addition, there is little or no control of relevant task variables.
Culture and Cognition
Research in both the formal and the informal tradition shows how important it is
to develop stimulus material that takes different (cultural) contexts and contents into
account. But there is a gap between these traditions. A culture-comparative approach
can be useful in bridging this gap, combining the experimental rigor of the formal tra-
dition and the analysis of the role of cultural factors as studied in the informal tradi-
tion. This kind of research involves culturally informed applications of the formal tra-
dition, as a rule carried out in different cultures.
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In the early years, cross-cultural studies on cognition used Western instruments to
assess cognitive performance. Over the years cross-cultural psychology became more
aware of the strong effect of literacy and schooling on cognitive test performance, but
in addition researchers in this area began examining specific cultural and social prac-
dces related to performance (Rogoff 8c Chavajay, 1995). More attention was given to the
daily-life experience and its influence on cognitive development and ro the transfer of
abilities developed in daily-life tasks to more artificial test situations (e.g., Lave, 1988;
Rogoff 8c Gauvain, 1984; Scribner, 1979; Scribner, 1984; Scribner 8c Cole, 1981).
Furthermore, in cross-cultural studies the ecological validity of stimulus material
became more important and several studies have demonstrated that the quality of per-
formance on cognitive tasks greatly enhances if familiar materials are used for testing
(e.g., Bell, Brown, 8c Bryant, 1993; Cole, Gay, Click, 8c Sharp, 1971; Price-Williams,
Gordon, 8c Ramirez, 196); Rogoff 8c Gauvain, 1984; Serpell, 1979; Tanon, 1994). '
The Present Study
The project Logical Rea.roning and Cultz~re is focused on logical reasoning, more
specifically on deductive reasoning. The idea was to develop an instrument chat would
measure the ability of verbal deductive reasoning in two different cultures, namely
Zambia and rhe Netherlands. The items of the test were designed in such a way, that
the results would be comparable (i.e., the same logical rules were used in both cultural
groups), but the content of the items had to be suitable for both cultures; the content
referred to an everyday topic, with specific adjustments for each cultural group, as
explained later.
The theoretical background to the thesis is provided by a model of abstract think-
ing (cf. Van de Vijver, 1991; Van de Vijver Sz Willemsen, 1993). This model includes
three basic elements. The first is pragrrzatic knou~ledge, which refers to declarative, factu-
al knowledge about ourselves and the environment. This knowledge is acquired
through formal and informal education and ir reflects both facts and (implicit) theories
(i.e., shared beliefs about the world). Pragmatic knowledge is the content to which the
reasoning is applied. As mentioned before, cross-cultural differences in pragmatic
knowledge (e.g., differences in daily-life experiences) can lead to large differences in
performance on cognitive tasks.
The second element consists of rea.roning rcheme.r, which are domain-independent
stimulus transformation rules, such as the modus ponens (if p then q; p, therefore q)
and the modus tollens (if p then q; not q, therefore not p). Although few data on cross-
~ Some authors are mentioned in the description of rhe informal tradition as well as in the section on cross-
culrural research, for example Cole, Gay, Click and Sharp (1971). During their stay with the Kpelle they
used all kinds of inethods ro study logical reasoning. Some of them more in line wíth the informal rradi-
tion (e.g. studying divorce law suits) and some more with cross-culrural research (e.g. presenting subjecrs
verbal logical reasoning problems).
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cultural differences in the mastery of reasoning schemes are available, no substantial
cross-cultural differences are expected; the schemes can be taken to be part and parcel
of the human condition (Van de Vijver, 1991).
The third element is nzetac-ognitive knou~ledge, linking pragmatic knowledge and rea-
soning schemes. This link starts from the recognition that the solution of a problem
demands a particular reasoning scheme. Pragmatic knowledge and reasoning schemes
are "put together" to form a"plan of action". Metacognitive skills are taught through
formal and informal education; there are areas of specialization in which individuals
have the highest metacognitive skills (e.g., logicians probably have high metacognitive
skills to solve logical reasoning problems according to the norm of logical reasoning).
Cross-cultural differences are quite likely, because cultures have their own "specializa-
tion"; members from a particular culture often share the same kind of problems to
which they are frequently exposed, which will lead to an advanced development of
metacognitive skills for these problems (Ferguson, 1)56; Irvine 8c Berry, 1988).
Unfortunately, no cross-cultural research has been carried out in which the role of
metacognition has been systematically investigated.
The application of the model is presented in more detail in the various chapters of
this thesis. In rhe next section a brief overview is presented.
Method
Pragntatic Knou~led~e
Child rearing was chosen as a natural domain for studying logical reasoning. In
everyday life people have theories and make cognirive inferences about all sorts of
things, also about the development of their children. Nowadays, it is a popular subject
for research and results have shown that parents have quite strong ideas about the devel-
opment of their children. Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard (1986) give an
example of reasoning in everyday life:
The mother ofa four-year old boy, observing that he has been unusually cranky
and obdurare for several days, decides that he has entered a'phase'. (p. 1)
The domain of child rearing and more specifically the implicit theories parents have
regarding the development of their children was also chosen because it is a broad
domain in which many different situations are imaginable.
The first part of the project is meant to gain insight in pragmatic knowledge about
child development. It deals with the timetable of expectations that parents hold for
their children: the types of competence they expect and the age ar which they expect
these to be acquired. (Pels, 1991, p. 64). Cross-cultural research has shown that there
are differences within and between cultures regarding the expectations parents hold for
the developmenr of their children (Goodnow, Cahsmore, Cotton, t3c Knight, 1)84;
Hess, Kashiwagi, Azuma, Price, t3c Dickson, 1980; Keller, Miranda, 8c Ganda, 1984;
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Miller, 1986; Pels, 1991; Zelko, Dunran, Barden, 8c Garber, 1986). For example, mothers
in Japan value early mastery of skills that show self-control, compliance with adult
aurhoriry, and social courtesy, whereas mothers in rhe United Srares emphasize early
acyuisition of skills that display individual action, standing up for rights, and other
forms of verbal assertion (Hess et al., 1980).
Seventy-seven skills covering a broad range of behaviors (e.g., eat u~itl~rrrrt f~elp, u~al,~
u~ithozrt help, krritting, reading and criticize self; see Table 2, Chapter 1) were presented to
Zambian and Dutch mothers. They were asked to indicate the expected age of mastery
for each skill, gender differences in mastery and the desirability of developing the skill.
The results of this study were of interest mainly because differences and similarities in
pragmaric knowledge were needed for the development of logical reasoning tasks.
However, the results turned out to be so interesting in their own righr that it was decíd-
ed to elaborare the study; Turkish-Dutch mothers were added to the sample.
The first study is reporred in rwo chapters. Chapter 1 examines cross-cultural dif-
ferences and similarities between Zambian, Turkish-Durch, and Dutch mothers in
expected age of mastery of various skills. Chapter 2 also considers cross-cultural differ-
ences and similarities of gender-differences and the desirability ofvarious skills. In both
chapters an attempt is made to formulate and test models of the patterning of cross-cul-
rural differences.
IZea~ortrrrg Schenter
The second part of the project was directed at the yuestion whether reasoning
schemes as described in formal logic are applied by Zambian and Durch mothers in
cheir thinking about children's development and whar rhe effect of empirical truth-
value would be on their logical reasoning.
The information about developmental expectations provided the context for "trans-
lating" ten different logical reasoning schemes into test items (see Table 1, Chapter 3).
Two rests were developed and administered to Zambian and Dutch women. Both tesrs
used the same logical rules; in the first tesr (the LRT) the premises of the reasoning
schemes were presenred and in the second test (rhe Story-LRT) these premises were
embedded in two types of prose passages, with a real-world and a make-believe content.
Furthermore, the logical reasoning items varied in empirical truth-value: empiri-
cally true for both countries, empirically false for both countries, empirically true only
for Zambia, empirically tnie only for the Netherlands. By "empirically true for both
countries" I mean rhat the content of the item deals with a statement that is based on
well-established or widely agreed upon facrs in both cultures such as "Children of two
years can walk" (also referred to as factual items). "Empirically false for both countries"
means that the item contains a statement that refers to something counterfactual, such
as "Children of one week old can walk up the stairs" (counterfactual items).
"Empirically true in one country and false in che other country" (possibly factual items)
means that rhe contenr of an item refers ro signifïcant cross-cultural differences found
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in pragmatic knowledge on developmental expectations in the first part of the project
(see Table 2, Chapter 3). For example, an item which was empirically true for the
Netherlands and false for Zambia involved a child of 3,5 years old that was able to use
a hammer. The expected age of hammering was 3.39 in the Netherlands and 5.79 in
Zambia (p ~ .001).
This study examines the effect of the different item facets on the performance in
logical reasoning and possible differences in these effects for Zambia and the Nether-
lands. Cross-cultural differences in the effects of reasoning scheme should be minimal,
whereas cross-cultural differences as a consequence of empirical truth-value (affected by
cross-cultural differences in pragmatic knowledge) could be substantial.
~lletacognition
It is difficult to make inferences about reasoning processes, solely based on the
answers that people give to logical problems. Besides scoring how often participants
give a logically right or a wrong answer, it is important to know `how' the problems are
solved. In particular, it is important to know whether answers are based on empirical
knowledge or on the logícal rules that are stated in the item. In order to assess metacog-
nitive aspects of logical reasoning, Zambian and Dutch participants were asked to give
reasons for the answers they gave on the Story-LRT. These answers were rated on thir-
teen attributes such as logical versus empirical explanation, sufficiency of the answer,
and references to the premise (see Table 2, Chapter 4). We were inrerested in cross-cul-
tural differences in these thirteen attributes, also in relation to the item facets empiri-
cal truth-value and realism of story content.
In this study a distinction is made between logically correct and logically wrong
answers. This does not mean right and wrong in a general sense, but right and wrong
according to the norm of formal logical reasoning. Empirical explanations are in my
opinion not better or worse than logical explanations; they are two different ways of
approaching a problem.
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Developmental Expectations of Dutch, Turkish-
Dutch, and Zambian Mothers: Towards an
Explanation of Cross-cultural Differences
Madde E. Willemsen and Fons. J. R. van de Vijver
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
In this study, three models of cross-cultural differences of developmental
expectations by parents were examined. The domain dependence model holds
that differences vary across psychological domains such as perception and
cognition. The cumulative differences model states that cross-cultural
differences increase with age. The context variables model holds that
cross-cultural differences in developmental expectations are mainly a function
of background variables such as differences in parental education. The
expectations of mothers in three different cultures were examined. Sixty eight
Dutch, 50 Turkish-Dutch (Turkish women living in The Netherlands), and 69
Zambian mothers were asked to indicate the expected age of mastery for each
of 77 skills, covering a broad range of behaviours. Zambian mothers expected
most skills to develop at a later age than did Dutch and Turkish-Dutch
mothers. Partial support was obtained for each model.Tentative evidence was
obtained that the domain dependence model could explain most and the
cumulative differences model the least cross-cultural differences.
In recent years much attention has been paid to the study of developmental
expectations. Various closely related terms have been utilised in the
literature such as parental perceptions, beliefs and attributions, social
cognitions, developmental models, implicit developmental theories, naive
developmental theory, developmental timetables (Goodnow, 1984, 1985),
parental ethnotheories (Harkness 8c Super, 1992), and developmental tasks
(Havighurst,1972). The most important topics in these studies are the nature
of the expectations, their origins, and their influence on the development of
the child (Miller, 1986).
The present study addresses the patterning of cross-cultural variations in
age differences at which parents expect their children to have acquired
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various skills. An overview will be presented of cross-cultural studies of
developmental expectations. This will be followed by a discussion of models
to explain cross-cultural differences in these expectations.
Cross-cultural research has shown that developmental expectations of
parents differ across cultures. For example, Hess, Kishiwagi, Azuma, Price,
and Dickson (1980) asked Japanese and American mothers at what age they
expect children to develop various skills. The skills were divided into seven
categories: school-rclated skills, verbal assertiveness, compliance,
politeness, emotional maturity, instrumental independence, and social skills.
Japanese mothers expected earlier mastery of self-control, compliance with
adult authority, and social courtesy, whereas the American mothers
expected earlier acquisition of skills that display individual action, standing
up for one's rights, and other forms of verbal assertiveness.
Goodnow, Cashmore, Cotton, and Knight (1984) studied developmental
expectations of Australian-born and Lebanese-born mothers, all living in
Australia. The mothers were asked to indicate the expected age of
development of 40 skills (32 skills from Hess et al., 1980, and 8 additional
skills). The results showed substantial cross-cultural differences. The
Lebanese-born mothers expected a significantly later age than the
Australian-born mothers on half of the items. Social skills and verbal
assertiveness revealed the largest cultural differences, with Lebanese-born
mothers expecting a later age than Australian-born mothers. The authors
argue that the observed cross-cultural age differences may reflect the value
attached to the skills in the two groups.
Pomerleau, Malcuit, and Sabatier (1991) and Sabatier (1994) studied the
parental conceptions about early development among mothers in Montreal,
Canada, and Rennes, France. In Mon[real, 45 Quebecois, 38 Haitian, and 20
Vietnamese mothers (first generation immigrants) were interviewed, in
Rennes, 30 French and 30 African and South-East Asian mothers. The
mothers indicated the expected ages of developmental milestones and
mastery of cognitive and affective abilities. Most differences were found
between immigrant mothers and both Quebecois and French mothers. The
latter groups expected most skills to develop at an earlier age, especially
perceptual and cognitive skills.
Pregnant (primiparous and multiparous) women in Germany and Costa
Rica were asked to provide information about their developmental
expectations, caregiving and child-rearing activities, and sources of
information on child development by Keller, Miranda, and Gauda (1984).
Again, there was a significant effect of culture, particularly in the area of
cognitive skills. Compared to Costa-Rican mothers, German mothers
expected these skills to develop earlier and also reported to engage in
caregiving activities in the cognitive area when the child was younger.
Costa-Rican mothers indicated a more prolonged bodily dependence
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between mother and child (e.g. longer breast feeding). No substantial
differences were found between primiparous and multiparous women.
It appears, in sum, that the cross-cultural studies of developmental
expectancies yield a fairly clear-cut picture. Differences are often found in
the expected age of mastery of skills. Western parents often indicate a lower
expected age of mastery than non-Western parents.
Because cross-cultural studies of developmental expectations are still
scarce, it is not surprising that the studies reported are more exploratory
than explanatory. Yet, it is the task of cross-cultural psychology both
to document and explain cross-cultural differences (e.g. Poortinga 8c
Malpass, 1986). As a first attempt to develop a framework for the
interpretation of cross-cultural dífferences, three models are proposed here.
The three models proposed do not serve as competing explanations. Rather,
they describe first attempts to study various aspects of cross-cultural
differences such as their overall patterning, their evolvement, and their
antecedents.
The first model, which could be labelled the domain dependence model, is
geared at the patterning of cross-cultural differences. It starts from a
taxonomy of cross-cultural differences developed by Poortinga and Van de
Vijver (Poortinga, Kop, 8r. Van de Vijver, 1990; Van de Vijver 8r Poortinga,
1990). The authors distinguish six behavioural domains, namely, physical,
perceptual, cognitive, intra-individual, inter-individual, and social. Going
from the first to the last domain, behaviour is increasingly influenced by
cultural transmission (as opposed to genetic transmission); as a
consequence, cross-cultural differences will increase in this direction. If
developmental expectations are functionally related to children's
behaviour, the cross-cultural differences in expected age will increase in the
aforementioned order; differences will be smallest for the physical and
largest for the social domain. Evidence that cross-cultural differences are
not invariant across domains was obtained by Sissons Joshi, and MacLean
(1997) even though their domains were somewhat different from ours.
The second model, labelled a cumulative differences model, is derived
from Jensen's (1974, 1977) cumulative deficit model and addresses the
relationship between the age of mastery of a skill and the cross-cultural
differences in mastery of the skill. Jensen's model predicts that performance
differences on cognitive test scores will increase with age. Analogously, the
cumulative differences model states that cross-cultural differences in
developmental expectations will increase with age. Age is not a real
explanation but merely a proxy. There may be various mechanisms
underlying the model. For example, when children grow older, they may
become more educated or more knowledgeable about the cultural norms of
their environment. This kind of explanation is further explored in the last
model.
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This model, labelled the context variables model, addresses antecedents of
cross-cultural differences in parental expectations. Poortinga and Van de
Vijver (1987; Van de Vijver 8z Leung,1997) have proposed context variables
as a generic term for antecedents of cross-cultural differences. The context
variables model is a general approach to cross-cultural differences in which
external variables (the context variables) are used to explain statistically
cross-cultural differences. The model does not yet specify the nature of these
variables but merely provides a statistical-methodological framework in
which the role of these variables in the validation of cross-cultural
differences is emphasised. Cross-cultural differences in developmental
expectations are taken in this model to be engendered by differences in
background variables across cultural groups such as education, income, or
number of children. In this model, no cross-cultural differences in
developmental expectations should remain after all relevant background
variables are (usually statistically) accounted for. In this model, culture is a
coreless concept, methodologically defined as a set of often loosely
interrelated independent variables (cf. Lonner 8z Adamopoulos, 1997;
Poortinga, Van de Vijver, Joe, 8c Van de Koppel, 1987). This concept of
culture is used here throughout. Cashmore and Goodnow (1987) showed
that after educational background was taken into account, cross-cultural
differences between Anglo-Australian and Italian-Australian parents in the
perceived value of children's conformity virtually disappeared. In the study
carried out by Hess et al. (1980), SES was modestly correlated with the
mothers' overall developmental expectations; mothers from higher
socioeconomic backgrounds tended to indicate a slightly earlier age of
mastery. Furthermore, SES correlated significantly with the expectations of
Japanese mothers regarding social skills and with the expectations of
American mothers regarding verbal assertiveness. In both countries
mothers of high SES expected an earlier mastery of school-related skills.
Intra-cultural research with Western subjects has shown that background
variables such as parental education, occupation, income, age, and gender
have a bearing on developmental expectations (McGillicudy-DeLisi, 1980,
1982; Palacios, 1990; Stevens, 1988). Mothers of high SES expected earlier
mastery of cognitive skills than mothers of low SES (Ninio, 1979). Reis
(1989) compared three different age groups of mothers on appropriateness
of developmental expectations. The results showed that teenage mothers
are less knowledgeable about child development than mature mothers.
Also, compared to mothers, fathers expected that skills develop at a later age
and showed more variation in their expectations (Ninio,1988). Vukelich and
Kliman (1995) found that a mother's occupation, age, and educational level
affect her expectations. Solís-Cámara and Fox (1995) did not find
differences in developmental expectations of Mexican and US mothers who
were matched on maternal education, marital status, and SES. In sum, the
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admittedly limited evidence available suggests that the cross-cultural
differences in developmental expectations reported may be due, at least
partially, to differences in background variables such as SES, educational
background, or age.
The present study examines the feasibility of the previous models to
explain cross-cultural differences in developmental expectations of Dutch,
Turkish-Dutch (i.e. Turkish mothers living in The Netherlands), and
Zambian mothers. As indicated earlier, developmental expectations vary
with modernisation (Segall, Dasen, Berry, 8z Poortinga, 1990, pp. 302-303)
of the cultural groups; hence, the three cultures of the current study were
chosen in such a way that they differed in modernisation. The Dutch and
Zambian groups can be taken to represent higher and lower levels of




The sample consisted of 68 Dutch, 50 Turkish-Dutch, and 69 Zambian
mothers. Most of them were approached via the primary school of their
children and a small part was recruited via snowball sampling. Ten percent
of the Turkish sample consisted of mothers involved in OPSTAP, the Dutch
version of the HIPPY programme (a cognitive intervention programme;
Eldering 8r Vedder, 1992). The Dutch subjects were living in four different
villages: Horst (n - 16), Hilvarenbeek (n - 15), Kerkrade, and Landgraaf
(n - 37). The Turkish-Dutch subjects were living in two different towns:
Tilburg (n - 5) and Deventer (n - 45). Eighteen percent of the Turkish-
Dutch mothers had been living in The Netherlands for less than 5 years, 25 0~0
between 5 and 10 years, and 570~o at least 11 years. At the time of the
interview the Zambian subjects were all living in Lusaka, the capital city of
Zambia, but originally they came from various provinces: Western (n - 9),
Eastern (n - 22), Southern (n - 9), Northern (n - 9), Lusaka (n - 4), Central
(n - 7), Luapula (n - 4), and other provinces (n - 5).
The average age in the Dutch sample was 35.5 years (SD - 4.78). In the
Turkish-Dutch sample the average age was 28.7 years (SD - 5.06), and in the
Zambian group 35.1 years (SD - 5.06).
Almost all mothers (93 0~0 ) in the three samples were married. The average
number of children of the Dutch mothers was 2.34 (range: 1~); for the
Turkish-Dutch mothers the average was 2.20 (range: 1-5), and for the
Zambian mothers 4.54 (range: 1-10).
All Dutch mothers completed primary, 92o~o secondary, and 600~o tertiary
education. The figures for the Turkish-Dutch mothers were 92o~0, 440~0, and
160~0, respectively. Seventy-four percent of the Turkish-Dutch mothers
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received their education in Turkey and 220~o in The Netherlands (4o~a did not
receive any education). Seventy-seven percent of the Zambian mothers
finished primary, 240~o secondary, and 21 o~o tertiary education. In particular,
the latter figures point to a bias towards the better educated upper class in
our sample; the national enrolment rate in tertiary education in 1995 in
Zambia was 2.10~0 (United Nations, 1996).
Of the Dutch sample, 560~o were housewives, 110~o teachers, and 33o~a had
other professions (e.g. cashier, librarian, midwife, and tailor). For the
Turkish-Dutch sample the corresponding percentages were 700~0, 20~0, and
280~0 (e.g. dressmaker and cleaning lady) and for the Zambian sample 630~0,
l00~0, and 270~0 (e.g. cashíer, cleaner, nurse, market vendor, typist, and
traditional healer).
Instruments
The instrument consisted of 87 items (see Table 2). The items were adapted
from a list of 153 developmental skills compiled from Gesell and Ilg (1946).
About half of the items could not be used because of their Western bias and
inappropriateness in other cultures. In addition, some skills were rephrased
(simplified) and some new skills were added to ensure a good representation
of skills across ages and domains.
The skills were split up according to six domains. Physical skills refer to
activities which primarily involve gross motor activities such as walking
without help and swimming. Perceptual skills involve activities combining
perception and fine motor activities such as hammering and turning pages of
a book. Cognitive skills refer to all kinds of inental activities such as reading,
writing, and naming the days of the week. Intra-individual skills refer to
personality traits that do not or marginally involve others such as being
afraid of storm and criticising oneself. Inter-individual skills are traits
involving other people such as being jealous of toys of others and criticising
others. Social skills refer to behaviours involving other people such as
playing with siblings and attitudes with strong relational aspects such as
having a strong feeling for the family. Compared to inter-individual skills,
social skilis presuppose a stronger implicit or frequently explicit
involvement of others. Even though we will refer to the item content as
skills, several items describe behaviours rather than skills (e.g. afraid when
mother leaves and jealous of toys of others). The order of the items was
randomised across the domains. The inter-rater agreement in the
assignment of skills to the six domains was assessed by two independent
raters ( ihe authors). Their agreement was 940~0.
In a pilot study in Zambia the suitability of the list was studied. The list of
87 skills was discussed with female teachers with the aim of judging the
suitability of the list for Zambia. This led to the elimination of 10 items.
28 Logical reasoning and culture
Examples of eliminated items were "wants to help teachers" and "look at
pictures". The teachers were also asked to judge the completeness of the list.
Because all new skills generated were culture-specific such as iron-wire
modelling and making ornaments with seeds and leaves, no items were
added.
The skill was printed at the top of the page. The question At what age do
you expect a child to be able to do this for the fzrst time? was printed below.
The response alternatives were 0 or 1 year old, 2 or3 years old, 4 or S years
old, 6 or 7 years old, 8 or 9 years old, and older than 9 years. The skills were
formulated in line with the recommendations of Holden and Edwards
(1989); an effort was made to avoid ambiguous wordings and the inclusion of
two or more skills in a single item.
The instrument was administered in a structured interview. For the
Zambian subjects the questions were translated in English, the official
language in Zambia, and for the Turkish sample in Turkish. In order to
check the accuracy of the translation both the English and the Turkish
version were backtranslated into Dutch. In The Netherlands the interviews
were held by the first author and a Dutch student. The Turkish-Dutch
mothers were interviewed by the Dutch student and an interpreter, the
Zambian mothers by the first author and a local assistant. The Zambian
interviews were held in English; most mothers had a good mastery of
English. In addition, parts of some interviews were held in Nyanja and
Tonga, two local languages which were spoken by the local assistant.
The internal consístencies (Cronbach's alpha) for the whole instrument
(77 items) were .90 in each cultural group. The values of the separate
domains, which have been presented in Table 1, were appropriate although
the values of the physical and perceptual domains were somewhat lower
even if the smaller number of items of these scales is taken into account.
Furthermore, a test of the equality of the internal consistency coefficients
across the three cultural groups (as described by Hakstian 8t Whalen, 1976)
did not show any significant results.
TABLE 1
Reliability Coefficients of the Domains per Cultural Group
Cuttt~ral Group
Test of Equality
Dutch T~irkish-Dutch Zambian (P)
Physical ( 11 items) .56 .52 .60 .53 (.81)
Perceptual ( 9 items) .52 .50 .49 .06 (.97)
Cognitive ( 19 items) .83 .77 .82 1.26 (.53)
[ntra-individual ( 14 items) .70 .77 .70 1.22 (.55)
[nter-indivídual ( ]1 items) .69 .61 .72 1.39 (.50)
Social ( 13 items) .70 .74 .78 1.49 (.47)
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In preliminary analyses place of birth and current place of residence were
found to be unrelated to the domain scores for expected age of mastery in
each cultural group. Finally, in the Turkish-Dutch group the place of birth
(urban: n - 31; rural: n- 19) and length of stay in The Netherlands were
unrelated to the domain scores. Therefore, these variables were not
considered in the remainder of the analyses.
RESULTS
Prior to a study of the feasibility of the models of cross-cultural differences, a
description of cross-cultural differences per skill and domain is given.
Cross-cultural Differences per Skill and Domain
The average expected ages per item for each cultural group are given in
Table 2 and the means per domain in Fig. 1. A MANOVA was carried out,
with culture as the independent variable and domain scores ( i.e. average
scores on the items of a domain) as dependent variables. The analysis
showed that the effect of culture was significant (P c.01; see Table 3). It was
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F1G. 1 Average expected age score per psychological domain for each culture.
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TABLE 2
Mean Age per Item for the Dutch (D1, Turkish-Dutch (TD), and Zambian (Z) Mothers
Mean Age
Domain Skill D TD Z
Ph ysical
Toilet-trained 2.43 2.38 1.92 7.63~`~`~`
Colour within lines 4.47 4.70 3.78 9.82~`~`~`
Bath without help 6.41 7.70 S.S1 17.88'~`~`
Walk without help 1.06 1.17 1.72 11.79~`~`~`
Carry water 3.62 3.78 4.42 4.33~`~`
Thumb-sucking 0.77 0.82 0.91 1.47
Swimming 5.67 5.19 7.37 23.77~`~`~`
Eat without help 2.64 3.16 1.90 21.10'~"
Run up and down stairs 3.33 2.80 3.24 2.72
Throw and catch balls 4.53 4.27 4.76 0.99
Stand without help 0.83 0.99 1.08 3.47'
Pereeptual
Knitting 7.92 8.42 6.79 14.98~`~~
Turn pages of a book 1.81 2.81 3.36 28.38~`~'
Dance to music 2.01 1.63 2.82 12.14~"~`
Recognise letters 4.68 5.06 5.37 4.19~`
Dress without help 4.50 5.10 4.73 3.08~`
Cry because of hunger 0.88 1.10 1.25 2.80
Draw figures correctly 5.82 5.86 6.67 6.15~'
Hammering 3.39 5.31 5.72 22.18~"~
Use scissors to cut 4.18 4.86 5.78 12.57~`~`~`
Cognitive
Say "mamma" 0.78 0.96 1.21 10.03""
Decidelmake choices 2.79 4.07 4.70 21.41 ~"'
Divisionlmultiplication 7.79 7.86 7.51 1.02
Tell what time it is 7.03 7.14 7.92 6.54~`~`
Write own name 4.53 5.18 5.98 23.86'~"
Call self by name 2.28 2.50 3.26 21.18~`~`~`
Tell what season it is 6.18 6.58 8.21 22.16~`~~`
Distinguish menlwomen 2.90 3.41 3.98 8.67~'~
Additionlsubtraction 6.09 6.78 7.22 13.71 ""
Use baby-talk 1.68 1.95 1.87 1.32
Write first words S.S8 5.22 6.36 9.92'~~
Reading 6.29 6.42 6.88 4.79~`'
Does not use babv-talk 4.23 4.78 5.02 3.63'
Count to ]0 4.09 3.86 4.64 6.SS~'
Verbalise ideaslproblems 4.79 5.02 8.18 67.43~~~
Write first sentences 6.SS 6.38 8.21 47.51~`~"
Draw and write letters 4.29 4.98 6.88 56.89~~`~`
Ask many questions 3.04 3.58 4.33 14.86`~`~`
Name days of the week S.8S 6.10 6.96 9.48~"~`
Developmenral expectations ~ 1
Mean Age
Domnin Skil! D TD "I. F"
Intrn-inrlividunl
Afraid when mother departs 1.43 2.90 3.52 25.14~`~"
Say "I want" 2.38 2.77 3.26 10.12~`~`~`
Want responsibility 4.71 5.26 6.77 13.21~~`~`
Be treated as an adult 7.85 7.50 8.88 5.81 ~`~
Worry being late for school 6.28 6.54 7.34 6.17~~
Cry a lot 0.96 1.17 1.17 1.11
Afraid of rain, storm, and darkness 3.27 3.36 3.42 0.15
Criticise self 6.14 5.90 6.88 3.33~
Get over crying by itself 4.91 2.82 4.12 14.91~`~`~`
Want to be independent 4.08 6.46 8.36 56.91~"~
Afraid mother may die 6.68 6.54 8.81 24.64~`~`~
Afraid of witches, ghosts, etc. 3.96 4.26 7.92 89.49~`~~
Afraid to fail at school 6.47 7.90 8.36 20.46'~`~
No longer afraid of rain
storm, and darkness 8.80 8.94 8.88 0.07
Inter-individuul
Be a good loser in a game 7.47 7.62 7.94 0.75
Jealous of tovs of others 3.70 3.34 3.46 0.75
Demand things from parents 5.98 5.41 4.82 4.41 ~`
Criticise others 5.82 6.22 7.14 6.96~'
Good manners towards adults 4.86 7.03 7.74 34.31~`~`~`
Afraid of strangers 1.75 2.55 4.12 28.71~~~
Like to obey 4.16 5.30 6.47 2Q09~`~`~`
Smile at the sight of a face 0.90 1.17 1.94 9.77~"
Not obeying orders 2.82 3.49 6.80 54.57~~~
Cannot share or wait for a turn 2.86 2.85 4.42 16.68~~`~`
Call names 2.58 2.74 3.30 6.63~`~`"
Sncinl
Helpful within family 5.03 5.58 7.66 30.93~~`~`
Co-operative in game 4.06 3.76 8.12 149.06~`~`~`
Say "hello"i"goodbye" 2.25 2.94 4.33 27.67~"'
Strong feeling for family 3.97 4.72 7.73 45.99'~~
Remember the names of uncles
and aunts 3.29 3.94 6.04 46.00~~`~`
Not co-operative in game 2.15 1.64 5.46 89.79`~`~`
Have one special friend 5.06 5.22 8.36 42.17'~`~`
Like to visit famíly 3.15 3.99 8.4] 151.81~'t
Teach younger síblings 3.11 3.46 5.98 48.56~"'
Play with siblings 4.26 5.10 7.71 62.61~"~
Say "please"i"thank you" 3.68 4.38 5.52 19.10~~`~
Use word "friend" 4.53 4.34 6.24 20.39~"'
Enjoy competition 5.41 6.54 8.01 30.19~`~`~`
' F ratio of one-way analysis of variance.
~P~.OS;~"P~.O1;~`"~`P~.001.
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the three cultures were significant for all but the physical domain. Post-hoc
comparisons (Student Newman-Keuls) for each domain revealed that all
groups differed significantly (P c.O1) from each other on these five domains.
The Zambian subjects invariably expected the highest ages of mastery and
the Dutch subjects the lowest.
A closer inspection of Table 2 shows that at item level this pattern is fairly
well reproduced, with the exception of some items from the physical domain.
However, it is interesting to observe that the expected ages were lowest in
the Zambian group for various self-care activities such as "toilet-trained",
"bath without help", and "eat without help".
Explanatory Models
According to the domain dependence model, cross-cultural differences
should increase with the cultural entrenchment of the domain. The
proportion of variance in the expected age of mastery accounted for by
culture was used as a measure of the size of cross-cultural differences. In
order to test the model, the proportions were computed for the MANOVA
on age reported in Table 3. The proportions are presented in Fig. 2. The
model predicts a perfect rank order between the position on the horizontal
axis of Fig. 2 and the proportion of variance accounted for. The cross-
cultural differences tend to increase in the expected order but the rank order
was not perfect; Spearman's p was .77 (P -.07). The cognitive, intra-
individual, and inter-individual domains did not show the hypothesized
order.
The cumulative differences model postulates a positive relationship
between age and the size of cross-cultural differences. In Fig. 3, the means of
TABLE 3
Multivariate Analysis of Variance for Age Before and After Correction for the
Background Variables
Domain (F)
Source df Phys. Perc. Cog. Intra. Inter. Soc.
Before (Multivariate, F(12,358) - 26.64')
Culture 2 0.57 25.29' S5.55' 47.56~` 37.65' 196.59'
S within-group error 184 (0.34) (0.48) (0.46) (0.80) (0.90) (0.92)
After (Multivariate, F(12,350) - 16.90')
Culture 2 0.12 10.62' 26.85' 23.00' 17.66' 110.13'
S within-group error 180 (0.33) (0.48) (0.46) (0.79) (0.88) (0.82)
Note: Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. Phys., physical; Perc.,
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FIG. 2 Proportion of variance of the original and the residual scores explained by culture for
expected age of mastery. Nore: Original: proportion of variance accounted for by culture in the
observed scores; ResiduaL proportion of variance accounted for by culture after statistical






FIG. 3 Relationship between overall mean age scores and proportion of variance accounted
for by cultural differences.
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the three cultures are plotted against the proportion of variance explained
by culture in an ANOVA with culture as independent variable and the
item's score as dependent variable. As can be seen in Fig. 3, there is a
curvilinear relationship between the variables. A quadratic regression
equation was fitted, with average age as independent variable and
proportion of variance accounted for as dependent variable. The equation
explained 140~0 of the variance [F(2, 74) - 6.13, P c .O1]. The linear and
quadratic regression coefficients were both significant (linear coefficient -
.119, t- 3.46, P c .Ol; quadratic coefficient --.012, t- 3.24, P G .O1). The
curve is drawn in Fig. 3. It is remarkable that the unsystematic error is not
homoscedastic. The error is largest between 3 and 7 years of age. At all ages,
there are skills that show hardly any cross-cultural differences; however,
particularly between, say, 3 and 7 years there are also skills that show large
cross-cultural differences. There are 14 items with an F-value above 40 (cuz 1
.30), namely the cognitive skills: verbalise ideas and problems, write
sentences, and draw and write ftrst letters, the intra-individual skills wants to
be independent and afraid of witches and ghosts, the inter-individual skill
does not obey orders and the social skills is co-operative in a game, has a
strong feeling for the family, remember names of aunts and uncles, is not
co-operative in a game, has one specialfriend, likes to visit family, teach young
siblings, and play with young siblings. Thus, large differences are mainly
found in the social domain.
According to the third model, the context variables model, there should be
no remaining cross-cultural differences after statistical correction for
background variables. The statistical analysis consisted of two steps. In the
first step the context variables are used as predictors of the expected ages in
the combined sample; residual scores (i.e. scores on expected ages not
accounted for by the background variables) are computed. The presence of
cross-cultural differences in the residual scores are tested in the second step.
If no significant differences remain, then the cross-cultural differences in
expected ages are accounted for by the background variables. Multiple
regression analyses were carried out for the three samples per domain, with
the mother's employment status (dichotomously scored as either or not
employed), educational level, number of children and age as independent
variables and the expected age as dependent variable. All domains except
for physical abilities revealed significant multiple correlations, ranging from
.1S to .38 (P c.01; see Table 4). Education and number of children were the
most effective predictors. Higher educated mothers reported lower ages.
Mothers with more children reporied later ages.
Subsequently, a MANOVA was carried out for each of the residual
domain scores (Table 3). In all domains the variance of the residual scores
was much smaller than the variance of the original scores (Fig. 2). The
background variables reduced the proportion of explained variance by on
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average 670~0. Yet, correction for the background variables did not eliminate
the intergroup differences; the MANOVAs for the original and residual
scores were significant for the same five of the six domains (P c.Ol).
Finally, the relative predictive power of the three models to explain
cross-cultural differences was compared. Unfortunately, a direct
comparison of the three models is impossible because the domain
dependence and cumeelative differences model refer to stimulus
characteristics whereas the context variables utilises subject characteristics.
The predictive power of the domain dependence model was examined by
correlating the estimated proportion of variance with the rank order of the
domain. The estimated proportion of variance was obtained in an analysis of
variance with skill as the dependent variable and cultural group as
independent variable. The rank order was formed by assigning the number
one to all physical skills, two to perceptual skills, and so on. The correlation
was .47 (P c .O1). The predictive power of the cumulative differences was
examined by correlating the (same) proportions of variance to the overall
mean age of the skill. The correlation was .14 (ns). The context variables
model was tested in a regression model. The same predictors were used as in
the test of the context variables model: the mother's employment status
(dichotomously scored as either employed or not employed), educational
level, and the number of children. The dependent variable was the mean age
across the three cultural groups; for each of the 77 skills a separate regression
analysis was carried out. The average multiple correlation of the 77 analyses
was .30. It can be concluded that in the present data set the domain
dependence model was a more powerful predictor of cross-cultural
differences than the cumulative differences model. It is tempting to conclude
that the context variables model occupied an intermediate position. Yet,
some caution is required in comparing the predictive power of the models
because the context variables model is based on individual-level data
whereas the test of the other models was based on aggregated data.
TABLE 4
Multiple Regressíon Analyses for Background Variables Predicting Age
Domain
Variable Phys. Perc. Cog. Inrra. Inter. Soc.
Employed 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.15' 0.19' 0.20~`
Education -0.15 -0.30' -0.34~ -0.34~ -0.36~ -0.43~
No. of children 0.06 0.20' 0.29~` 0.23' 0.18~` 0.35'
Age -0.12 -0.20' -0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.01
R- 0.04 0.15' 0.22' 0.20' 0.19~` 0.38~
Note: Figures are standardised regression ccefficients. Phys., physical; Perc., perceptual;
Cog., cognitive; Intra., intra-individual; Inter., inter-individual; Soc., social.
~`P c .05.
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DISCUSSION
The study examined cross-cultural differences in developmental
expectations among Dutch, Turkish-Dutch, and Zambian mothers. The
Zambian subjects expected the highest ages of mastery and the Dutch
subjects the lowest. These results confirm earlier findings that non-Western
mothers expect later ages than Western mothers.
Three models of cross-cultural differences were tested. Cross-cultural
differences tended to increase in the order as postulated by the domain
dependence model ( i.e. physical, perceptual, cognitive, intra-individual,
inter-individual, ar.d social), but salient deviations were found. Two
interpretations of the deviations may be envisaged. Looking at Fig. 2, it
could be argued that the value of cognitive skills is too high vis-à-vis the
values of the intra-individual and inter-individual domains. It was examined
as to whether the deviance may be due to differences in schooling. Cognitive
items may represent skills learned in preschool and primary school;
Zambian children often do not go to a preschool and primary school starts at
seven years, whereas in The Netherlands most children start preschool at the
age of four and primary school at six years. We tested cross-cultural
differences in school and nonschool skills. An ANOVA showed that there
were no significant differences. Another explanation for the relatively large
cross-cultural differences in cognitive skills could be found in differences in
the value parents associate with developmental skills. Various authors seem
to work from the assumption that skills which are valued more, are expected
at an earlier age (e.g. Hess et a1.,1980). In this study, although not presented
here, we asked the mothers to indicate for each skill how desirable it is that a
child develops this skill. Results showed that Dutch mothers, who expected
the earliest development of cognitive skill, also indicated the lowest
desirability. Along similar lines, Goodnow et al. (1984, p. 203) argued that,
"it is tempting to conclude that the age of expectations reflects the degree of
value placed on a particular skill by a particular culture. ... Any simple
equivalence of early expectations with high value, however, is likely to be
misleading".
Another interpretation of the deviance of the expected rank order of Fig.
2 might be that the values of the intra-individual and inter-individual skills
are too low. We do not favour this interpretation because it is less
parsimonious than the aforementioned interpretation (as it involves two
domains) and a theoretical rationale of why these domains would deviate
from the expected pattern is difficult to give.
The increase of cross-cultural differences as postulated by the cumulative
differences model was found for ages up to five years. Across the whole range
considered, a curvilinear relationship was observed (see Fig. 3); there were
more cross-cultural differences for skills which develop between 3 and 7
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years of age, especially in the social domain. It could be argued, in line with
Jensen's original hypothesis, that the relationship holds only for the
cognitive domain. This was examined by restricting the analyses to the
cognitive domain (see Fig. 3). The relationship between age and cross-
cultural differences was not significant (r -.09, ns).
The current study presents evidence that background variables can
account for a substantial amount of cross-cultural differences, as postulated
by the context variablesmodel. Background variables had a significant effect
on expected ages, although they could not account for all cross-cultural
differences. The choice of context variables in the present study was
inevitably restricted. Many other variables could be taken into account, like
social pressure mentioned by Goodnow et al. (1984). Mothers' reports may
differ from their experiences and may reflect the normative development as
perceived by them. Sources of information about child development, in
particular developmental milestones such as walking and talking, may well be
reflected in the opinions expressed by the mothers (Kliman 8t Vukelich,1985;
Vukelich 8r. Kliman, 1985). The source of information that parents use in
order to "learn" about the development of their children, differs across
cultures. This aspect was not addressed explicitly in this study, but during the
interviews we got the impression that books, magazines~medical experts, and
pregnancy and child-care organisations are important sources for Dutch
mothers, though the role of grandparents and friends must not be
overlooked. Books, magazines, and institutions are available for Turkish-
Dutch mothers as well (although probably not in the same amount in
Turkish), but because we did not ask each mother speci6cally about this, we
do not know if they actually utilise these sources. With regard to sources of
information about theories of child development in Zambia we were told that
there are books (e.g. The first baby. Aguide fornew mothers by M. Shilalukey-
Ngoma,1991) and women's magazines about child rearing available, but they
are expensive and are mainly read by upper class parents. Furthermore, there
are small institutions in most areas of Lusaka where mothers seek advice
from nurses. The most important source is the grandparents, who will tell the
(becoming) mother how to handle her first-born baby.
The present study examined the development of children as perceived by
their mothers in a self-report mode. We do not know or imply that parental
expectations and perceptions reflect differences in actual behaviour.
Observational studies of behaviour could well reveal other cross-cultural
differences and similarities. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that mothers in
different cultures apply differential norms in their definition of mastery. For
example, does being helpful in the kitchen mean that a child brings hislher
own plate to the kitchen or that helshe does the dishes? It might be useful for
future studies to first let the mothers define mastery of the skills or provide a
detailed description of what is meant with mastery. Furthermore, the
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present study was an attempt to move beyond the stage of inere
documentation of cross-cultural differences to a test of specific models of
such differences. Our knowledge of cross-cultural differences of
developmental expectations would be deepened by future studies in which
other and more refined models of such differences are tested.
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Chapter 2
Attentes des Mères Néerlandaises,
Turques-Néerlandaises et Zambiennes.
Recherche d'un modèle explicatif?'
Madde E. Willemsen
Fons J.R. van de Vijver
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Recherche d'un modèle explicatif?'
Les 10 dernières années ont été témoin du développement d'un grand nombre
d'études sur les ethnothéories parentales (voir chapitre introducti~. Ce chapitre traite-
ra des différences et similitudes qui caractérisent ces ethnothéories, à partir d'une étude
empirique auprès de mères néerlandaises, de mères d'origine turque mais vivant aux
Pays-Bas ainsi que de mères zambiennes. Plus précisément nous centrerons notre étude
sur deux rypes de questions.
Tout d'abord existe-t-il des différences dans les attentes des mères concernant 1'ac-
quisition d'habiletés au cours des 12 premières annéesl Par ailleurs, conjoíntement aux
différences attendues dans les áges d'acquisition, existe-t-il des différences de "désirabi-
lité" dans ces acquisirions et éventuellement des différences selon que 1'enfant est une
fille ou un gar~on?
Le deuxième objectif de ce travail, plus rarement abordé, consiste à explorer plu-
sieurs modèles explicatifs possibles des différences observées.
Modèles explicatifs des différences culturelles dans les attentes parentales
La plupart des études comparatives sur les conceptions parentales du jeune enfant
font état de différences plus ou moins importantes selon les cultures. Si la description
de ces différences peut être intéressante il est nécessaire d'en développer des modèles
explicatifs. Willemsen et Van de Vijver (1997) ont proposé trois modèles interprétatifs
des différences culturelles observées. Nous exposerons successivement chacun de ces
modèles, et y ajouterons un quatrième.
Le "modèle des domaines comportemenraux" met 1'accent sur la structure des dif-
férences selon les cultures. Dans ce modèle on distingue six domaines comportemen-
taux: physique, perceptif, cognitif, intra-individuel ( maitrise de soi), inter-individuel
(comportement relationnel) et social (Van de Vijver et Poortinga, 1990). L'ordre dans
lequel ces différents domaines sont listés correspond à un poids croissant de la trans-
mission culturelle (opposé à une transmission génétique).
II en résulte des différences culturelles croissantes selon ce même ordre. Si les
attentes parentales sont fonctionnellemenr liées aux comportements de 1'enfant, les dif-
Férences culturelles dans les áges attendus vont croitre selon cet ordre: en moyenne les
différences seront donc moins grandes dans le domaine physique, et plus importantes
dans le domaine social.
Le "modèle des différences cumulatives" est dérivé du modèle des déficits cumulés
de Jensen (1974; 1977). II décrit les relations entre 1'áge d'acquisition de la maitrise
d'une habileté et les différences culturelles dans ces habiletés. Ce modèle prédit que les
différences de performance dans les tests cognitifs vont s'accroitre avec 1'áge. Les habi-
' Transfated in French by B. Bril. Published in B. Bril , P. Dasen, C.Sabatier tk B. Krewer (Eds.), Provo~ .rrrr
lérrfánt et ! áclole.rrerrt. Qucd.r enjanu. por~r que!!e~ rrrlttrrer.', pp. 134-155. Paris: L'Harmattan. Reproduced with
permission.
Attentes des Mères Néerlandaises, Turques-Néerlandaises et Zambiennes 4~
letés acquises plus tardivement montreronr plus de différences culturelles dans 1'áge
d'acquisition que les habiletés acquises à un plus jeune áge.
Le "modèle des variables contexruelles" traire des antécédents des différences cul-
turelles dans les attentes des parenrs. Ces différences sont en effet considérées comme
relevant de paramèrres liés aux antécédents des parents, tels que 1'éducation, le niveau
des revenus ou le nombre d'enfants. D'après ce modèle, une fois ces paramètres pris en
compte, il ne devrait pas subsister de différences culturelles (Poortinga et Van de Vijver,
1987). Les recherches transculturelles, de même que les recherches intraculrurelles dans
les pays occidentaux (McGillicully de Lisi, 1980, 1982; Ninio, 197), 1988; Palacios,
19)0; Reis, 1989; Stevens, 1988; Vukelich et Kliman, 1985) onr montré ce lien entre
variables antécédentes telles que 1'éducation des parents, leur occupation professionnel-
le, leur revenu, leur áge et sexe et leurs atrentes. Ainsi si les groupes culturels different
selon un ou plusieurs des paramètres cités, les variations observées dans les attentes
parentales leurs seront attribuées.
Alors que les trois modèles présentés jusqu'ici tentent de rendre compte des diffé-
rences entre groupes dans les attentes parentales (i.e. 1'áge d'acquisition et de maitrise
d'habilerés) le "modèle des besoins parentaux" aborde la question des différences entre
groupes liées aux valeurs associées aux habiletés. Le degré de valorisation est considéré
comme une conséquence des différences dans les besoins des parents satisfaits par 1'en-
fant. Nous ne reviendrons pas sur 1'impact de 1'environnement sur les idées concernant
1'éducation des enfants et les valeurs parentales (Barry, Child, et Bacon, t959; LeVine,
1974, 1988; Ogbu, 1981; Rosenthal et Bornholt, 1988; Super, 1976). La structure
sociale et économiyue peur influencer les besoins de base des parents. Les enfants peu-
vent satisfaire des besoins économiques (force de travail bon marché ou, plus tard à
1'áge adulte, prise en charge des parents ágés), mais aussi des besoins affectifs (1'en-
fant comme compagnon) ou encore le besoin de distraction (1'enfant comme compagnon
de jeux). Les données empiriques à 1'appui de ce modèle proviennent d'une part d'une
étude comparée (Cross-National Value of Children Study), réalisée dans neuf pays (Hoff-
man, 1987, 1988; Kagit~ibasi, 1982, 19)0), d'autre part de celle d'Eldering et Vedder
(19)2) concernant quatre groupes culturels vivant aux Pays-Bas auxquels s'ajoutait un
groupe de parents hollandais. Lorsque les enfants sont désirés afin de satisfaire un besoin
économique (sécuricé pour la vieillesse, et aide matérielle) les parents veulent des enfants
obéissants et dépendants. Des enfants dépendants seraient, à 1'áge adulte, moins concer-
nés par leur propre bien-être et donc plus sensibles à celui de leurs parencs, ce qui en rerour
augmente la probabilité pour que les enfants prennent en charge leurs parents ágés.
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De nombreux travaux font ressortir le róle important que joue 1'occidentalisation
comme dérerminant dans les différences culturelles observées en ce yui concerne les
attentes parentales relatives au développement de 1'enfant (Hoffman, 1987; Kagit~ibasi,
1990). C'est ce critère qui a prévalu au choix des trois cultures dans 1'étude présentée
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ici, chacune correspondant à un degré différent d'occidentalisation. Les mères néerlan-
daises et zambiennes représentent chacune respectivement un haut et un faible degré
d'occidentalisation. Les mères d'origine turque et vivant aux Pays-Bas (dénommées dans
le texte par 1'expression "turques-néerlandaises") ayant une position intermédiaire.
Le but de ce travail est double. En premier lieu cette étude examine les opinions
des mères concernant 1'acquisition d'habiletés, par des enfants de la naissance à 12 ans
dans six domaines différents: physique, perceptuel, cognitif, intra-individuel (maitrise
de soi), inter-individuel (comportements relationnels) et social. Plus précisément, cette
étude pose les questions suivantes: 1) quelles sont les attentes des mères néerlandaises,
turques-néerlandaises et zambiennes? 2) quel est le niveau de désirabilité de dévelop-
pement de telle ou telle habileté? 3) les mères envisagent-elles une trajectoire dévelop-
pementale différente pour les filles et les gar~ons?
A partir des résultats publiés dans la littérature, on s'attend à trouver des diffé-
rences culturelles dans les áges donnés pour I'acquisition de différentes habiletés, et
dans le degré de désirabilité d'acquisition de ces habiletés. Les mères zambiennes valo-
riseront moins 1'indépendance et plus la serviabilité et 1'obéissance que les mères des
deux autres groupes. Enfin, concernant le dernier point, les recherches existantes
n'ayant pas mis en évidence de différences liées au sexe de 1'enfant (Goodnow,
Cashmore, Cotton, et Knight, 1)84), nous faisons 1'hypothèse ici qu'il en sera de même
dans les trois groupes culturels étudiés.
Dans un deuxième remps nous testerons, à partir des résultats obtenus dans la pre-
mière partie, la validité des quatre modèles exposés.
Srrjets
Soixante huit mères hollandaises, 50 curques-néerlandaises et 69 zambiennes ont
été interrogées. Dans la majeure partie des cas les premiers contacts ont été pris par 1'in-
termédiaire des écoles, en procédant à un échantillonnage "boule de neige". Une partie
du groupe de mères turques-néerlandaises était impliquée dans un programme d'in-
tervention cognitive (Eldering et Vedder, 1992). Les mères hollandaises vivaienr dans
quatre villages différents, les mères turques-néerlandaises dans deux villes d'importan-
ce moyenne. Parmi 1'ensemble des mères turques-néerlandaises, 18~ vivaient aux Pays-
Bas depuis moins de cinq ans, 25l depuis cinq à dix ans. Les 57r7c- restants s'étaient in-
stallées aux Pays-Bas depuis plus de onze ans. Au moment de 1'interview, touces les mères
zambiennes vivaient à Lusaka, la capitale de la Zambie. Cependant seules quatre parmi
1'ensemble étaient originaires de Lusaka, la plupart d'entre elles venaient de province.
La moyenne d'áge des mères néerlandaises était de i5,5 ans. Les mères turques-
néerlandaises avaient en moyenne 28,7 ans et les mères zambiennes 35 ans. La plupart
des mères interrogées étaienr mariées, soit )3~~ de 1'ensemble. Le nombre moyen d'en-
fants était de 2,3 pour les mères hollandaises, 1'écart étant de 1 à 4 par famille, de 2,2
pour les turques-néerlandaises avec un écart de 1 à 5, et de 4,5 pour les mères zam-
biennes, soit de 1 à 10 enfants par femme.
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Le niveau d'éducation des mères varie sensiblement selon les groupes. Alors que
toutes les mères hollandaises avaienr faít des études primaires, 92~ avaient terminé des
études secondaires, et 601 des études supérieures, 70~1 des mères zambiennes avaient
terminé le cursus primaire, 24~1 le secondaire et 21~ avait faic des études universi-
taires. Deux femmes rurques-néerlandaises n'étaient jamais allées à 1'école, mais 929ó
d'entre elles avait terminé le cursus primaire, 44~1c le secondaire et 16~1 avait continué
au delà. Un nombre non négligeable d'entre elles avair fait leurs études aux Pays-Bas.
Dernière caractéristique prise en compte, la vie professionnelle de ces femmes. Plus
de la moitié des femmes hollandaises ne travaillaient pas (56~1), 11 Io sont enseignantes,
et 3 ~~ ont des professions diverses (caissière, bibliothécaire, sage femme et couturière).
Les pourcentages correspondants dans le groupe de femmes turques-néerlandaises sont
respectivement de 70~ , 2r1 et 28~1. Les femmes qui travaillent à 1'extérieur sont essen-
tiellement femmes de ménage et couturières. Quant aux femmes zambiennes, 63~1- s'oc-
cupent de la vie domestique familiale, 10~1o sont enseignantes et 271- exercent des acti-
vités variées telles que caissières, femmes de ménage, infrmières, vendeuses de marché
ou guérisseuses traditionnelles.
Construction des questíonnaires
Les items choisis ont été adaptés des échelles de développement de Gesell et Ilg
(1946). Les habiletés retenues recouvrent un large éventail de comportements de 1'en-
fant, et semblenr tout à fait appropriées aux enfants néerlandais et tures-hollandais. Leur
adéquation aux enfants zambiens a été discutée avec des enseignants locaux. A 1'origine
1'ensemble de 1'interview comprenait 87 items, 10 furent supprimés après discussion.
Ils étaient inappropriés, vagues ou trop difficiles ou trop proches d'autres items.
Les items relevaient de six domaines différents, mais pour les besoins de I'interview
l'ordre de présentation a été déterminé au hasard. On considérera que chaque item fait
référence à une habileté (.rkill) bien que certains d'entre eux désignent plutót un com-
portement (par exemple, 'effrayé lorsque la mère s'en va' ou `jaloux des jouets des
autres'). Pour la passation, chaque item était inscrit en haut d'une page accompagnée
de trois questions. La première faisair référence à l'áge d'acquisition: 'A quel áge pen-
sez-vous que 1'enfant doit être capable de faire ceci pour la première fois~' Une grille de
réponses possibles donnait les choix suivants: de 0 à 1 ans, de 2 à 3 ans, ..., de S à 9 ans,
et enfin plus de 9 ans. La seconde question concernait les différences entre les gar~ons
et les filles. `Est-ce que cette habileté se développe plus chez les gar~ons ou chez les
filles, ou bien n'y a-t-il pas de différences~' Trois réponses alternatives étaient possibles:
'plus développée chez les gar4ons'; `plus développée chez les filles' et `il n'y a pas de dif-
férence'. La dernière question mesurait le degré de "désirabilité" de 1'habileté. Cinq
degrés de désirabilité allant de -2 (pas désírable du tout) à t2 (très désirable) en passant
par une opinion neutre (valeur 0). Le questionnaire ainsi con~u tente d'éviter autant que
possible les questions ambiguës que ce soit au niveau du vocabulaire employé ou à celui
du contenu (Holden et Edwards, 1989).
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Passation drr qrrestionnaire
Le questionnaire a éré rempli au cours d'une interview structurée. En Zambie, les
questions ont été traduites en anglais, langue officielle qui est par ailleurs celle utilisée
le plus fréquemment par la presse écrite. Pour le groupe de femmes turques-néerlan-
daises les questions onr éré traduites en turc car leur connaissance de leur langue mater-
nelle reste bien supérieure à celle du néerlandais. En outre, afin de s'assurer de la yua-
lité de la traduction, une double traduction a été effectuée (après une première traduc-
tion du néerlandais en anglais et en n~rc, les questionnaires ont été traduits à nouveau
en néerlandais).
Les interviews ont été faites à la maison pour 1'ensemble des femmes turques-néer-
landaises et la moitié des femmes néerlandaises, 1'autre moitié étant interviewée dans le
cadre de 1'école primaire de leur enfant. A Lusaka en Zambie, les interviews se sont tous
déroulées dans une école primaire de la ville. Dans les cas d'interviews en anglais à Lusaka,
Willemsen a éré secondée par une institutrice zambienne parlanr Nyanga et Tonga, deux
des langues locales les plus parlées, afin d'expliciter les questions en cas de difficulté. Les
interviews des mères rurques-néerlandaises ont éré réalisées par un interprète.
Résrrltats
Remarques générales
Une première analyse montre que le lieu de naissanre, les provinces d'origine pour
les mères zambiennes, 1'origine rurale ou urbaine pour les femmes turques-néerlandaises
et la zone de résidence pour les femmes néerlandaises n'avaienr aucun effet sur les
réponses atix questionnaires et en parriculier sur les attentes maternelles en terme d'áge
d'acquisition, de différences gar4onslfilles ou de degré de désirabilité. Ces critères ne
sont donc pas pris en compte dans I'analyse des résultats.
Réponses aux questions
Le tableau 1 présente les áges moyens d'acquisition des différentes habiletés tels
que les donnent les mères de chaque groupe culturel. Pour 52 questions (parmi les 77
posées) on constate des différences importances selon le groupe culturel dans les áges
d'acquisition donnés par les mères. C'esr dans le domaine des compétences sociales que
les résultats sont le plus net puisqu'il existe des différences significatives pour toutes les
questions, les mères zambiennes donnant les áges d'acquisition les plus élevés. Ces der-
nières donnent généralement des áges d'acquisition plus élevés comparativement aux
mères des deux autres origines culturelles, sauf dans le domaine des habiletés physiques,
en particulier pour 1'acquisition de la propreté, la capacité de se laver ou de manger sans
aide, ou encore de colorier sans dépasser, items pour lesquelles elles donnent les áges les
plus précoces.
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Apprentissage de la propreté 2.43 2.38 l.)2 7.63 ~`~~`
Colorie à I'intérieur d~un contour 4.47 4.70 3.78 9.82 t`~`s`
Se buigne sans aide 6.41 7.70 5.51 17.88 ~`~`~
Marche sans aide L06 1.17 1.72 1 1.79 ~~~`
Porte de 1'eau 3.62 3.78 4.42 4.33 ~~-
Suce son pouce .77 .82 .)L 1.47
Nage 5.67 5.19 7.37 23.77 ~~~
Mange sans aide 2.64 3.16 1.)0 21.10 ~`~`~
Monte et descend les escaliers 3.33 2.80 3.24 2.72
Lance et attrape une balle 4.53 4.27 4.76 99
Tient debout sans aide 83 .99 1.08 3.47 ~`
Cognitif
Dir "Maman" .78 .96 1.21 10.03 ~~~
Décide seul, fait des choix 2.79 4.07 4.70 21. 41 ~~`~
Fait des divisions I multiplications 7.79 7.86 7.51 1.02
Saít dire l'heure 7.03 7.14 7.92 6.54 ~`~
Ecrit son nom 4.53 5.18 5.98 23.86 ~`~~`
Connait son nom 2.28 2.50 3.26 21.18 ~~`~`
Sair quelle est la saison 6.18 6.58 8.21 22.16 ~`~~`
Distingue les homme des femmes 2.90 3.41 i.98 8.67 ~~~`
Fait des additions ~ soustractions 6.09 6.78 7.22 13.71 ~~~`
Utilise un parler bébé 1.C8 1.)5 1.87 1.32
Ecrit ses premiers mots 5.58 5.22 6.36 9.92 ~~`~`
Lit 6.29 6.42 6.88 4.79 ~~
N'utilise plus le langage bébé 4.23 4.78 5.02 3.63 ~`
Compte jusqu'à l0 4.09 3.86 4.64 6.55 ~`~
Verbalise des idées, des problèmes 4.7) S.OZ 8.18 67.43 ~`~`~`
Ecrit ses premières phrases 6.55 6.38 8.21 47.51 t`~`~`
Dessine et écrit des lettres 4.29 4.98 6.88 56.8) ~`~`~`
Pose de nombreuses questions 3.04 3.58 4.33 14.86 ~~~
Connait les jours de la semaine 5.85 6.10 6.96 9.48 ~`~`t`
Perceptivo-moteur
Sait tricorer 7,92 8,42 6.79 14.98 ~~`~
Tourne les pages d'un livre 1.81 2.81 3.36 28.38 ~~~
Danse avec de la musique 2.01 1.63 Z.82 12.14 ~~~`
Reconnait des lettres 4.68 5.06 5.37 4.1) ~
S'habiile sans aide 4.50 5.10 4.73 3.08 ~`
Pleure parce qu'il a faim .88 1.10 1.25 2.80
Dessine des figures 5.82 5.86 6.67 6.15 ~`~`
Utilise un marteau 3.39 5.31 5.72 22.18 ~~`~`
Utilise des ciseaux 4.18 4.86 5.78 12.57 ~~~`
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Inter-individuel (relationne4
Est bon-perdant au jeu
Jaloux des jouets des autres
Demande des choses aux parents
Critique les autres
A de bonnes manières envers les adultes
A peur des étrangers
Aime obéir
Sourit à la vue de quelqu'un
N'obéir pas aux ordres
Ne partage pas ou n'attend pas son tour
Appelle les gens par leur nom
7.47 7.62 7.94 .75
3.70 3.34 3.46 .75
5.98 5.41 4.82 4.41
5.82 6.22 7.t4 6.96
4.86 7.03 7.74 34. i 1
1.75 2.55 4.12 28.71
4.16 5.30 6.47 20.09
.90 1.17 1.94 9.77
2.82 3.49 6.80 54.57
2.86 2.85 4.42 16.68
2.58 2.74 i.30 6.63
Maitrise de soi (maitrise de soi)
Pleure lorsque la mère part 1.43 2.90 3.52 25.14 ~`~~
Dit "je veux" 2.38 2.77 3.26 10.12 ~`~s`
Veut des responsabilités 4.71 5.26 6.77 13.21 ~~`~`
Est traité comme un adulte 7.85 7.50 8.88 5.81 ~`~`
Soucieux s'il est en retard à 1'école 6.28 6.54 7.34 6.17 ~`~
Pleure beaucoup .96 1.17 1.17 1.11
Effrayé par la pluie, lbrage, 1'obscurité i.27 i.36 i.42 .15
Se critique soi-même 6.14 5.90 6.88 3.33 ~`
Est capable de se consoler seul 4.91 2.82 4.12 14.91 ~`~~`
Veur-être indépendant 4.08 6.46 8.36 56.91 ~~~`
A peur que sa mère puisse mourir 6.68 6.54 8.81 24.64 ~`~~
A peur des sorcières, esprits, etc. 3.96 4.26 7.82 89.49 ~`~`~`
A peur d'échouer à l'école 6.47 7.90 8.36 20.46 ~`~`~
N'a plus peur de la pluie, de 1'orage, etc. 8.80 8.94 8.88 .07 ~`~~`
Social
Aide au sein de la famille S.Oi 5.58 7.66 30.93 ~~`~`
Esr coopératif dans les jeux 4.06 3.76 8.12 149.06 ~~~
Dit "bonjour" et "au revoir" 2.25 2.94 4.33 27.67 ~`~`~
A des sentiments forts pour sa famille 3.97 4.72 7.7i 45.99 ~~~`
Conna?t les noms des oncles et tantes 3.29 3.94 6.04 46.00 ~~~`
N'est pas coopératif dans les jeux 2.15 1.64 5.46 89.79 ~`~~
A un ami privilégié 5.06 5.22 8.i6 42.17 ~`~~`
Aime rendre visite à sa Famille 3.15 3.99 8.41 151.81 ~~`~`
Enseigne aux plus jeunes 3.1 L 3.46 5.98 48.56 ~~`~
Joue avec ses frères et soeurs 4.26 5.10 7.71 62.61 ~~~`
Dir "s'il te plair" er "merci" 3.68 4.38 5.52 19.10 ~~~
Utilise le mot "ami" 4.53 4.i4 6.24 30.39 ~~`~
Aime la compétition 5.41 6.54 8.01 30.19 ~~~`
Probablité de signification du Chi2: t ~.10; ~~.05; ~~~A1; ~`~~~.001
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II est intéressant de s'attarder sur les items qui offrent soit la plus grande, soit la
plus petite différence selon les cultures. Les items montrant les plus grandes différences
appartiennent aux domaines cognirif, intra- et inter-individuels ainsi que social. Les
tests statistiques (Student Newman-Keuls) montrent que les mères zambiennes rappor-
tent invariablement dans ces domaines, les áges les plus élevés; cependant lorsque des
différences existent entre les mères néerlandaises et turques-néerlandaises, ce sont les
mères néerlandaises qui donnent les áges les plus précoces. Les items offrant le moins de
différences selon les cultures relèvent de tous les domaines à 1'exception des domaines
perceptif et social.
En moyenne les différences gar4ons-filles selon les cultures ne concernenr que 18
items, et s'avèrent donc nettement moins importantes que les différences culturelles
concernant les áges d'acquisition. Si 1'on considère les 10 items montrant les plus
grandes différences culturelles en terme d'áge, les mères zambiennes donnent le plus
souvent un áge plus précoce pour les gar~ons, les mères turques-néerlandaises ne s'at-
tendent pas à une quelconque différence, et les mères néerlandaises donnent un áge plus
précoce pour les filles.
La "désirabilité" moyenne pour chaque item dans les trois groupes de femmes
interrogées a été calculée. Le nombre de différences significatives à p-.001 est très
important puisqu'il concerne 60 des 77 items, témoignant ici de variations non négli-
geables selon les cultures.
Les dix items offrant le plus de différences culturelles en terme de désirabilité, ainsi
que les dix offrant le moins de différences sont donnés par le tableau 2. Tous les
domaines sont concernés sauf le domaine des habiletés physiques et celui des habiletés
intra-individuelles (maitrise de soi). Ce sont les mères néerlandaises qui montrent le
niveau le moins élevé de désirabilité pour cet ensemble d'items, les mères turques-néer-
landaises et zambiennes ne se différenciant pas nettement. II est intéressant de noter que
les items qui offrent le plus de différences concernent des activités fonctionnelles dans
une perspective socio-économique (e.i. savoir tricoter, aider dans le famille, apprendre
aux plus jeunes, aimer obéir). Les dix items offrant le moins de différences concernent
les habiletés physiques, cognitives, intra- et inter-individuelles.
Tableau 2. Items offrant les plus grandes (e[ les plus faibles) différences culturelles dans la désira-
bilité (valeurs de F correspondantes, ec anal}-se post hoc)
Icem F Post Hoc
Différences les plus grandes
Sait tricorer 68.07 PB~Tu~Za
Aide au sein de la famille 5i.15 PB~Tu-Za
Enseigne aux plus jeunes 48.14 PB~Tu-Za
Compce jusyu'à l0 38.50 PB~Tu-Za
Aime obéir 35.65 PB~Tu-Za
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Dessine et écrit des lettres 29.69 PB~Tu-Za
Danse avec de la musiyue 28.43 PB~Tu~Za
Aime la compétition 28.41 PB~Tu~Za
Connait les noms des oncles et tantes 28.38 PB~Tu~Za
Ecrit son nom 28.30 PB~Tu-Za
Différences les plus faibles
Critiyue les autres 16
Monte et descend les escalier 18
Pleure lorsque la mère part .30
Utilise un langage "bébé" 45
Pose de nombreuses questions 1.45
Demande des choses aux parents 2.93
Se critique soi-même 2.99
Est bon-perdant au jeu 3.24
Veut-être indépendant 4.33
Est traité commr un udulte 5.02
On trouve souvent dans la littérature un présupposé implicite qui suggère que les
habiletés les plus valorisées, seraienr aussi celles que 1'on souhaite développer le plus
précocement. En fait très peu d'études ont testé cette hypothèse, yui n'a jusqu'ici pas
été confirmée (Rosenthal et Gould, 1989). Dans la présente étude, il n'existe aucune
corrélation entre désirabilité et áge d'acquisition, et ceci quelle que soit la culture. Une
analyse de toutes les cultures confondues ne donne pas non plus de corrélation signifi-
cative.
En poussant un peu plus loin 1'analyse, on pourrait penser qu'il existe une relation
entre les différences culturelles dans la variabilité des áges attendus d'acquisition et les
différences culturelles de désirabilité. Cette corrélation est de .27 (p ~.05).
En général ce sont les réponses des mères zambiennes en terme d'áge attendu pour
la maitrise de telle ou telle habileté qui offraient le plus de variabilité, alors que les
mères néerlandaises donnaient des áges beaucoup plus rapprochés. Cela pourrait être du
à 1'origine plus hétérogène des mères zambiennes, qui viennent de différents sous-
groupes culturels. Ces résultats restent cependant cohérents avec ceux des différents
auteurs qui remarquent que la variabilité augmente lorsque 1'áge attendu augmente
(Holloway, Gorman, et Fuller, 1988; Keller, Miranda, et Gauda, 1984; Ninio, 1988).
Une analyse par domaine
La figure 1 donne les moyennes des áges attendus pour 1'acquisition des différentes
habiletés par domaine selon le groupe culturel. Quel que soit le domaine, à 1'exception
des habiletés physiyues, il existe des différences significatives entre les groupes cultu-
rels. Les mères zambiennes donnent systématiyuement des áges plus tardifs, les mères
néerlandaises les áges plus précoces.
II est intéressant de constater que, lorsyue les attentes des mères different selon que
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I'enfant est une fille ou un gar4on, 1'áge donné est plus précoce pour les filles, tout par-
ticulièrement dans les domaines physiyue, perceptif, cognicif et intra-individuel. Ce
sont par ailleurs les mères néerlandaises qui s'attendenr à la plus grande différence enrre
gar~ons et filles. Les mères turyues-néerlandaises et les mères zambiennes ne se diffé-
renciant yue pour des habiletés perceptives, les mères turques-néerlandaises donnent
des áges plus précoces, 1'inverse étanr vrai pour les habiletés intra-individuelles (mai-
trise de soi).
Quant à la désirabilité moyenne pour chaque groupe culturel, des différences
importantes émergent dans yuatre domaines: physiyue, perceptif, cognitif et social. Les
trois cultures diffèrent significativement, les mères néerlandaises montrant le niveau de
désirabiliré le plus faible, les mères ruryues-néerlandaises le plus élevé, sauf pour des
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Figure l. P~ges moyens pour les six domaines dans les trois groupes.
A la yuestion, un haut degré de désirabilité correspond-il à un áge attendu plus
précoce, la réponse est positive pour yuatre comparaisons parmi les 18 possibles (trois
groupes culturels ~` six domaines). II existe une corrélation significative entre désirabi-
lité et précocité d'acquisition dans les domaines inter et intra-individuels pour les mères
turyues-néerlandaises et les mères néerlandaises, aucune corrélation n'étant positive
pour les mères zambiennes.
Les modèles explicatifs
A partir des résultats discutés dans les paragraphes précédants, cette section reste-
ra successivement la validité de chacun des modèles présentés au début du chapitre.
Dans chayue cas une analyse de variance a été réalisée afin de déterminer la proportion
de la variance attribuable à la variable culturelle.
Le modèle des "domaines comportementaux" prédit un accroissement des diffé-
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rences culrurelles allant du domaine physique au domaine social. Selon ce modèle il
devrair y avoir une augmentation continue de la part de variance expliquée par la cul-
ture selon le domaine, et ceci dans 1'ordre listé sur 1'axe horizontal. Cependant bien que
les différences culturelles tendent à augmenter selon 1'ordre préconisé, ceci n'est pas vrai
pour les domaines cognirifs, intra- et inter-individuels.
Le modèle des "différences cumulées", préconise un accroissemenr des différences
avec 1'áge attendu d'acquisition. La figure ~ montre en fait une relation curvilinéaire
entre 1'áge d'acquisirion des différents items considérés et la proporrion de la variance
expliquée par la culture (pour plus de détails voir Willemsen et Van de Vijver, 1997).
Les résultats ne confirment donc pas le modèle des "différences cumulées". L'hypothèse
originale de Jensen étant basée sur des items cognitifs exclusivement, nous avons réali-
sé une analyse à partir de ces irems uniquement. Mais là encore aucune relation entre
áge et différence culturelle n'a été mise en évidence, ce qui encore une fois ne permet
pas de valider le modèle des "différences cumulées".
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Figure 2. tlge, différences gar4ons-filles et désirabilité dans chayue groupe culturel avant
et après correction des variables contextuelles
Le "modèles des variables contextuelles" serait validé si les différences culturelles
s'effa~aient, après correction statistique pour des variables contextuelles ou "antécé-
dentes". Les variables antécédents urilisées dans cette recherche recouvrent le statur pro-
fessionnel de la mère (travaille à l'extérieur ou non), son niveau d'éducation, le nombre
er 1'áge des enfants. Ces variables ont éré utilisées comme variables indépendantes dans
des régressions multiples, 1'áge attendu pour 1'acquisition des différentes habilerés
constituanr la variable dépendante. Les résultats montrent que dans tous les domaines,
sauf celui des habiletés physiques, ces variables sont de bons prédicteurs de 1'áge d'ac-
quisition artendu. Le niveau d'éducation et le nombre d'enfants apparaissent comme le
Attentes des Mères Néerlandaises, Turques-Néerlandaises et Zambiennes 53
meilleur prédicreuc Cette analyse a donc permis de calculer des données résiduelles (i.e.
la différence entre les áges observés er les áges prédits, en utilisant les prédicteurs), gom-
mant pour ainsi dire 1'effet des variables "antécédencs". La figure 2a donne les résultats
"corrigés", montrant ainsi une diminution importante des différences culturelles dès
lors que 1'on supprime 1'effet des variables liées à 1'éducation, au travail professionnel et
au nombre d'enfants. Ces variables, en effer, font apparaitre des différences importantes
entre les trois groupes culturels, alors même qu'elles ne sont pas, à proprement parler,
des variables culturelles. Après correction, la culture conserve cependant un effet signi-
ficatif dans tous les domaines sauf celui des habiletés. La prise en compte des variables
antécédentes réduit de 67r7o en moyenne la proportion de variance expliquée. Si 1'on
effecrue une analyse analogue pour les variations gar~on-fille et le degré de désirabilité,
on observe également une diminution des différences culturelles ( figures 2 6 et c).
Si 1'on se place maintenant dans la perspective du "modèle des besoins parentaux".
la valeur que les parents attribuent au développement des habiletés devrait offrir des
différences culturelles qui dépendent des besoins parentaux. Deux experts ont été char-
gés d'évaluer 1'importance de chacun des 77 items en termes de besoins socio-écono-
miques et psychologiques des parents ( Hoffman, 1987; Kagit~ibasi, 1)90). II faut noter
que 1'accord inter-expert était nettement meilleur pour les besoins économiques que
pour les besoins psychologiques. La relation entre les différences culturelles de la valeur
accordée par les parents aux différentes habiletés et I'importance de leurs besoins en
termes socio-économiques et affectifs a été testée à partir du calcul des corrélations entre
ces deux types de besoins et les valeurs de F calculées sur le niveau de désirabilité. Cette
corrélation est significative dans le cas des besoins économiques (r -.26, p ~.05), mais













Figure 3. Relation entre áge moyen et proportion de variance expliquée par la culture.
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Discussion
L'analyse en terme d'áge d'acquisition attendu relatif aux différentes habíletés
considérées individuellement, fait apparaitre que dans 67~ des cas, il existe des diffé-
rences culturelles marquées. En outre, tous les items du domaine social offrent des dif-
férences significatives pour les trois groupes culturels concernés. Dans la plupart des cas
ce sont les mères zambiennes qui donnent les áges d'acquisitíon les plus tardifs, les
mères néerlandaises les plus précoces. Ces résultats corroborent ceux publiés dans la lit-
térature concernant les enfants d'áge scolaire ( Goodnow et al., 1984; Rosenthal et
Bornholt, 1988; Rosenthal et Gold, 1989).
Dans cette étude, les mères zambiennes donnent des áges significativement plus
précoces pour plusieurs items concernant les habiletés dites physiques. Ici encore ces
résultats confirment ceux de la littérature mettant en évidence un áge attendu plus pré-
coce chez les femmes africaines pour les acquisitions motrices ( Bril, Zack, et Hombessa-
Nkounkou, 1989; Super, 1976). Cependant ceci n'est pas vrai pour l'ensemble des items
dans le groupe des mères zambiennes (voir par exemple marcher sans aide). Dans une
revue de question sur le développement moteur et les attitudes culturelles, Bril (1986)
suggère que "des différences importantes dans 1'environnement conduisent à des pra-
tiques notablement différentes qui auront un effet non-négligeable sur les performances
motrices" (p. 297). Kilbride er Kilbride (1975) ont observé un développement précoce
du sourire et de la maftrise de la position assise chez les enfants baganda, concluant ainsi
à 1'importance des expériences précoces médiatisées par la culture.
On peut avancer ici que les attentes d'un développement préccxe des femmes zam-
biennes reflète un haut niveau de désirabilité associé à ces habiletés, ce dont témoignent cer-
tains de nos résultats. Nous avons vu que ce domaine est le seul pour lequel le degré de dési-
rabilité des mères zambiennes est plus élevé que celui des deux autres groupes. II ne faudrait
cependant pas exagérer et généraliser ces résultats. Dans notre étude, si pour certains items
du domaine physique les femmes zambiennes donnent un áge nettement plus précoce, ce
domaine dans son ensemble ne donne pas lieu à des différences culrurelles. En fair différenres
études culturelles ne considèrent qu'un petit nombre de comportements. Dans les études
considérant un plus grand nombre d'items en général, seuls quelques items different.
Il est important de noter cependant, que durant les interviews il était impossible
d'échapper à 1'impression que plusieurs cas de différences culturelles dans les áges don-
nés par les mères étaient dus à des normes appliquées de manière plus scricte par les
femmes zambiennes que par les mères néerlandaises et turques-néerlandaises. Un item
tel que ' aider dans le cercle familial', pouvait être beaucoup plus ambigu que nous ne
1'avions pensé tout d'abord. Doit-on L'interpréter comme "1'enfant est capable de rap-
porter un plat de la cuisine" ou bien que " 1'enfant est capable de cuísiner le plat lui-
même"' Dans des recherches ultérieures il pourrait être nécessaire de laisser les femmes
définir et décrire elles-mêmes ce qu'elles entendent par la ma?trise d'une habileté. Un
autre problème que pose le questionnement en terme d'áge d'acquisition peut être lié
aux problèmes de santé de tel ou tel enfant. Par exemple, 1'áge d'acquisition de la
Attenres des Mères Néerlandaises, Turques-Néerlandaises et Zambiennes 55
marche dépend de sa santé. Ainsi certaines différences culturelles en terme d'áge atten-
du pourraient être sérieusement affectées par les problèmes de santé.
En ce qui concerne le degré de désirabilité, 78~I des items offrent des différences
culturelles importantes. Les dix items pour lesyuels les différences culturelles sont les
plus grandes ont tendance à être, pour les mères néerlandaises, nettement moins valori-
sés que pour les mères des deux autres groupes culturels. Par ailleurs aucun domaine
n'est plus particulièrement représenté si 1'on considère ces dix items, ou à I'opposé les
dix items pour lesyuels les différences culturelles sont les plus faibles.
Si 1'on considère à présent les différents domaines pris dans leur ensemble, les mères
zambiennes donnent les áges les plus élevés, les mères néerlandaises les plus précoces
(sauf dans le domaine physique). En ce qui concerne les différences gar~on-fille, ce sont
les mères néerlandaises qui font état le plus souvent d'un développement plus précoce
pour les filles, puis viennent les mères turques-néerlandaises, puis les mères zambiennes
pour quatre des six domaines pris en considération, physiyue, cognitif, perceptif et intra-
individuel. Les mères néerlandaises ont pu dans leurs réponses réagir implicitement aux
générations précédentes pour qui le développement des gar~ons était plus précoce que
celui des filles. Les mères turyues-néerlandaíses ont de fait souvent refusé d'indiyuer
toute différence entre les tilles et les gar~ons, attitude qui pourrait être à 1'origine de la
faible variabilité observée dans ce groupe. Quant aux mères zambiennes, bien que ne rap-
portant que peu souvent de différences entre les filles et les gar~ons, il n'érait pas rare que
durant les interviews elles qualifient les filles de plus agréables et obéissantes que les gar-
~ons qui apparaissent comme moins sages, plus obstinés et plus intelligents.
Le degré de désirabilité de maitrise des habiletés, fait aussi apparaitre des différences
culturelles selon les domaines. Dans le domaine cognitif, les mères néerlandaises font
apparaitre le degré le plus bas de désirabilité, les mères turques-néerlandaises le plus
haut. Les habiletés liées aux domaines physique, perceptif et social apparaissenr aux yeux
des mères néerlandaises comme moins valorisées yue pour les mères des deux autres cul-
tures. En général les mères néerlandaises valorisent moins le développement d'habiletés
en général que les femmes des autres groupes. Ceci pourrait s'expliquer par une attitu-
de, souvent exprimée par les mères au cours des interviews, que les parents ne doivent
pas orienter le développement de 1'enfant, de même qu'ils ne doivent pas faire pression
sur 1'enfant pour qu'il maitrise les habiletés considérées comme utíles. L'idée que "1'on
doit laisser 1'enfant être un enfant" est très populaire parmi les mères néerlandaises.
Ainsi, une analyse par domaine permet de montrer un pattern de réponses clair et
consistant, souvent absent d'une analyse par item. Cette logique sous-jacente ne peut
être mise en évidence que gráce à 1'agrégation de différents items d'un même domaine.
D'après nous, il est donc fondamental de centrer 1'analyse non pas sur des items pris iso-
lément mais sur des agrégats d'items constituanr un domaine com-portemental ou sur
différents items impliquant une habileté particulière.
Un des buts essentiels de ce travail consistait à tester les différents modèles pré-
sentés. Aucun des quatre modèles n'a été totalement corroboré par les résultats obtenus,
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mais rous le sont partiellement. Comme le postule le modèle " domaines comportemen-
taux", les différences culturelles sont plus faibles pour le domaine physique, et plus
importantes dans le domaine social. Cependant dans les domaines intra-, inter-indivi-
duels, et cognitif plus particulièrement, d'importantes variations ont été mises en évi-
dence. Ceci pourrait en particulier être du au fait que ces items ( dessiner et écrire ses
premières lettres, écrire ses premières phrases) concernent des habiletés acyuises dans le
contexte scolaire (maternelle et primaire). En Zambie il n'est pas rare que les enfants ne
soient pas scolarisés en maternelle, et l'école primaire ne commence qu'à sept ans, alors
qu'aux Pays-Bas, la plupart des enfants commencent à fréquenter la maternelle vers
quatre ans, et 1'école primaire à six ans. Une analyse de variance cependant montre qu'il
n'y a pas de différence entre les habiletés liées à 1'école et celles qui ne le sont pas, bien
que les mères zambiennes mentionnent souvent le fait que 1'áge d'acquisition d'une
habileté dépend de la fréquentation par 1'enfant de 1'école maternelle.
Outre cela, 1'augmentation des différences culturelles telle que la postule le modè-
le "différences cumulatives", est confirmée pour les items concernant des acquisitions
antérieures à 1'áge de cinq ans. Si 1'on prend en compte 1'ensemble des áges concernés
(jusqu'à dix ans environ) il existe en fait une relation curvilinéaire (figure 3). C'est pour
les áges entre trois et sept ans que I'on observe le plus de différences culturelles, tout
spécialement pour les habiletés sociales.
Conformémenr aux prédictions du modèle "variables contextuelles", les variables anté-
cédents rendent compte d'une part importante des variations culturelles en ce qui concer-
ne les áges attendus d'acquisition, sans pour autant éliminer les différences intergroupe.
Finalement, en ce qui concerne le modèle "besoins parentaux" les différences cul-
turelles relatives à la désirabilité ont un lien avec les besoins économiques des parents,
mais pas avec des besoins d'ordre psychologique. Une analyse item par item montre que
quatre parmi les cinq habiletés ayant donné lieu aux plus grandes différences en terme
de désirabilité, c'est à dire savoir tricoter, aider au sein de la famille, avoir un róle édu-
catif à 1'égard des plus jeunes, aimer obéir, sont fonctionnels dès lors que leur utilité
économique est prise en compte. Ce résultat confirme ceux de Hoffman (1988) et de
Kagit~ibasi (1982, 1990) obtenus dans 1'étude comparée sur "la valeur de I'enfant dans
différents pays" (Cross-national Value of Children Study), stipulant que les parents qui
voient dans leurs enfants un moyen de satisfaire leurs besoins économiques préféraient
des enfants obéissants plutót qu'indépendants, yu'ils attendaient d'eux plus d'aide, en
particulier subvenir à leurs besoins à 1'époque de la vieillesse.
L'utilité économique est un meilleur prédicteur des différences culturelles en terme
de désirabilité, que 1'utilité psychologique. Ceci n'a sans doute rien de surprenant étant
donné les différences de leur influence en Zambie et aux Pays-Bas. Les besoins paren-
taux sont très probablement plus contraints et influencés par des facteurs économiques
quand la survie économique reste la préoccupation première. Dans un environnement
doté de conditions économiques meilleures, les parents, moins préoccupés par leur sur-
vie, seront plus à même d'élever leurs enfants comme ils le souhaitent (LeVine, 1974,
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1988). Cette hétérogénéité dans les buts recherchés, pourrait peut-être aussi expliquer
les corrélations inter-juges nettement moins élevées en ce qui concerne 1'évaluation des
besoins psychologiques en termes d'utilité, comparativement à 1'utilité économique. Il
est plus aisé de passer des besoins aux habiletés valorisées dans le cas de 1'utilité écono-
miyue que dans celui de 1'utilité psychologique.
Les quatre modèles présentés dont nous avons testé la validité doivent être vus
comme une première tentatíve d'explication de différenrs aspects des variations cultu-
relles dans les ethnothéories, en termes d'origine, d'antécédents ou de développement.
Ils ne constituenr pas des alternatives incompatibles entre elles, mais plutót un moyen
d'aborder des aspects différenrs des variations culturelles de ces ethnothéories.
Une des causes déterminantes des différences culturelles qui n'est pas abordée dans
cette étude concerne les sources d'information à partir desquelles les parents se forgent
une ethnothéorie du développement (Norimatsu, 1995). Au cours des interviews nous
avons eu le sentiment que pour les parents néerlandais, les livres, magazines, experts
médicaux, organisarions de soins pour la femme enceinre et 1'enfant, constituaient d'im-
portantes sources d'informarion, bien qu'il ne faille pas sous-estimer le róle des grands-
parents et des amis. Bien yue les mères turques-néerlandaises aient accès aux mêmes
sources d'informations, il n'est pas possible de dire si elles les utilisent ou non. En ce
qui concerne la Zambie, il existe là aussi des ouvrages tel que "Le premier enfant, un
guide pour les jeunes mères" par Shilalukey-Ngoma (1)91), et différents magazines sur
l'éducation des enfants. Ils sont cependant chers et seuls les parents issus de classes
sociales aisées les lisent. II existe en outre dans la plupart des quartiers de petites insti-
tutions dans lesquelles des avis peuvent être donnés aux mères qui le souhaiteraient.
Malgré cela, la source d'information la plus importante provient des grands parents qui
diront à la future mère comment s'occuper de son premier-né.
Dans cette étude on demandait aux mères de faire part de leurs attentes et idées
concernant le développement de 1'enfant. Cela ne dit rien sur des différences de com-
portement. Des observations du comportement pourraient révéler d'autres différences
ou similarités culturelles, et il se pourrait alors que la valeur prédictive des modèles soit
différente de celle évaluée ici.
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Context Effects in Logical Reasoning in the
Netherlands and Zambia
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The influence of various contextual factors on deductive reasoning in 'Lambia and the
Netherlands was examined. Two instruments were developed, the Logical Reasoning Task
(LRT) and the Story Logical Reasoning Task (Story-LRT); both use the same logical rules but,
unlike the LRT, items of the Story-LRT were embedded in a shorr story. The tasks were admin-
istered to 74 Dutch and 100 Zambian women. The use of counterfactual elements decreased
the proportion of logically correct answers for both tasks in both cultures, showing the effect of
belief bias. Items thar were empirically false for one country and true for the other were nor
harder than items that were empirically true for both countries. Embeddedness of items in a
prose passage facilitated logical teasoning, both in the Netherlands and Zambia. Cross-cultur-
al differences in proportions of logically correct answers were relatively small and mainly due
to the presence of negations in the reasoning schemes.
Research on logical reasoning has shown a profound influence of the content and con-
text of a problem on performance. Ic is paradoxical that the type of thinking that is
assumed to be based on conrext-free logical schemes shows such effects. The context-
dependence raises two questions: What are problem characteristics that modulate con-
text effects~ Second, the reasons of the context dependence are not clear. "Why is it that
responses to reasoning tasks are so largely affected by the content and context of the
problem, despite the apparent logical irrelevance of these variables~" (Evans, 1993, p.
564). These questions have been studied in two different traditions: the fornral and the
infornral traditi~m (Van de Vijver 8c Willemsen, 1993). Tasks examined in the formal tra-
dition are characterized by a closed problem space and a focus on the logical correctness
of a solution (Chapman 8t Chapman, 1959; Evans, 1989; Evans 8c Pollard, 1990; Evans,
Barston, 8c Pollard, 1983; Henle, 1962; Wason, 1966). The use of logically correct
deductions defines the implicit norm of good problem solving. In the early years,
research in this tradition did not refer to a specific cultural context and utilized abstract
stimuli. Later studies on the effect of real-world knowledge on reasoning showed that
performance on logical reasoning tasks is influenced by rask conrent; realism of logical
problems is oken found to facilitate performance (e.g., Girotto 8c Politzer, 1990; Hawkins,
Pea, Glick, 8c Scribner1984; Hilton, Jaspars, 8c Clarke, 1990; Revlin 8c Leirer, 1978).
Several explanations have been put forward to account for context specificity, par-
ticularly in the context of Wason's famous four card problem (e.g., Griggs 8c Cox, 198~;
Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, 8c Legrenzi, 1972; Wason 8c Johnson-Laird, 1972), such as the
familiarity I availability approach (Gigerenzer 8c Hug, 1992), the pragmatic reasoning
schemas model (Cheng 8c Holyoak, 1985, 1989; Markovits í3c Lesage, 1990), and the
social contract model (Cosmides, 1989).
Besides research that indicated that performance can be enhanced by realism of
content, many srudies in the formal tradition address belief bias. It refers to "a tenden-
cy of people to judge the validity of an argument on the basis of the prior believability
of its conclusion" (Evans ~ Over, 1996, p. 95). In the study of Evans er al. (198~) syl-
logistic reasoning problems were divided into four categories: the conclusion of the pre-
sented problem could be valid-believable, valid-unbelievable, invalid-believable, or
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invalid-unbelievable (valid versus invalid refers to logically correct versus logically
incorrect). The acceprance of the conclusions was strongly affected by logic More valid
than invalid conclusions were accepted. However, the effect of believabiliry was eyual-
ly strong: More believable than unbelievable conclusions were accepted. This belief bias
was most apparent for the invalid conclusions. This belief bias effect is found both in
rasks in which a given conclusion has to be accepred or rejected, and in rasks in which
individuals are asked to generate their own conclusions from given premises (Markovits
8c Nantel, 1)89; Oakhill Ltc Johnson-Laird, 1985; Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, ~ Garnham,
1)8)). In sum, subjects seem to base their conclusions on prior knowledge and beliefs
as well as on the premises presenred. Reasoning can both be farilirated and biased by
prior beliefs and knowledge (Wilkins, 1928, described in Evans, 1989).
In che irafr~r~rlal traditiora, tasks to be solved have an open problem space and the
focus is on the practical value of a solurion. Within this tradition, research focuses on
cognitive processes in real-life situarions (Rogoff 8c Chavajay, 19)5). An example from
cultural anrhropology can be found in the work of Gladwin (1964) among the Trukese
of the Pulawat atoll in the South-Pacific. He studied the work of the navigators of a sail-
ing canoe, who make voyages over hundreds of miles of open ocean, withour a compass,
sextant, or star rables. Hutchins (1980) examined lawsuits abour land assignment
among the Tobrianders. Gay and Cole (1967) and Cole, Gay, Glick, and Sharp (1971)
described ways of reasoning in naturally occurring situations among the Kpelle in
Liberia, namely a divorce law case and a game often played, the Malan game. Several
studies on tailoring and weaving have been carried out in which the relationship be-
tween these and other cognitive skills were addressed (Childs ác Greenfield, 1980;
Greenfield 8e Lave, 1982; Lave, 1988; Rogoff 8c Gauvain, 1984; Tanon, 1))4). Research
in Western countries often deals with mathematical activities in daily life such as in
consrruction work or shopping in a supermarket (Carraher, 1986; Ceci 8c Liker, 1)86;
Lave, 1)88; Lave, Murtaugh, 8c De La Rocha, 1984; Scribner, 1)86).
Resulrs of research in the informal tradition show some consistent findings; first,
there is little or no correlation berween performances in informal tasks and formal tests.
Second, there is little rransfer of cognitive skills from a familiar to an unfamiliar problem
solving situation. Third, there are remarkable differences between experts and novices
with regard to accuracy and strategies they use in problem solving tasks (Van de Vijver
í3~ Willemsen, 1993, p. 330).
Srudies of borh the formal and informal tradirion offer a limited scope on context
effects in logical reasoning. Many studies of the formal tradition apply either Wason's
task or syllogisms, thereby restricting rhemselves to a narrow set of logical rules.
Srudies in rhe informal tradition typically focus on a single, often atypical cultural
group such as dairy workers and street vendors (Schliemann 8c Carraher, 1992; Scribner,
1986). Moreover, "evidence abour the logic of the 'inference' obtained from anecdotes
or naturally occurring insrances is always open to alternative interpretarion" (Cole et al.,
1971, p. 177); there is little or no control of relevanr task variables and as a conse-
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quence, results of this kind of studies do not allow for a comparison with or general-
ization to other groups or cultures.
There is a gap between the formal and informal tradition. In our opinion, iross-cul-
tural researcb can be very useful in bridging this gap; it may combine the experimencal
rigor of the formal tradition and the analysis of the role of cultural factors as scudied in
the informal tradition. Cross-cultural research involves culturally informed applications
of the formal tradition, sometimes carried out in different cultures. An example can be
found in a study carried out by Cole et al. (1971). These authors used Kendlers' Inference
Apparatus, which is a metal box, with three panels, each with its own door and a but-
ton. Subjects had to combine three separate learning sequences in order to put the right
object in the right panel to receive the reward, a metal charm. The results showed that
only schooled subjects were initially inclined to start working with the apparatus; espe-
cially among the nonliterate subjects, there were overt signs of fear. Performance was
low. The authors also designed an ecologically more valid version of the task, using
materials familiar to the Kpelle, such as matchboxes and keys. The change of stimulus
material greatly enhanced performance.
Luria's ( 1976) work in the 1930s in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia is an early example
of a cross-cultural study on verbal logical reasoning. He presented syllogisms to liter-
ate and nonliterate subjects, such as:
In the Far North, where there is snow, all bears are white.
Novaya Zemlya is in the Far North; and there is always snow there.
What color are the bears there' ( p. 108)
The literate subjects solved the problems in the usual, logical way, but many nonliter-
ate subjects refused to solve the logical problems, because they did not accept the prem-
ises as a given. A common type of reaction to the above syllogism was: "How should I
know what color the bear was' I haven't been in The North." Cole et aL (1971) pre-
sented verbal logical problems to the Kpelle in Liberia, and Sharp, Cole, and Lave
(1978) replicated this study among Mayan adults in Mexico. These studies largely
replicated Luria's findings. Nonliterate subjects did not work from the logical relations,
but based their solutions on past experience.
In a study among South African nonliterate workers, Grant (1965) found a strong
influence of content on the performance on syllogisms. Real-life syllogisms were easier
than syllogisms with abstract assumptions as long as the assumptions are factual.
Syllogisms with an everyday content were easier than syllogisms with an abstract con-
tent; however, counterfactual syllogisms were more difficult than abstract syllogisms.
Research has shown that there is a strong influence of formal education on cogni-
tive test performance and that ecologically valid stimulus material can enhance as well
as reduce this performance ( e.g., Cole et al., 1971; Cole 8c Scribner, 1974; Irwin, Schafer,
8c Feiden, 1974; Price-Williams, Gordon, ~ Ramirez, 1969; Scribner, 197); Serpell,
1979). As a consequence, the choice of the domain of application requires close scruti-
ny in the study of logical reasoning.
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Child rearing was chosen as domain of application in the present study, more
specitically the implicit theories parents have about the development of their children.
Child rearing is a relevant domain for all cultures; in everyday life people have theories
and make cognitive inferences about the development of their children (e.g., Goodnow,
1984; Harkness ~ Super, 1992; Hess, Kashiwagi, Azuma, Price, 8c Dickson, 1980).
Moreover, the domain is sufficiently broad to allow for a wide variery ofcognitive tasks.
Data concerning the pragmatic knowledge on child development were collected in
a previous study in Zambia and rhe Netherlands (Willemsen 8c Van de Vijver, 1997).
In this study, 68 Dutch and 69 Zambian mothers were asked to indicate for 77 differ-
ent developmental skills the expected age of mastery, gender differences in mastery, and
the desirability to develop the skill. We chose not to include fathers because mothers
ofren are more involved in child-rearing than fathers and they rend to be better
informed and more accurate in their expectations of child development (Ninio, 1988;
Stevens, 1988). The study showed that Zambian morhers expected most skills to devel-
op ar a later age than did Dutch mothers. Dutch mothers indicated a lower desirabili-
ry than the other group for most skills. Gender differences were similar across the cul-
tural groups. The results of this study were used for the development of ecologically
valid contents of deductive reasoning schemes. The cultural knowledge on child devel-
opment was implemented in different reasoning schemes (a generic term for "domain-
free" stimulus transformations, such as the modus tollens and syllogisms; Van de Vijver
1991; Van de Vijver 8c Willemsen, 1993).
In order to measure the effect of the ecological validiry of test material, the test
consisted of four types of logical reasoning items: empirically true for both countries,
empirically false for both countries, empirically true only for Zambia, and empirically
true only for The Netherlands. A statement is empirically true in a particular culture if
it is based on well-established or widely agreed upon facts such as "Children of two
years old can walk." Items with a content that is empirically true for one country can
be true or false for the other country; such statements are labeled possibly factual. The
content of these items was derived from our previous study (Willemsen 8c Van de
Vijver, 1997).
We were also interested in the effect of presentation mode; therefore items were
added ín which the same logical reasoning schemes were embedded in two types of
prose passage, namely wich a real-world and a make-believe content. A srudy by
Markovits (1985) showed that performance on a conditional reasoning task was
enhanced when the task was embedded in a paragraph describing alternate possibilities,
if subjects recognize the relevance of the information and reason with it. Presenting rhe
logical problem in a story may facilitate reasoning, because of the additional informa-
cion derived from pragmatic knowledge of the problem context described in the story.
However, the information in the stories should not be in contradiction with the prem-
ises. The work of Stevenson and Over (1995) on the effect of belief-bias on deductive
reasoning with conditional rules revealed that the addition of a premise that makes the
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major premise uncertain led to a significantly smaller number of subjects accepting the
valid conclusion.
Dias and Harris (1990) found that children's accuracy of reasoning from premises that
violated their real-world knowledge markedly improved, when the premises were present-
ed in a make-believe mode. Maybe this effect was found because the premises and the con-
clusion could be accepted as more believable within the context of a make-believe world.
Three hypotheses about item facets were tested (all hypotheses refer both to Dutch
and Zambian participants):
1. Items dealing with factual information will show more logically true responses
than ítems with possibly factual information; items dealing with possibly factual
information will show more logically true responses than items with counterfactu-
al information (belief bias).
2 Items that are embedded in a prose passage will show more logically correct
responses than items that are not embedded (we assume that the content of the
prose passage is not in contradictíon with the logically true conclusion).
3. Items that are embedded in a prose passage with a content located in a make-
believe world will show more logically correct responses than items with a content
located in the real world.
Method
Particip~nts
The item content of the test battery was based on an earlier study in which moth-
ers in the Netherlands and Zambia were asked to indicate the age at which their chil-
dren had acquired various skills ( Willemsen 8r Van de Vijver, 1)97). In order to be able
to use the results of that study, a comparable sample was required in the present study.
The sample consisted of 74 Dutch and 100 Zambian mothers.
The participants were approached via the primary school of their children and via
snowball sampling. In the Dutch sample the average age was 38.1 years (SD - 6.25)
and in the Zambian sample 30.2 years (SD - 8.62).
Most Dutch participants (90q ) were married while the other mothers were widow,
single or living together. Of the Zambian sample, 65~~ was married, 31r1 was single,
and 49é was widow. The average number of children of the Dutch mothers was 2.41
(range: 1 to 4) and for the Zambian mothers 3.00 (range: 1 to 9).
All Dutch mothers completed primary and secondary education, and 69"1c tertiary
education; the figures for the Zambian mothers were )Brlr, 527, and 48~, respective-
ly. There is a bias towards better-educated upper class in our sample; the national enroll-
ment in rertiary education in 1997 was 47~ in the Netherlands and 3`'1c in Zambia
(Worldbank, 2000). Of the Dutch sample 54~ was housewife and 46~1 had a paid job
(7~ was teacher and 39!7~ had other professions like cleaner, nurse, arrist, and hair-
dresser). For the Zambian sample these percentages were 47~1c and 53~~ (22~ was
reacher and 31~ had other professions, like market vendor, nurse, cleaner, and typist).
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1nstrz~~nents
Two instruments were administered, namely the Logical Reasoning Task (LRT)
and the Story-Logical Reasoning Task (Story-LRT). The instruments were based on
deductive reasoning schemes used in previous research in this area (e.g. Erickson, 1978;
Evans, 1)82, 1989; Evans, Barston ~ Pollard, 1983; Evans, Newstead 8c Byrne, 19)3)
and on logical rules described by Sergant (1)86). In a pilor study among 10 students,
15 different logical reasoning schemes were presented with a content referring to child
development. Based on the results of this srudy, five reasoning schemes were deleted,
because they appeared to be too difficult. All reasoning schemes used in the final study
are given in Table 1.
Table I. Logical Reasoning Items
Empirir~r! truth nalue
Rrrle Reruorriub ceheme ET-NZ EF-NZ ET-N EF-N
F.F-Z. ET-Z
Elementary Rules 1. (p tk q) -~ p 1 2 3 4
2.((pUq)t~-p)~q 5 6 7 S
Conditional rules 3. ((p ~ y) 8c p) ~ q ) l0 1 1 12
4. ((p ~ q) tk ~q) -~ -p L3 14 l5 16
Syllogisms 5. all ~s are rjs
all ms are ps
all ms are gs
6. all (~s are qs
some ms are ps
some nts are qs
Transitivity 7. p ~ q
q~m
p ~ m
8. p ~ q
m ~ q
17 18 1) 20
21 22 23 24
25 2C 27 2S
2) 30 31 32
p ~ m
Task 5 9. (((p 8c y) --~ m) ~ ((p 8c -y) ~ m)) -~ 33 34 35 36
Dilemma (p ~ m)
10.((p ~ q) 8~ (- P ~ 91) ~ 9
37 3s 39 40
ET-NZ - empirically true in the Netherlands and Zambia. EF-NZ - empirically false in the Netherlands
and "Lambia. ET-N!EF-Z - empirically true in the Netherlands and empirically false for Zambia.
EF-N!ET-Z - empirically false in the Netherlands ancl empirically true for Zambia
Nnte. NrunGer.r irr cellr refer to item type.r.
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Table 2. Examples of Items of the Logical Reasoning Test
Enzpiriial trruh t~alue Exam~le Barkgrarn~
Empirically true in the Arvrme: The expected ages of "throwing
Netherlands and Zambia lf Stephen is tí years old, then he can balls" was 4.53 in the Dutch and
throw balls. Stephen is C years old. 4.79 in the Zambian sample;
lr the follou~ing then right or urong: difference was not significant
Srephen can throw balls.
Thtr tl: right wrong
Empirically false in the Arrunte: Expected ages of mastery were
Netherlands and Zambia lf Linda is 1 week old, then she can walk 3.Z4 year in the Netherlands and
up the stairs. Linda is 1 week old. 3.3i year in Zambia; difference
Lr the following then right nr urong: was not significant
Linda can walk up the stairs.
7hiJ ir: right wrong
Empirically true in the Arrz~me: Expected age of hammering was
Netherlands and false in If Ronald is i.5 years old, than he can 3.39 in the Netherlands and
Zambia hammer. Ronald is 3.5 years old. 5.79 in Zambia; difference is
I r the follou~ing then right or urong: significant (p ~.001)
Ronald can hammer.
Thir ir: right wrong
Empirically falsr ín the A.rizrme: Expected age of "eating without
Netherlands and true in If Harriet is almost Z years old, then she help" was 2.C4 in the Netherlands
Zambia can eat without help. Harriet is almost and 1.89 in Zambia; difference is
2 years old. significant (h ~.001)
It the follou irzg then right or u rorzg:
Harriet can eat without help.
Thir ir: right wrong
'based on Willemsen and Van de Vijver (1)97)
The items of the LRT were generated on the basis of a set of rules. The following
facets applied to each item:
~ Enzpiric-a! truth value: four levels were used: true in Zambia and che Netherlands
(factual items), false in Zambia and the Netherlands (counterfactual items), true in
Zambia and false in the Netherlands, and false in Zambia and true in the
Nerherlands. The first two categories are comparable with the distinction made by
Evans et al. (1983) in believable and unbelievable items. The latter two categories
refer to possibly factual statements.
The distinction is based on our previous study (Willemsen 8z Van de Vijver, 1997);
for instance, an item that is empirically true in Zambia and false in the Nether-
lands is an item that showed a significantly lower mean expected age of mastery in
the Zambian group. Table 2 gives examples of how the logical rule ((p -~ ql f~ pl
-~ q was presented in each of the four forms.
~ Rea.roning rchemer (10 levels): two types of each of the following five rules were used:
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elementary rule, conditional rules, syllogisms, transitivity rules, and dilemmas (see
Table 1). The two types of each rule varied in difficulry.
~ Lagieal ( in)corrert roncltr.rion in the item ( 2 levels): 40 items were made by crossing
the first rwo facers. Of each of these 40 items, two versions were made: one with a
conclusion at the end of the item that was logically correct ( the a-version) and one
rhat was logically incorrect ( rhe b-version).
~ Tert half ( 2 levels): The test was composed of two sets of 40 items ( item 1 to 40 and
item 41 to 80). The a-version ( logically correct conclusion) and the b-version (log-
ically incorrect conclusion) ofan item were randomly distributed over the first half
of the test. The item order was identical in the two rest halves; for example, item
3 was the same as item 43, except for the logical accuracy of the conclusion.
The internal consistencies ( Cronbach's alpha) for the logical reasoning items were .91
for the Dutch sample and .89 for the Zambian sample. The reliabilities did not differ
significantly for the two cultural groups, F(95, 60) - 1.22, n.r.
For the Story-LRT the odd numbered logical reasoning rule of Table 1(i.e., logi-
cal rules 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9) were embedded in a story. Two versions of these logical rules
were used: empirically true ( factual) and empirically false (counterfactual) for both
Zambia and The Netherlands. Furthermore, two different types of stories were written,
namely with an unrealistic, fairy-tale-like content and with a more realistic content.
Table 3. Examples of Embedded Logical Reasoning Items
Exam~(e I Real world Content
Stephen and his nephew
Stephen lives in Chipata where there is much space fot children to play. Next to the house where he lives
some boys are oken playing football. If Stephen is 6 years old, then hr can throw the ball. One day a
nephew, who has not seen Stephen for several years, comes to visit him. Stephen is C years old now and he
plays faxball with some friends. The nephew asks him to throw the ball.
Whirh of the follntrtng ic then true:
I. Srephen can throw the ball. Z. Stephen cannot throw the ball.
Exarreple ll IV1ake-believe content
A small island
Somewhere there is a small island where it is always srorming. Nobody wants to live there, except for one
family. The family has a daughter named Diana. If Diana is 9 years old, then she is no longer afraid of
storm. One day a tisherman has problems with his boat and he decides to go to the island. Diana is ) years
old now and she brings the fisherman to her house.
W'hi~-h of the follou ing i.r then true:
I. Diana is no longer afraid of storm. 2. Diana is afraid of storm.
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The 20 differenr embedded items were presented to the participants with two pos-
sible conclusions below the story. Participants had to indicate which conclusion was
correct. Table 3 gives two examples of embedded logical reasoning items based on the
rule (p ~ q) ~S pl ~ q embedded in a realistic and make-believe context.
The internal consistencies were . 88 for the Dutch group and .77 for the Zambian.
These values are appropriate; yet, the reliabilities were not equal for the two samples,
F(97, 67) - 1.92, p ~ .01. The significant difference was not caused by specific items;
the item-total correlations were higher in the Dutch group for almost all items.
In order to be able ro relate the performance on the LRT and the Story-LRT to a
standard reasoning test, Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices (Series A and B) were
administered. The Raven test was chosen here because it is a measure of inductive
thinking, which, together with deductive reasoning, are the main constituents of fluid
intelligence (reasoning) (Carroll, 1993). Moreover, compared to most tests of reasoning,
Raven test performance is less influenced by cultural factors. The internal consistencies
were adequate, .77 for the Dutch and .82 for the Zambian sample. There was no sig-
nificant difference in the coefficients, F(94, 71) - 0.80, n.r.
In order to measure metacognition, participants were asked to motivate their
answer immediately after responding to an item. A more direct assessment of inetacog-
nitive aspects using a "Think-Aloud" method turned out to be impractical and to inter-
fere the thought process ( results of inetacognitive aspects of the study are described else-
where; Willemsen 8c Van de Vijver, 1999). The responses were audiotaped. This proce-
dure was followed only for the embedded items to prevent fatigue among the partici-
pants.
Administration
All participants were tesced individually. In the Netherlands this was done by the
firsr author and in Zambia by the firsr author and a local, female assistant. The LRT and
the Story-LRT were presented in written form. For the Dutch participants the instru-
ments were in Dutch. Seventy of the Zambian participants got an English version and
thirty participants got a Nyanja version, the most common local language. The English
version was back-translated in Durch in order to check the accuracy of the translation.
The Nyanja version was back-translated in English.
In the instruction to the participants it was emphasized that they had to assume
what was written in the premises and that their answer had to be based on the item con-
tent.
Half of all participants first completed the LRT and then the Story-LRT, the other
half in reversed order. In preliminary analyses no order effects were found. These effects
will not be further considered. The Raven was always administered lasc. The adminis-
tration of all instruments took abour two hours per participant.
Preliminary analyses on the effect of language (English versus Nyanja) showed that
on the LRT 23 of the 80 items showed a significant difference between the English and
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the Nyanja version. The participants who had chosen the Nyanja version performed
signitïcantly better on 1 ~ and poorer on 10 items than participants with the English
version. Four of the 20 items of the Story-LRT showed a significant difference, the
English version showed a significanrly higher performance for three items. The effect of
language appears to be small and not in one direction and therefore this variable is not
taken into account in the remaining analyses.
Results
Ite~n Difficulty of the LRT arrd the Story LRT
The first set of analyses involved the influence of various item facets on test per-
formance (measured by the proportion of items that were correctly solved from a logical
perspective). The influence was examined in a multiple regression analysis. The depen-
dent variable of the first analysis was the proportion of logically correct solutions of che
LRT; the independent variables were the reasoning schemes (10 levels), the test half (2
levels), the logical correctness of the conclusion (2 levels: the conclusion is either logi-
cally correct or incorrect), and the empirical truth value of the items (4 levels). In order
to avoid linear dependencies of the predictors, one level of each ser of predictors (i.e.,
the reasoning schemes, empirical truth status, and order of the items) had to be elimi-
nated as predictoc The first item of the test was arbitrarily chosen as the item for which
all predictors had a value of zero. A dummy coding (with scores of 0 and 1) was used for
all predictors. As a consequence, regression coefficients can be interpreted as the change
in proportion of logically correct solutions to the item when the predictor changes from
zero to one (e.g., when the second elementary rule is used instead of the first). The
choice of the anchor item (i.e., the item with a value of zero for all predictors) has an
impact on the significance of the non-zero levels. For example, when an anchor item
wirh a low proportion of logically correctly solved answers is chosen as anchor, the
regression coeffïcients of reasoning schemes with similar proportions of these answers
will be nonsignificanr; however, regression coefficients of the same reasoning schemes
would have been significant if an anchor item would have been chosen that showed a
high proportion of logically correct answers. So, size and signifcance of regression coef-
ficients should be interpreted keeping in mind the characteristics of the anchor item.
For both the LRT and the Story-LRT the anchor item was logically correctly solved by
almost all participants in both cultural groups.
The results of the multiple regression analyses are presented in Table 4. In the
Dutch sample, the squared multiple correlation obtained a highly significant value of
.64, p ~ .001. The proportion of logically correct solutions is apparently strongly influ-
enced by item facets. Both types of syllogisms and the second dilemma were reasoning
schemes that led to a significant reduction of the number of logically correct answers,
b--0.20, -0.16, and -0.10, respectively, all ps ~.05 (see Figure 1). Another set of pre-
dictors involved the empirical truth value. Only one predictor was significant:
Counterfactual items showed significantly fewer logically correct responses in both
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countries, G--0.18, p ~.001. Items that were true in either country (possibly factual)
and in both countries (factual) did not show a difference in proportion of logically cor-
rect answers (see Figure 2). Furthermore, Dutch participants gave fewer logically cor-
rect answers on the items of the first test half, G- 0.06, p ~.001. This could be caused
by a learning effect, because the second half of the test replicates the firsr half (except
for logically opposite conclusion).
Table 4. Multiple Regression Analysis of Proportion of Logically Correct Answers of [he Logical





Intercept 96~`~`~ .96~`~`~` -.01
Empirical rruth value
True in bonc ~ouncries .006 .006 OOh
False in both countries -.18~`~`~ -.17~~~ -.O1
True in the Netherlands, false in Zambia -.01 -.O1 -.O1
False in the Netherlands, true in Zambia -.04 -.04 00
Reasoning scheme'
Elementary rule I .00~' .006 .00~
Elementary rule 2 -.07 -.29~`~`~` .22~~~`
Conditional rule I -.03 -.0)~` 06
Conditional rule 2 -.07 -.32~`~~ .25~~`~
Syllogism 1 -.20~~`~` -.22~`~~` .02
Syllogism 2 -.16~`~`~ -.16~`~~` .O1
Transitivity 1 -.08 -.1 1 ~` .03
Transitivity 2 -.04 -.08 04
Dilemma 1 -.04 -.14~~ .10~`~`
Dilemma 2 -.10~ -.16~~~` .06
Logically (inkorrect conclusion
Correct 0O'' .OOn .006
Incorrect -.02 -.06~`~ .04~~
Tes[ half
First half .006 .006 00~
Second half .06~~~ .04 .03
R'' 64~~`~` 70~`~~ C7~~t`
aSee Table l for an explanation of the reasoning schemes ~Facet tevel was set at zero.
t`p~.05.~`~p~.Ol.t`~~p~.001.
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In the Zambian group, the squared multiple correlation obtained a highly signifi-
cant value of .70, p ~.001. Except for the second transitivity rule, all reasoning schemes
were found to reduce the proportion of logically correct answers, p ~.05 (see Table 4
and Figure 1). The influence of empirical truth value replicated the Durch findings;
counterfactual items yielded a significantly lower proportion of logically correct ans-
wers (h - -0. U, p ~ .001) while regression coefficients of all other empirical truth vari-
ables were close to zero (cf. Figure 2). The regression coefficient of test half was of the
same size as in the Dutch sample but just failed to reach significance, b- 0.04, ~t - .08.
Finally, logically incorrect conclusions yielded fewer logically correct answers, 6-
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Figure I. Proportion of logically correct answers of the LRT and Story LRT per reasoning scheme and country
Note. ER - Elementar} rule: CR - Condltional rule: SY - S~llogi~rrr; TR - Tranritraity: DI - Dílernnra
(ree TaGle 1 for arr etplanation)
Different (post hoc) inrerpretacions can be envisaged. First, logically incorrect conclu-
sions ofren involved negations. The Zambian participants may have found it more dif-
ficult to indicate that a negation is incorrect because of the possibly implied double
negation (even though we tried to reduce rhis problem by using "right" and "wrong"
as response alternatives). Second, verification strategies may be easier than falsífications,
in particular in a test format in which conclusions are already formulated.









Dutch T F T F T F
Zambian T F F T T F
Figure 2. Proportion of logically correct answers of rhe LRT and Story LRT
per level of empirical truth value and country
Note. TT - Enapirically true in both countrier: FF - entpiricall}' false rn both rotrntrier:
TF - eznpzrrcally trz~e in the Netherlandr artdfal.re in Zanabia: FT - ernpirically false
in the Netherlarrdr and trzre in Zunzbia
The first hypothesis stating that items dealing with factual information would give
more logically correct responses than items with possibly factual information, and items
with possibly factual information would give more logically correct responses than
items with counterfactual information, was partly confirmed for the LRT. In both cul-
tural groups counterfactual items (empirically false in both countries) showed fewer
logically correct responses than factual and possibly factual items.
In an additional analysis the difference in performance on factual and counterfac-
tual items was further explored; more specifically, we examined whether such an effect,
if present, could be observed for all rules, as defined in Table 1. Average items scores
were computed for counterfactual (i.e., empirically false in both countries) and factual
(i.e., empirically true in both countries, empirically true in the Netherlands and false
in Zambia, and empirically true in Zambia and false in the Netherlands) items. A mul-
tivariate analysis was carried out, with the average item score as dependent variable, and
factual vs. counterfacrual items and rule (5 levels) as within-subject factors and cultur-
al group (2 levels) as between-subjects factor. Results have been presented in Table 5.
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Table 5. Analysis of Variance (Repeated Measures) with Scores on Proportion of Correct Answers
as Dependent Variable, FactualslCounterfactuals and Rule (5 Levels) as Within-Subject Factors,
and Cultural Group (2 Levels) as Between-Subjea Factor
Soune Dt





Faccual (F) 1 .58a~`~~
Rule (R) -i .85~`~`~
CxF 1 9)
C x R í 87~~`~
F x R i 63~`~`~
CxFxR i )6
aProportion of variance accounted for. bF ratio. ~~~~ ~.001.
Table 6. Multiple Regression Analysis oF Item Difficulties of the Story-Logical Reasoning Test





Intercept 1.OOt`~~ 97~~~ .03
Empirical truch value
True in bonc ~ountries .00~ .00h .00~
False in both councries -.12~`~`~ -.15~~`~` .03
Scory concent
Real 00'' .OOt' .00~,
Make-believe 00 .04 .Oi
Reasoning schemea
Elemenrary rule 1 .006 006 .00~
Conditional rule l -.O1 -.04 03
Syllogism 1 -.07~` -.02 -.05
Transitivity 1 -.07~` -.02 -.06
Dilemma 1 -.05 -.13s` .08
R~ .83~`~~` 73~~ .~6
aSee Table 1 for an explanacion of the reasoning schemes ~Facer level waz sec ac zero.
~`p~ .05.~`~`p~.O1.~~~p~.001.
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Main effects were found for cultural group and rule, which replicates the findings
of the regression analysis. In addition, a main effect of factuality was found; factual
items showed significantly higher proportions of logically correct responses than coun-
terfactual items did. This strong effect, explaining 42q of che score variation, exem-
plifies the impact of unbelievability on logical reasoning ( belief bias). Moreover, a high-
ly significant interaction of factuality and rule was found. As can be seen in Figure 3,
the interaction was mainly due to transitivity and, though to a lesser extent, dilemma.
Factual transitivity icems were considerably easier than counterfactual items; the latter
showed indeed the lowest proportion and the former the highest proportion of logical-
ly correct responses. Finally, the interaction of cultural group and rule was significant.






Figure 3. Proportion of logicall}' correct answers for factual and counterfactual items per rule
Note. ER - Eleme~uar} r~~le: CR- Conditional ruk~: S}' - S}'llogiim: TR - Traiuitrtit}: DI - Dilemma (tee
Table I Ji~r e.x~lanatronl
The second set of analyses involved the Story-LRT. A multiple regression analysis
was applied to predict the proportion of logically correct answers to this test, using the
reasoning scheme, empirical truth value, and story content (real or imaginary) as inde-
pendent variables. Again, the first item was defined as anchor (with values of all predic-
tors ser to zero). In line with findíngs for the LRT, item facets were highly adequate pre-
dictors of the attractiveness of logically correct answers of the Story-LRT. In the Dutch
sample the syuared multiple correlation was .83, p ~ .001 (see Table 6). Two reasoning
schemes showed significant, negative regression coefficients: syllogisms and transitiviry
(both bs --0.07, p ~.05; cf. Figure 1). Empirical truth value had a signilïcant bearing
on the proportion of logically correct answers; stories with counrerfacrual premises trig-
gered fewer logically correct answers, b- -0.12, p ~ .001 (cf. Figure 2). Story location
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(real vs. make-believe world) did not affect the proportion of logically correcr answers.
The Zambian group also showed a high and significant squared multiple correla-
tion, R' - .73, p ~ .001. The only reasoning scheme that reached significance was the
dilemma; this scheme decreased the proportion of logically correct answers, b--0.13, ~
~.05 (cf Figure 1). The results of empirical truth status and story contenc replicated the
Dutch findings: the use of counterfactual premises led to a decrease of the proportion of
logically correct answers, b- -0.15, p ~ .001 (cf. Figure 2). The results of the analyses of
the Story-LRT also partly confirmed the first hypothesis for both samples. No supporr
was found for the third hypothesis, according to which items located in a make-believe
world would show more logically correct responses than items located in rhe real world.
The third set of analyses involved a comparison of the LRT and Story-LRT with the
aim of examining the effect of item embeddedness on item performance. A combina-
tion of the data of both instruments necessítated an item reduction of the LRT because
rhis insrrument was based on ten reasoning schemes, whereas only five schemes were
present in the Srory-LRT. Furthermore, possibly factual items were not included in the
Story-LRT. The final data set contained 20 items of each instrument. Separate multiple
regression analyses were carried out for both cultural groups. In addition to embedded-
ness (2 levels, indicating whether the item came from the LRT or Story-LRT), empiri-
cal truth value (2 levels) and reasoning schemes (5 levels) were independent variables.
Item facets were adequate predictors oF the item difficulty in the Dutch group. The
squared multiple correlation in the Dutch group was .63, ~ ~.001 (see Table 7).
Empirical truth value showed a significant effect; counterfactual items yielded fewer
logically correct responses than did factual items, b--0.14, ~ ~.001. Two reasoning
schemes, syllogism and transitivity, had a significant effect on item difficulty, b--0.16,
p ~ .001 and h- -0.09, p ~ .05, respectively. Dutch participants gave fewer logically
correct responses on the LRT than on the Story-LRT (b - -0.10, j~ ~ .001).
The squared multiple correlation in the Zambian group was also .6i (p ~.001).
Dutch findings were replicated with regard to the empirical truth starus; empirically
false items in both countries showed fewer logically correct responses (G --0.17, p ~
.001). For the Zambian participants, syllogisms and dilemmas proved to be more diffi-
cult, in both cases b--0.14, p ~.01. Again, the LRT yielded fewer logically correct
responses than the Story-LRT, b- -0.13, p ~ .001.
The second hypothesis according to which items that are embedded in a prose pas-
sage (rhe Story-LRT) would show more logically correct responses than items that are
not embedded (the LRT), was confirmed in both samples.
Intertask correlations for all cognitive tasks were examined. The correlation
between the scores on the LRT and Story-LRT was positive and significant: .64 for the
Netherlands and .38 for Zambia (p ~.001). In the Netherlands the Raven's Progressive
Matrices showed a significant correlation, both with the LRT (r -.41, p ~.001) and
the Story-LRT (r -.40, p ~.001). However, neither correlation was significant in the
Zambian sample (r -.13, n.r, for both tests).
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Incercept 1.05~~`~ 1.05~~~ .00
Empirical truth value
True in both countries .00~ 00~ .006
False in bonc ~ountries -.14~`~`~ -.17~`~`~` .03
Test
Story-Logical Reasoning Test .OOh .00~' OOh
Logical Reasoning Test -.10~~~ -.13~~`~ .02
Reasoning schemea
Elementary rule 1 .006 .OOh .00~'
Conditional rule 1 -.05 -.07 .02
Syllogism 1 -.16~~~ -.14~`~ -.02
Transicivity 1 -.o)~` -.09 .00
Dilemma 1 -.06 -.14~`~` O8~
R' C~~~~ 63~~ 24
aSee Table 1 for an ezplanation of the reasonin~; schemes hFacer level was set at zero.
~~ ~ .05. ~`~p ~ .() L. ~~~~ ~ .001.
Cross-Cultural Comparisons
The first analysis addressed the question of which facets contributed to cross-cultural
differences in proportions of logically correct answers on che LRT. The same item facets
were used as in the above reponed multiple regression analysis of the LRT. The dependent
variable was the difference in proportion of logically correct answers in the Netherlands and
Zambia. The facet levels of the first item were (again) defined as zero. Because, as noted
before, the proportions of logically answers of this item were almost identical in the two
groups, the intercepts were close to each other; as before, the regression coefficients reflect
the difference in proportion of logically correct answers. The results have been presented in
the last column of Table 4. The squared multiple correlation was .C7, p ~ .(101. Neither
empirical tnith value nor test half showed significant regression coefficienrs. Three reason-
ing schemes showed significant, positive regression coefficients (p ~.O1): the second ele-
mentary rule, the second conditional rule, and the first dilemma. As can be seen in Figure
1, these reasoning schemes showed the largest cross-cultural differences in proportion of
logically correct answers. Finally, the use of logically incorrect conclusions led to an increase
of the cross-cultural differences in the proportion of logically correct answers.
The second analysis applied the same procedure ro the Story-LRT (see Table 6). The
multiple correlation was not signitïcant; none of the item facets had a significant
impact on the cross-cultural differences. The third analysis considered the data of the
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combined tests ( see Table 7). Again the multiple correlation was not significant; of all
predictors only one reached significance, namely the dilemma, G- 0.08, p ~.05.
In a subsequent analysis, che presence of cross-cultural differences in average score
on the LRT, Srory-LRT, and Raven was tesred in a multivariate analysis of variance;
country was the independent variable and the three cesr scores were the dependent vari-
ables. Wilks' lambda showed a highly significanr value of . 82, F(3, 165) - 11.78, p ~
.001. Univariate analyses did not show a significant difference for the Story-LRT (the
Netherlands: ~~I - 18.14, Zambia: Iti1 - 17.51), F(1, 167) - 1.83, p-.18. Both other
tests showed significanrly higher means in the Dutch sample: for the LRT F(1, 167) -
23.47,p ~.001, the Netherlands: ~ll - 67.30, Zambia: ~lt - 59.48; for the Raven F(1,
167) - 16.46, p ~.001, the Netherlands: 11I - 22.00, Zambia: 161 - 20.02.
The question arises ro whar extent the observed cross-cultural differences on the
LRT can be accounted for by differences in background variables such as education and
age. A procedure was adopred as outlined by Van de Vijver and Leung ( 1997). In the
first step of this two-step procedure a mulriple regression analysis is carried out (for
the two cultural groups combined); test scores are predicted on the basis of presum-
ably relevanr independenr variables. The analysis yields residual scores that are scruti-
nized in the second srep. These residual scores indicate parts of the scores thar cannot
be accounted for by the independent variables. Cross-cultural differences in the origi-
nal and residual scores can be compared. Differences of residual scores are smaller than
differences of original scores if background variables affect cross-cultural score differ-
ences. Participanrs' education, age, number of children, and employment status
(dichotomously scored as either or nor employed) were used as predictors of LRT
scores. The procedure was applied to rhe tests that showed significant cross-cultural
differences, the LRT and Raven's Progressive Matrices. After correction for the inde-
pendenr variables, cross-cultural differences for the LRT were still significant, t(172)
- 2.42, p ~.05. Yet, the effect size (defined as the Durch minus the Zambian average
score divided by rheir pooled standard deviation) decreased from a value of 0.77 before
correcrion ro 0.40 after correction. The Raven's Progressive Matrices yielded a compa-
rable picture. The t value remained signi6cant, t(168) - 2.20, p ~ .05. After correc-
tion for the background variables, the effecr size was reduced from 0.61 to 0.32. In
conclusion, the cross-cultural differences were halved after correction for background
variables for both instrumenrs. Cross-cultural differences in participancs' educational
level, age, number of children, and employmenr sratus could accounr for half of the
cross-cultural differences observed.
Finally, a more detailed analysis of the influence of background variables on test
scores was carried out for both cultural groups separately. In a multiple regression
analysis the same independenr variables as above were utilized to predict each of the
chree tesr scores. The squared multiple correlations were modest, ranging from .O1 to
.20. In the Netherlands, mothers with more education had a higher score on the LRT
(b - 0.33, p ~ .O1) and rhe Raven (G - 0.26, p ~ .05) (see Table 8).
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Table 8. Multiple Regression Analyses for Background Variables Predicting Mean Scores on the




~áriaGle Dutch Zambian Duteh Zambian Duteh Zambian
Education .ii~`~ .09 .24 -.03 .26~ .20
Age -.12 -.10 -.14 .08 -.02 -.58~~`~`
Number of children .09 -.Ol .(12 -.10 .04 -.11
Employed
K-'
-.07 .26~ -.10 -.04 -.05 .18
.14~` .0) .09 .O1 .07 .20~~`~
~p ~ .05. ~~p ~ .ol. ~~~p ~ .001.
Zambian working women showed more logically correct answers than did housewives
on the LRT (b - 0.26, ~i ~ .O1) while age showed a negarive regression coefficient (b -
-0.58, p ~.001). None of the predictors reached significance for the Story-LRT.
Discussion
This study examined the influence of various contextual factors on logical reason-
ing in Zambia and the Nerherlands. The results showed that contexr did have an effect
on the performance on logical reasoning tests. As hypothesized, the use of counterfac-
tual elements decreased the proportion of logically correct answers (cf. Grant, 1965),
both for non-embedded (LRT) and embedded (Story-LRT) items. However, we did not
find the expected difference in proportion of logically correcr answers between the fac-
tual and possibly factual icems; items that were empirically false for one country and
true for the other were not harder than items that are empirically true for both coun-
tries. The difference in empirical truth value of factual and possibly factual items may
have been too subtle. Possibly factual items may have involved information that is
probably not entirely correcr according to one's own frame of reference but still easily
imaginable. Our study shows that a relatively high degree of unbelievability (counter-
factual information) is needed before belief bias affects logical reasoning, both in Dutch
and Zambian subjects. Belief bias was found for both cultures and for all reasoning
schemes, but was strongesr for transitivity rules and dilemmas. The results of this study
can be seen as a demonstration of the classic belief bias over a wide range of logical rea-
soning schemes and in two differenr cultures.
Furthermore, as hypothesized, embeddedness of items in a prose passage facilitat-
ed logical reasoning in the Netherlands as well as Zambia. Yet, conrrary to expectation,
it did not make a difference whether the content referred to the real or a make-belief
world. At least rhree explanations can be put forward to explain the lack of confirma-
tion. First, the overall level of performance was high in both countries; ceiling effects
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may have played a role. Second, studies reporting the expecred effects dealt with chil-
dren (e.g., Dias 8c Harris, 1990; Hawkins et al., 1984), whereas our study involved
adults. The hypothesized effect may be restricted to children. Third, our way of pre-
senting the make-believe world may have been insufficiently powerful. Our make-
believe items referred to "far-away countries," "villages in the middle of nowhere," and
"somewhere overseas"; however, the items always referred to children and their skills.
A formulation in which other planets and creatures, such as gnomes, giants, and
Martians may be more powerful and produce the hypothesized effects, even with adulrs.
Cross-cultural differences in logically correct reasoning on the non-embedded
items were mainly caused by three reasoning schemes. The second elementary rule (i.e.,
((p ~~ q) fr -p) ~ q), the modus tollens (i.e., ((p ~ ql fr ~q) ~~p)) and the first dilem-
ma (i.e., (((p f~ q) --~ m) f~ (lp fi --q) ~ r~a)) -~ (p ~ nr)) showed higher proportions
of logically correct answers in rhe Dutch group. Interestingly, all these reasoning
schemes use negations. One more reasoning scheme involves a negation, namely the sec-
ond dilemma (i.e., (((~ -~ q) fJ (~~ ~ q)) ~ q)). Its regression coefficient in the analy-
sis of cross-cultural differences approached significance (b - 0.06, p ~ .10). It is tempt-
ing to conclude that cross-cultural differences in proportions of logically correct
answers for the various reasoning schemes were mainly due to the presence of negations.
Both in the Netherlands and Zambia items about reasoning schemes with negations
were relatively difficult. This is in line with Galotti's (1989) finding that negations in
premises often increase the difficulry of a reasoning task. The finding that negations in
reasoning schemes enlarged cross-cultural differences in proportions of logically correct
solurions is in line with the observacion, made earlier, that conclusions with negations
showed fewer logically correct answers in the Zambian sample than items with affir-
mative conclusions. In our (admittedly post hoc) interpretation reasoning schemes with
negarions may be less common in daily life than schemes with only affirmative prem-
ises; the modus tollens may be less frequently encountered in daily life than the modus
ponens. As a consequence, persons with less previous test exposure (which presumably
holds for the Zambian participants) may have solved fewer of these problems and may
be less inclined to base their reasoning entirely on logical grounds.
Cross-cultural comparisons revealed that Dutch participants showed a higher pro-
portion of correct answers on the LRT and the Raven than Zambian participants. These
cross-cultural differences were halved after correction for background variables.
Apparently, variables like education have an important bearing on the assessment of
logical reasoning, which confirms other findings (cf. Van de Vijver, 1997). The Dutch
participants may have been more exposed to similar tasks as the ones used here. As a
consequence, previous test experience and test-wiseness may play a role. During the
instruction of the Raven the researcher and her assistant observed that many Zambian
participants found it difficulr to understand the task. The standard instruction was
given, but if a participant did not understand the task, the researcher explained it with
an example out of a daily life situation. The parcicipant was asked to imagine that there
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was a piece missing from her dress; she was asked to point at the piece what would be
needed to repair the dress. This nonstandard instruction turned out to be highly effective.
Overall, participants showed a high number of logically correct answers on the
LRT and the Story-LRT. Even for counterfacrual items, which showed the smallest
number of logically correct answers, this number was well above chance level. It can be
concluded that a domain (test content) chat is derived from everyday situations, such as
the development of children, facilitates logical reasoning. It could be argued that the
participant's past experience has created associations between the propositions in a con-
ditional rule; the more exposure a participant has had to these proposirions, the easier
they will come to mind (e.g., Griggs 8z Cox, 1982, 1983; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, 8z
Legrenzi, 1972; Manktelow 8c Evans, 1979). The availability of pragmatic knowledge
about children's development may entail a variety of psychological mechanisms, such as
a richer semantic network and more metacognitive knowledge (e.g., a better recogni-
tion of possible solution strategies). These mechanisms may make it easier to separate
domain and reasoning scheme; hence, they facilitate the formulation and testing of log-
ically correct solutions.
In sum, more cross-cultural similarities than differences were fottnd. Our study
shows that the factors determining the choice of logically correct answers were similar
for Dutch and Zambian participants. Belief bias was found in both groups. If pragmat-
ic knowledge is available about the domain of rhe logical reasoning, the basic structure
of the reasoning process may be rather universal. Differences in responses on logical rea-
soning tests may be more due to differences in knowledge, associations, expectations,
and beliefs with regard to the domain of application of the reasoning than to a differ-
ential availability of reasoning schemes.
In rhis cross-cultural study we have combined the experimental rigor of the formal
tradition with the focus on cultural context of the informal tradition. The insrruments
used in this study are exploratory and need refinement with regard to the possibly fac-
tual items. However, we argue that by desígning tests in which reasoning schemes are
studied in a single domain of application (as applied here) or systematically varied
across various domains of application, it is possible to gain a detailed insight in the
impact of the application domain of a problem on reasoning.
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The structure ofabstract thinking has often been reported to be universal, but
this universality has never been examined in the metacognitive domain.
Mothers in Zambia (N - 100) and the Netherlands (N - 74) were given
embedded reasoning rasks that involved the application of reasoning schemes,
such as the modus tollens and dilemmas, co stories about children. The stories
differed in realism of content (real life vs make-believe context) and empirical
truth-value (factual vs counterfactual). Participants were asked to give reasons
for their answers, which were rated on thirteen attributes such as logical ver-
sus empirical explanation, sufficiency of the answer, and reference to the first
and the second premise. The cross-cultural similarities were more salient than
the differences. However, Dutch mothers tended to treat the problems more
as logical tasks than Zambian mothers did, while Zambian mothers used more
non-essential information from the story and referred less to the second prem-
ise. Zambian mothers elaborated more in their explanations than Dutch
mothers did; elaborate answers were more often logically correct in the
Zambian sample, but no such tendency was present in the Dutch sample. In
a regression analysis with the combined data sets it was found that partici-
pants with more education gave more logical and fewer empirical explana-
tions. Our study indicates that the universality of abstract thinking also
extends, at least in schooled populations, to the metacognitive aspects.
Various studies have been devoted to contextual inEluences on logical reasoning (e.g.,
Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, 8c Legrenzi, 1972; Wason 8t Johnson-Laird, 1972). Other
studies have addressed the influence of the broader context of culture (e.g., Cole, 1996;
Luria, 1976; Van de Vijver, 1997; Willemsen 8c Van de Vijver, 1997). Both contextual
and cultural factors have been found to exert an effect on logical reasoning. For exam-
ple, realism of problem content has been varied in studies using the famous four-card
problem (Wason 8c Johnson-Laird, 1972). Realism was found ro posicively influence the
percenrage of logically correct answers. Analogously, cross-cultural research has shown
that stimulus familiarity tends to promore logical thinking (Cole, Gay, Glick, 8z Sharp,
1971). In addition to stimulus familiarity, other suggestíons have been pur forward to
explain cross-cultural performance differences. Tulviste (1991) has argued that school-
ing engenders a new type of verbal thinking, corresponding functionally to working
with scientific information and solving scientific problems.
The various explanations can be seen as focusing on different aspects of logical
thinking. More specifically, we argue that the major differences in viewpoints can be
described on the basis of a model of logical thinking developed by two of che present
authors (cf. Van de Vijver, 1991; Van de Vijver 8z Willemsen, 1995). This model
includes three basic elements. The first is pragrnatic knou~ledge, which refers to declara-
tive, factual knowledge about the environment and ourselves. This knowledge is col-
lected through informal and formal educarion and it refers to both facts and (implicit)
theories (i.e., shared beliefs abour the world). Pragmatic knowledge is the content to
which reasoning is applied. Cross-cultural differences in pragmatic knowledge have
been put forward as an important source of performance differences. For example,
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Reuning (1)88) administered various cognitive tasks to Bushmen in the Kalahari
desert. Their performance on complex mental tests wenr up, when rhe test stimuli were
adapted to the ecological environment.
The second element consists of rea.ronirrg .rchenaer. These are domain-independent
stimulus transformation rules, such as the modus ponens (if p then q; ~i, therefore q) and
the modus tollens (if p then q; not q, therefore not p). Proponents of explanations for
cross-cultural differences in terms of rhe availability of such logical rules can be found
in the Russian cultural-historical school, in which it is argued that schooling has a
formative influence on logical thinking (e.g., Tulviste, 1991). However, this view is not
widely shared and there is more support for the viewpoint rhat reasoning schemes are
universal, although the domains in which the schemes can be applied are culture-spe-
cific (e.g., Cole, 1996).
Finally, nretacognitrve kraou~ledge links pragmatic knowledge with reasoning schemes.
Pragmatic knowledge and reasoning schemes are "put together" to form a"plan of
action." Metacognitive skills are taught through informal and formal education; indi-
viduals have the highest metacognitive skills in areas of specialization (e.g., one's pro-
fession). According to Ferguson (1956), cultures frequently expose their members to
similar problems (such as perceptual discrimination of certain classes of objects in the
environment), thereby creating a specialization that will impact on the development of
metacognitive skills. In this line of thinking it becomes very likely that cross-cultural
performance differences will be found. The role of inetacognitive knowledge in the
explanation of cross-cultural performance differences on tests of logical thinking is
emphasized in the work of D'Andrade (1990). He argues that when individuals make
errors in a logical reasoning scheme, such as a modus ponens, they usually do not have
a cultural scheme that links p and q. Similarly, Cole et al. (1971) state that "cultural dif-
ferences in cognition reside more in the situatíons to which particular cognitive process-
es are applied than in the existence of a process in one cultural group and its absence in
another" (p. 233). In a more recent interpretation of this earlier work, Cole argues that
"when people perform poorly in our tasks we assumed that it was the task and our
understanding of its relationship to logically organized activities, not the people's
minds, that were deficient" (Cole, 1996, p. 80). Despite the intuitive appeal of
metacognitive knowledge as an explanation of performance differences, little systemat-
ic cross-culrural research of inetacognition has been done.
Luria's (1976) work is an exception. His studies, carried out in 1)30s in Uzbekistan
and Kirghizia, can be seen as an early example of a cross-cultural study on metacogni-
tive aspects of verbal logical reasoning. Syllogisms with a content based on immediate
practical experience and syllogisms with an unfamiliar content were presented to liter-
ate and nonliterate individuals. Participants were first asked to repeat the syllogism,
then to provide an answer to complete the syllogism, and finally to explain why they
had arrived at this conclusion. They were asked to repeat the premises immediately fol-
lowing presentation. Many nonliterate participants reproduced the sentences as sepa-
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rate, unrelated statements and did not immediately perceive the logical relation
between the premises given. The most typical response given by nonliterate partici-
pants was a denial or refusal of the possibility to draw any conclusion from the syllo-
gisms. Syllogisms with an unfamiliar content yielded more refusals than syllogisms
with a familiar content. Nonliterate participants declared that they "could only judge
what they had seen," or "didn't want to lie," or gave other responses indicating that the
premises did not lead to any conclusion.
About thirry years later Cole, Gay, Glick, and Sharp (1971) carried out an exten-
sive series of studies, involving verbal reasoning problems, among schooled and
unschooled Kpelle, a rice-farming tribal people in Liberia. Again, nonschooled partici-
pants did not respond to the logical relations but based their answers on past experi-
ence. Schooled participants responded much more on the basis of the verbal relations in
the problem. These findings were replicated by studies on verbal reasoning by Sharp,
Cole, and Lave (1978) among Mayan villagers in Mexico and by Cole and Scribner
(1974) among rhe Vai in Liberia.
Scribner (1979), after summing up the results of several studies on verbal logical
reasoning, argues that absence of a logically correct answer often has to do with not
applying available logical skills to verbal materiaL Many unschooled participants, while
giving logically wrong answers, were perfectly capable of valid inferential reasoning
from new evidence. However, they tended to add their own factual evidence from which
they reasoned (functional evidence) to the premises, and these facts could be different
from the information given in the premises (formal evidence). In some studies partici-
pants were asked to explain their answers. Scribner used these explanations to distin-
guish between theoretical and empirical solutions. A theoretical solution is based on the
premises given in the problem, while an empirical solution is based on pragmatic
knowledge, derived from everyday life. People who base their judgments solely on their
past experience, can reach a correct or incorrect answer, depending on the factual status
given in the problem. This factually based reasoning can also lead co a refusal to solve
the problem, when the problem cannot be solved on the basis of available pragmatic
knowledge.
Tulvisre (1991) states with regard to syllogistic problems that schooling increases
the number of correct solutions, leads to more theoretical instead of empirical solutions,
and enhances the ability to solve syllogistic problems with any content. Tulviste carried
out an experiment in 1977 in Northern Eurasia among the Nganasan people, a nomadic
population with traditional types of economic activities like hunting, fishing and rein-
deer herding. Ten different syllogistic problems were orally presented to 35 children
attending primary school. Each problem with an "everyday" content (e.g., about tea
drinking) was followed by a problem with a"school" content (e.g., about Molybdenum,
a precious metal). The aurhor found that:
"Practical error-free solution of simple syllogistic problems based on relating
deduction to premises initially emerges in the sphere of school (scientific)
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information and is transferred only later to the everyday sphere. First, children
successfully solve the problem with molybdenum, and only later the one
involving tea drinking." (Tulviste, 1991, p. 127)
In sum, these studies show that there are cross-cultural and intercultural differences in
the way people provide answers to verbal logical reasoning problems. Individuals from
more traditional cultural groups solve these problems more ofren on the basis of prag-
matic knowledge. In addition to the content and the context of the problem, schooling
appears to have a strong effect on the solution process. We have reviewed here studies
in which aspecrs of inetacognition were included. The small number of studies on the
topic reflects the limited interest in the cross-cultural study of inetacognition, despite
its potentially important role in the explanation of cross-cultural differences in abstract
thinking.
In order to gain more insight in cross-cultural differences in metacognitive aspecrs
of logical reasoning, the present study is aiming at an analysis of the contents of
response explanations to logical reasoning problems. The study builds on two earlier
studies, one on implicit parental theories (Willemsen L~ Van de Vijver, 1))7), the other
a study of verbal reasoning (Willemsen tk Van de Vijver, 2000).
Pragmatic knowledge was derived from the study of implicit parental theories of
child development, carried out among Dutch and Zambian mothers (Willemsen 8c Van
de Vijver, 1997). The mothers indicated the age at which they expect children to have
acquired each of 77 skills, such as walking and reading. In the verbal reasoning study
this pragmatic knowledge was combined with five frequently studied reasoning
schemes: elementary rule, conditional rules, syllogisms, transitivity rules, and dilem-
mas (e.g., Evans, Newstead, 8c Byrne, 1993; Sergant, 1)86).
Two tests were developed, the Logical Reasoning Task (LRT) and the Story-Logical
Reasoning Task (the Story-LRT), in which the reasoning problems of the LRT were
embedded in a short srory about children. The LRT consisted of 10 tasks (two versions
of each rule) varying in empirical truth-value: true in Zambia and the Netherlands, true
in Zambia and false in the Netherlands, false in Zambia and true in the Netherlands,
and false in both Zambia and the Netherlands. The distinctions are based on the first
study (Willemsen 8c Van de Vijver, 1)97). An item that is empirically true in Zambia
and false in the Netherlands is an item that showed significant lower mean expected age
of mastery in the Zambian group. For instance, expected age of "eating without help"
was 1.89 in Zambia and 2.64 in the Netherlands. The item, based on this significant
difference, was "If Harriet is almost 2 years old, then she can eat without help. Harrier
is almost 2 years old. Is the following then righr or wrong: Harriet can eat without help."
The Story-LRT consisted of one version of each rule (see Table 1) embedded in
prose passages. There were five tasks varied at rwo levels. First, enzpirrcal trreth-valrre: true
in Zambia and the Netherlands (factual items) and false in Zambia and the Netherlands
(counrerfactual items). Factual items are those in which the age of masrery mentioned
in the premises did not show a significant difference between Zambia and the Nether-
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lands and was equal or higher than the mean expected age in both cultural groups (e.g.,
"If Stephen is 6 years old, he can throw balls." is based on the skill "throwing balls"
which showed a mean expected age of 4.5 i in the Dutch and 4.79 in the Zambian sam-
ple). In the counterfactual items the age mentioned was much lower than the mean
expected age of mastery in both culcural groups (e.g., "If Linda is 1 week old, she can
walk up the stairs."; mean expected age for "walking up the stairs" was 3.24 in the
Netherlands and ~.33 in Zambia).
Table I Logical Reasoning Schemes Used in the Story-LRT
ltem nuntber




Task 1 (p 8c q) --~ p 1 7
Flementary
rule
Task 2 ((p ~ q) 8~ p) --~ q 10 2
Conditional
rule
Task 3 all ps are qs
Syllogism all ms are ps
--------------- 4
all ms are qs
Task 4 p ~ q






Task 5 (((p 8c q) ~ m)8t








Second, reali.rm of the rtory: an unrealistic, make-believe concent and a more realistic con-
tent. Thís distinction was added, because research has shown that when the content of
a reasoning problem is false an ir is embedded in a fairy-tale-like prose passage, per-
formance improves compared to non-fairy-rale-like stories (Dias 8c Harris, 1990;
Markovits 1985). Items with a make-believe content contain sentences like "Some-
where there is a country where all people live in boats "(see item 15, Appendix).
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The tests were adminisrered to 74 Dutch and 100 Zambian women. Results
showed that counterfactual elements decreased the proportion of logically correct
answers for both tasks. Embeddedness of irems in a prose passage facilitated logical rea-
soning, both in the Netherlands and Zambia. The reasoning schemes which showed
signiticanr cross-cultural differences, i.e. higher proportions of logically correct answers
in the Dutch group, were schemes that used negations, like the modus tollens (~ -~ qj
~ ~ql ~ ~~).
The present study focuses on the metacognitive aspects of logical thinking. During
the administration oF the Srory-LRT participants were asked to explain theír answers
and these explanations were recorded. The present article describes the results of a con-
tent analysis of these response explanations, examining differences and similarities
between Zambia and the Netherlands. In addition, the effect of the empirical truth-
value on the explanations is explored. On the basis of the literature ( e.g., Evans, 1989,
19)2; Evans Rc Over, 1)96; Evans ác Pollard, 1990; Griggs 8c Cox, 1982; Wason 8c
Johnson-Laird, 1972), ir seems fair to expect that realism oFproblem content increases
the likelihood of a logical explanation for factual items and decreases the likelihood for
counterfactual items. Furthermore, the effecr of the story-content ( real or make-believe)
on response explanations is studied; we examined whether explanations would refer to
the make-believe elements of items with an unrealistic content and whether factual and
counterfactual items would differ in this respect. In addition, we were interested in the
effect of background variables, like education and employment, on the response expla-
nations. Schooling can be expected to lead to more theoretical solutions and hence, to
more logically correct answers. Finally, the relationschip between the number of logi-
cally correct answers on the Story-LRT and the kinds of response explanations partici-
pants give for their answers, was examined.
Method
Partícípants
The sample consisted of 74 Dutch and 100 Zambian mothers. The participants
were approached via the primary school of their children and via snowball sampling. In
the Dutch sample the average age was 38.1 years (SD - 6.25) and in the Zambian sam-
ple 30.2 years (SD - 8.62).
Most Dutch participants (90~1c) were married while the other mothers were wid-
owed, single or living with a partner without being married. Of the Zambian sample,
65~Ir was were married, 31~1r were single, and 4~7 were widowed. The average number
of children of the Dutch mothers was 2.41 (range: 1 to 4) and for the Zambian moth-
ers 3.00 children (range: 1 to 9).
All Dutch mothers had completed primary and secondary education, and 69q ter-
riary education; the figures for the Zambian mothers were 98~1, 52~,, and 48c1, respec-
tively. There is a bias towards better-educated upper class respondents in our sample;
the national enrollment in tertiary education in 1997 was 47c7 in the Netherlands and
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3o1c in Zambia ( Worldbank, 2000). Of the Dutch sample 54~ was housewife and 46~
had a paid job (7~ was teacher, and 39~I had other professions like cleaner, nurse, artist
and hairdresser). For the Zambian sample these percentages were 47~ and 53 r(22~ was
teacher and ~ 1 Í had other professions, like market vendor, nurse, cleaner, and rypist).
Instruments
The Story -LRT had twenty items (Appendix): the five different logical reasoning
schemes were crossed with the empirical truth-value of the item (two levels) and real-
ism of the story in which the items were embedded (two levels). The content of the
prose passages contained names of people and names of cities, provinces, and countries.
These names were adjusted for each sample (e.g., Amsterdam in the Dutch version
became Lusaka in the Zambian version). Below each item two possible conclusions were
given and participants had to indicate which of the conclusions was correct.
Table 2 Attributes of Response F.xplanations that were Rated
Attrrhnte Dcurription
1. The total explanation is ~ Logical: Participant only refers to the premises to explain her answer.
particularly or exclusively: Example: "Beruure rhilrlren nj 3 yeurt old rurr tell the tínre better than rbíldren nj 6
~ Lo~ical }e~n'c. AnÀtbe rhílAre~ rj6 cart tel! Getter than tbe rbildrerr oj 9. So j ure the Gett."
~ b4ixed (logical and ~irem ti)
empirical) ~ Mixed: Partiiipant uses logical as well as empirical information to
~ Empirical explain her answer.
~ Not elear Example: "Childrrn aj )}eur.r ~n'e Gi,~ ennti~h to tel! tlie tune. Children rj3 yeurr old
etrn te!! better tbun c) }eurr nld." (item I 3)
~ Empirical: Participant uses non-essenrial information from the story
or own experience to explain her answer
Example: "T{ie nne uho ir 3}eart n!d rannot tr!! exutt!} uhat time it íi. tbun the onr
ul~~~ i.~ )}eur.r nld. An.ruet' 2. tbey ure jtect wn yntmg. Sane don't e:en knntr tbe uauh.
Tbe} u~illGreak ít." (irem 13)
~ Not clear. It~s really nor clear what strategy the participant has used
to reach an answer.
2. Is the explanation sufficient Participant gives both premises or the empirical explanation is suffi-
fi~r the answer? cient for the answer given by the participant.
Example 1(borh premises): "Chíklren oj8 }ear.r n!d ran rntnrt firtter tbuu d~íldren nj
C}eura n!d und it rtuter thaJ rhilAren nj (}ear~ can rr~unt bettrr thun d~ildren oj -Í }eart
n!d Thu~. ~fiildren oj8 yearr cun rnnnt Getter thun tbrzre nj~." (item 1O
Example ?(empirical explanarion suftïcient): "Tbe ate uho ít ?}earl nld. he eun-
rtnt drect lrrnrer!}, ut tbe runre tinte he iunnnt ru ínr. He mul drou n. " ( i tem 15 )
~. Are the premises mentioned a) Participant repeats the tirst premise.
in the explanation? Example: "Ijlrene it 3}euri old. then rhe ran do additinn." (item 3)
a) Premise a b) Participant repeats second premise.
b) Premise b Example: "Irenr í~ 3}eurr rild." (item 2)
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4. Is categorical informarion used Participanr refers to a category.
which is nor mentioned in the Examplr: "0lder,~irLr run da thut better"(irem 3J
story?
5. Is individual informarion used Participanc refers to her own experience.
which is not mentioned in the Examplr: ",bly~ rhrldren rnuld rrnt do rh~n ut thur age." (irem 4)
story?
(. Is rhere explicit reference to Participant refers explicitly to the story.
the story! Example: '7'be rtory ~u}.r..." " It:r te!ling ter..."
7. Is non-essential infiirmation Participant refers to other sentences or words in rhe story, than the
from the story used.' sentences of the premises.
Example "Beruure hrr ~;randnmther, ttho ua.r rrrr~rt.red, uvnted to ,~n und rer tbut
~nrndchilrl." (irem 12)
8. Does the participant indicate Partic'ipant laughs or makes remarks ahout the tasks being strange or
that she finds ir strangelamusing! funny.
). Does the participant indicate Participant makes remarks about the tasks being diffictdt or confusing.
that she finds it difficuldhard'
10. Have there been any Necessary interventions made by the administraror in order to get a
interventions ofthe test- clearer picture ofan explanation given by the participant.
administrator? Example: "1 u~ntrld lrke tn knntt uhy ynu ttiink the anru~er i~ nundier Il"
l 1. Has there been a"false start"~ Participant firsr gíves answer number I and explains that, but then
scvirches to answer number 2 and explains that as her final answer (or
vice versa).
Example: "l~Grmficm 1. Irene i.r nnt 3 yeur.r rild. thut'r u h} rhe ~z~nnot do udditinnr. Oh
rorry, rt} ru~ntber?. Sr, firxe Irene ir 3 yeart old. .rhe ran do udsfitiora." (item ?)
12. How many sentences does Number of srnrences of the explanation.
the explanarion have'
The internal consistencies were . 88 for the Dutch group and .77 for the Zambian. These
values are appropriate; yet, the reliabilities were not equal for the two samples, F(97,
67) - 1.92, p ~.01. The significant difference was not caused by specific items; the
item-total correlations were higher in the Dutch group for almost all items. The
response explanations were audiotaped and transcribed.
Two independent judges scored the response explanations. Thirreen questions per
response explanation per item were answered by the judges (see Table 2). Nine yues-
tions addressed the way participants had solved the task. These solution process indica-
tors were: total explanation i.r logiial verrus enapiriial, rufficienc'y of the exjrlanation, mention-
irtg ofprentire a, rrtentioning of prenti.re b, u.re of categoric-al inforntation, rr.te of indit~idrral infor-
ntation, expliiit referenc-e to the .rtory, ttre of non-e.rrential inforntation from the .rtory, and nuntber
of ~entenc-e.r of the explanation. The other four questions, referred more to communicative
attributes of the explanation . These included, finding the itent .rtrange~anruring, finding the
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item difficultlhard, intervention(s) ntade hy the test administrator, and ntaking a false start
(when a participant starts with a new solution after having tried but not completed
another one). The interrater agreement was analysed for 25 participants. The average
rare of agreement was 88~1 over the thirteen attributes and twenty items, which was
considered to be satisfactory.
Administration
All participants were tested individually. In the Netherlands this was done by the first
author and in Zambia by the first author and a local female assistant. The Story-LRT
was presented in written form. For the Dutch participants the instruments were in
Dutch. Seventy of the Zambian participants got an English version and thirty got a
Nyanja version, the most common local language. The English version was translated
form the Dutch and back-translated in order to check the accuracy of the translation.
The Nyanja version was translated from and then back-translated into English.
Preliminary analyses on the effect of language (English versus Nyanja) showed that four
of the 20 items of the Story-LRT showed a significant difference; the English version
had a signiiicanrly higher performance for three items. Since the effect of language of
administration appeared to be small, this variable was not taken into account in the
remaining analyses.
Originally we had planned to measure metacognition with the "Think-Aloud"
method. Participants were asked to think aloud while solving the logical problems. It
turned out to be too difficult to solve the problems and think-aloud at the same time;
the "thinking-aloud" interfered the thought process. Therefore, the participants were
asked, immediately after responding to an item, how they came up with the answer
they just gave.
Results
The average scores per aaribute of the response explanation for each cultural group
are given in Table 3. Univariate t tests were carried out (because the difference between
the two cultural groups was tested 13 times, a Bonferroni correction was applied and
an alpha of .0038 (a.05113) was used). On the first attribute, where a low score implies
that the total explanation was more logical and a higher score indicates a more empir-
ical explanation, Zambian participants showed a significant higher score than Dutch
participants (p ~.05). Also, premise B was mentioned significantly more often by
Dutch participants (j~ ~ .05) and Zambian participants used significantly more non-
essential information from the story to explain their answer (j~ ~.05).
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Table 3. Means of At[ribntes of Response Explanation Averaged across Items.
Criltrrre
Attrihute Dutch Zambian t (168)
Logicallempirical explanation 1.36 1.64 -i.75~`
Suftïcient explanation 2.25 2.21 0.74
Premise A 0.67 0.61 1.25
Premise B 0.62 0.50 3.31~`
Categorical information 0.13 0.15 -0.80
Individual information 0.01 0.00 2.65
Explicit reference ro srory 0.33 O.i6 -0.76
Non-essential information 0.12 0.29 -7.24~`
Srrangelamusing 0.05 0.03 1.7)
Difficuldhard O.OS 0.03 2.38
Intervention 0.02 0.09 -6.51 ~`
False start 0.01 0.02 -3.17~
Number of sentences 1.76 1.69 0.94
~` ~ ~ .05 ( after Bonferroni correction)
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For example, a Dutch participant explained her answer to item 12 (see Appendix)
as follows:
"Linda ian u~alk up the.rtairr. If Linda i.r 1 u~eek old, rhe can u~alk up the.rtair.r. And
irt tbe end it .rayr .rhe i.r 1 u~eek old. So Linda can u~alk up the ,rtairr. "
A Zambian participant explaining her answer to the same item:
"Ntrmber 1. Linda u~a.r 1 year old and after Girth her ~iarent.r kneur that their dattgh-
ter u.~ar very bright and krteu~ hou~ to clinzG zrp the .rtair.r. And one day her grandntoth-
er came to see her. "
Furthermore, there were fewer incerventions by the test administrator in the Dutch
group (~ ~.05), while Zambian participants more often made a false start (~i ~.05). It
seems that Zambian participants, especially at the beginning of the test, more often did
not encirely understand what chey had to do:
A Zambian parcicípant explaining her answer to item 1(P is participant, I is
interviewer):
P: "Both are right. "
L"Only one of therrt it right. Why do you think both are right?"
P: " I've read the .rentence here and 1'z~e read that Alex i.r 1 year old. Alex i.r 1 year
old. Alex ir not 1 year old (P laughr). No, anru~er 1 i.r right. Tbe fir.rt one ir right."
No significant differences were found for the other attribuces of the response explanation.
A second set ofanalyses addressed the question of whether ic was possible to reduce
the 13 attributes of response explanations to a smaller set of scales. Individual respons-
es were averaged across all 20 items. The patterning of the response explanations was
examined in a factor analysis of che scores of che 13 attributes of Zambian and Dutch
participants. The first three eigenvalues were i.41, 1.76, and 1.63, explaining 52.4~7é
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of the variance. The Varimax-rotated loadings are presented in Table 4. On the first fac-
tor the attributes total explanation i.r more enapirical than logical, mentioning of~remi.re a, men-
tioning ofprenzi.re G, u.re of categorical information. and explicit reference to the .rtory showed the
highest loading (-.89, .87, .78, -.82, and .51, respectively). These attributes all involve
logical elements of the explanation and therefore the first factor refers to a focus on log-
ical attributes of the explanation. On the second facror, labeled "elaboration of the expla-
natinn", .ruffrciency of the explanation, u.re of non-e.rrential rnfornzation fronz the .rtory, and nrrnt-
her of ,renteracer had the highest loading (.67, 63, and .80, respectively). Ure of individual
irrfornzation (.32), strange~antzr,ring (.40), difficult~hard (.69), intervention f~y te.rt adntirti.rtra-
tor (.69), and fál.re .rtart (.59) load highest on the third factor, which was labeled "coru-
naunicative attriGttte.t".




Logicallempirical explanation -.89 .35 .O8
Sufficient explanacion .34 .67 -.29
Premise a .87 .14 -.16
Premise b .78 .26 -.15
Categorical information -.82 .17 .00
Individual information -.20 11 3?
Explicit reference to srory .51 11 .19
Non-essential information -.l3 63 .~~9
Strangelamusing .l 1 -.02 í0
Difficuldhard .02 .09 69
Intervention -.09 -.03 69
False start -.06 -.03 .59
Number of senrences 02 80 .13
Scores on the three scales were urilized in the remaining analyses. The five high
loading attributes of the first factor conscituted a scale labeled Logir, analogously, three
attributes made up Elaboration, and four atrributes Communication (ure of irtdia~idzral
informution was left out due to the relatively low loading). For each participant three
standardized scale scores were computed for each of the 20 items (i.e., srandardized sum
scores of rhe attribures thar had the highest loading on a factor).
The first three research questions were tested in a repeated-measures ANOVA for
each scale. Culture (2 levels) was the between-subjects factor, empirical truth-value (2
levels), realism of story content (2 levels), and reasoning scheme (5 levels) were the
within-subjecr factors. The scale scores were the dependent variables (all variables were
srandardized across all subjects in order to facilitare interpretation of scores). The eta
square values (proportion of variance accounted for by the factor) and their significance
Metacognition ~~
have been presented in Table 5. The Logic scale showed no significant main effects. A
significant interaction effect was found for culture and realism of story content, F(1,
156) - 4.90, p ~ .05; Zambian participants gave relatively fewer logical explanations
for rhe items embedded in a realistic story rhan for the irems embedded in a make-
believe story, while the opposite was found for the Dutch participants (Zambian means:
-0.06 and 0.00, Dutch: 0.07 and 0.00, respectively) (mean scores based on a standard-
ization across all participants in both samples are reported here in order to facilitate the
interpreration of these scores). Culture by reasoning scheme had a significant effect,
F(4, 153) - 11.98, p ~.001.
Table i. Results of Repeated Measures ANOVAs with Empirical Truth-Value, Realism of Story
Concen[, and Reasoning Scheme as Independent. Variables and the Scale Scores (Logic,
Elaboration, and Communication) as Dependent Variablesa
Effeit rize.r
Srinz'e Logic Elaboration Communication
Culrure (C) OI .03~` .02
Empirical truth-value (E) .00 ,p0 Op
Realism (R) .00 .00 .00
Scheme (S) .01 .O1 .00
C x E .00 .01 00
C x R 03~ 10~~~ 00
C x S .~~~~~ ~g~m~ .03
E x R 00 .00 00
E x S .O 1 .00 .00
R x S .00 .00 .00
CxExR 00 A4~ 01
C x E x S .09~`~` .06 .02
C x R x S .O1 .07~ .04
ExRxS 00 .00 .00
CxExRxS 04 04 .01
aCells represent estimated proportions of variance accounted for (h ~)
~ p ~ .05. ~~ p ~ .01. ~~~ p ~ .ool
Empirical explanations were given relatively more ofren for the items of the condition-
al rule in the Zambian group and for the elementary rule in the Dutch group (Zambian:
conditional rule: llI --0.10, elementary rule: ~I - 0.06, other rules: hf --0.04; Dutch:
condirional rule: M - 0.14, elementary rule: !ll --0.11, other rules: ~1 - 0.05). For
example, a Zambian participant explained her answer ro item 2 by providing an empir-
ical explanation :
P: "1 rerte cannot do additirn. "
I: "Ix~l~y itrrt~ Why do yott think ro?..
P: " She ir too yoi~itg."
A Dutch panicipant explains her answer to item 17 ( empirical answer to an elementary rule):
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"Stanley i.r not 1 year old. A child of 1 year i.r not able to dre.r.r hsm.relf. He can do that
when he i.r older, right?"
Finally, culture by empirical truth-value by logical reasoning scheme had a significant
effect on the Logic scale scores (F(4, 153) - 3.70, p ~ .O1); counterfactual items of the
elementary rule and the conditional rule led to relatively more logical explanations
compared to the other logical reasoning schemes for the Zambian participants, while
the opposire was found for the Dutch participants. Counterfactual items of Task 1 and
Task 2(items 7, 17, and 2 and 12) showed relatively more logical explanations in
Zambia compared to the other tasks, while the opposite was found for the Dutch group.
The following two quotations illustrate this. A Zambian participant explained her
answer to item 12 as follows:
"If Linda i.r one week old, then .rhe can walk up the .rtair.r. Linda i.r 1 week old now
and rhe walks arortnd. She can walk up the .rtair.r. "
A Dutch participant said (about the same item):
`No! That r not po.r.rible. A child of one week! No way. If Linda i.r 1 week oldshe can
walk ttp the .rtairr. Nobody is gonna naake nte beliez~e that!"
The Elaboration scale showed a main effect for culture, F(l, 157) - 5.47, p ~ .05;
Zambian participants elaborated more in their explanations (Zambian: M- 0.04,
Dutch: ~f --0.05). A significant interaction effecr was found for culture by realism of
story content, F(l, 157) - 17.93,~ ~.001. Dutch participants elaborated relatively less
when explaining their answers on the items embedded in a make-believe conrext (lbl -
-0.12) compared to Zambian participants ( M --0.08), while this was equal for the
items embedded in a realistic context.
The larger elaboration is illustrated in the following two responses to item 20. A
Zambian participant gave the following explanation:
"Number 1. Drana i.r no longer afraid of the ttorm. Caure it .ray.r if Diana ir 9 yearr
old. then rhe i.r no longer afraid of the storrra. One day a firhernaan had problenzr with
hir óoat and decide.r to go to the irland. Diana war 9 yearr old nou~ and bring.r the
fi.rherrnan to her hou.re, because she wa.r not afraidof the .rtorrn. "
A Dutch participant explained:
"Diana i.r no longer afraidof tbe rtorna. Becaure it says, if Diana r.r 9 yearr old, .rhe
i.r no lorrger afraidof the .rtornt, and .rhe i.r 9 yearr old. "
Culture by logical reasoning scheme also showed a significant interaction effect (F (4,
154) - 13.13,p ~.001); Dutch participants elaborated relatively more in their explanation
of che syllogisms than Zambian participants, while the opposite was found for rhe other
logical reasoning schemes with the biggest difference for the elementary rule (Dutch: ele-
mentary rule: lbí --0.21, syllogism: 111 - 0.10, other rules: Itil --0.06, Zambian: elemen-
tary rule: 111 - 0.15, syllogism: Itif --0.07, other rules: ltit - 0.03). The following quota-
tion is a good example of the relatively long answers of the Dutch to syllogisms (item 18):
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"All ihrldren of the faniily who u~alk for the firrt tinze, are tu~o dayr old. Becaute it
say.r here that all ehildrert of this fantily u~ho talk for the firrt time, are two dayr old.
All c-hildren, u~ho tcalk for the fir~t tirrze. talk far the firrt tinte. Let'r .ree.... (P readr
the rtory agarrz). It goe.r together. Walkirtg fnr the firrt tirrze goe.r together u~zth talkrrt~
for the firtt tirrze. Thert it nzzrft be hury indeed. If they are 2 days old. Erpecially if all
clildren are 2 day~~ old. (P lazrgh~).
The triple interaction of culture by empirical rruth-value by realism of story con-
tent had a significant effect for the Elaboration scale scores. Zambian participants elab-
orated relatively more on the counterfactual items embedded in a realistic context and
less when these irems were embedded in a make-believe context compared to the fac-
rual items A final, significant interaction effect was found for culture by realism of story
contenr by logical reasoning scheme, F(4, 154) - 2.74, li ~ .05; Zambian participants
elaborated more in their explanation for the items embedded in a make-believe context
compared to the realistic context, while Dutch parricipants for all schemes elaborated
more on the items embedded in a realistic story. This difference between Zambia and
the Netherlands was largest for the elementary rule and the dilemma (Zambian: elemen-
tary rule and dilemma embedded in a realistic story, respectively: ~11 - 0.07 and Iti1 - 0.04;
elementary rule and dilemma embedded in a make-believe story: Iti1 - 0.24 and ~Ll -
0.12; Dutch: elementary rule and dilemma in a realistic story: IV1 --0.09 and Itií --
0.06; elementary rule and dilemma in a make-believe story: Itil --0.34 and: h1 --0.17).
The Communication scale showed no significant effects at all.
The next analysis addressed the influence of background variables, such as educa-
rion on the response explanations (the scale scores). Multiple regression analyses were
carried out in which participants' education, age, number of children, and employment
status (dichotomously scored as either or not employed) were used as predictors of the
average score on the Logic, Elaboration, and Communication scales (see Table 6). The
Logic scale was considered first. Education and age were the most effective predictors
(b - 0.29, p ~ .01, G- -0.24, p ~ .05), showing that participants with more education
and participants who were younger more often gave a logical explanation.
Table 6. Multiple Regression Analyses for Background Variables Predicting the Average Score on
the Logical Scale, the Communica[ion Scale and the Elaboration Scale
Logic Elaboration Communication
Background variables
Education 0.29~`~ 0.04 -0.14
Age -0.24~` 0.01 -0.08
Number of children -0.00 -0.04 0.22~~
Employed -0.06 -0.05 -0.02
R' 0.0)~~` 0,00 0.07~
~p~.05.~~p~.Ol.
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For the Elaboration scale no significant predictors were found. For the Communication
scale there was only one significant predictor, namely number of children (- - 0.22, p
~.OS), indicating that participants with more children showed more communicative
attributes in their explanation.
The next analysis addressed the relation between the scale scores and the scores on
the Story-LRT (i.e., number of logically correcc solutions). For each cultural group cor-
relations were calculated between, on the one hand, mean scores of factual items, coun-
terfactual items, items embedded in a realistic story, and items embedded in a make-
believe story and, on the other hand, standardized scores on the Logic, Communication,
and Elaboration scale (see Table 7). With regard to the Logic scale, all types of items
showed a positive, significant correlation in both cultural groups (p ~.OS). This indi-
cates thar, not surprisingly, a more logical solution of the problems (e.g., total expla-
nation is more logical than empirical, both premises are used, or explicit reference to
the story is made) were associated with a higher score on the Story-LRT.
On the Elaboration scale the Zambian participants showed significant positive cor-
relations for the number of logically correct answers on the factual items (r -.37, p ~.O1)
Table 7. Correlations between the Scale Scores (Logic, Elaboration, and Communication) and the
Scores on the Stor}--LRT for Zambian and Dutch Participants
Zambian Dutch
Scale
FAC C-FAC Real Make- FAC C-FAC Real Make-
believe believe
Logic .33~ .49~~` .35~~` .54~~ 49~~ . 68~~ .65~s` 68~~
Elaboration .37~~` .16 .24~` .21~` -.15 -.i3~` -.28~` -.31~
Communication .02 -.16 -.I6 -.07 -.11 -.16 -.16 -.13
FAC- factual items. C-FAC- counterfactual items.
Real - realistic story. Make-believe - make-believe story.
~p~.o5.~~p~.o1.
and both on the items embedded in a realistic context and in a make-believe context
(respectively, r-.24, r- .21, both p ~ .05).
This means that the more sufficient the answers of the Zambian participants were,
or the more non-essential information from the story they used, or the more sentences
to explain their answer, the more logically correct answers they gave for the items,
except for the counterfactual items. The Dutch participants, however, had lower scores
on all types of items, except for the factual items, if they used attributes in their re-
sponse explanations that scored high on the Elaboration scale. For the Communication
scale no significant correlations were found.
Discussion
Metacognitive aspects of abstract thinking were examined cross-culturally. Zambian
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and Dutch mothers were given embedded deductive thinking tasks that involved the
application of reasoning schemes, such as the modus rollens and dilemmas, to stories
about children's activities. The items differed in realism of content (realistic versus
make-believe context) and empirical truth-value (factual vs counterfactual). Response
motivations provided by the participants immediately after their answers were rated on
thirteen attributes, such as logical versus empirical explanation, sufficiency of the
explanation, and reference to the premises. The proportion of logically correct answers
was high in both countries (Willemsen t3c Van de Vijver, 2000) and the nature of the
response explanations did not differ substantially.
There is abundant evidence to demonstrate that the structure of abstract thinking
is universal (e.g., Jensen, 1980; Van de Vijver, 1997). If tests of abstracr thinking are
administered in differenr cultures, ir is common to find similar factor analytic solutions.
This similarity can only be found if factors that influence the relative difficulty of an
item are invariant across cultures. Similarly, the order of difficulty of reasoning schemes
tends to be similar across cultures. Moreover, in our opinion the occurrence of most rea-
soning schemes in daily life can be safely assumed. In informal contacts in Zambia we
often heard types of reasoning with a modus ponens structure, like: "If you send your
child to nursery school, it can read and write at an earlier age." Another example is the
belief, said to be common among Zambian mothers, that "If a baby is still breast-fed,
while the next child is born that needs breast-feeding as well, those two children will
fight a lot when they get older".
The present study has extended the analysis to the area of inetacognition. We
found some cross-cultural differences in metacognition, but the similarities were more
salient. It is unlikely in our view that dissimilar metacognitive processes are found in a
cross-cultural study that deals with stimulus domains familiar to participants in all the
groups that take part..
Still, various small cross-cultural differences were observed. First, rhis is the case
for some of the response attributes listed in Table 3. For example, compared to the
Dutch mothers, the Zambian mothers used more empirical justifications, which is com-
parible with findings described by Scribner (1979). The Zambian participants were
somewhat more inclined to "contextualize" their solution (by using non-essential infor-
mation more often) and to treat the problem less as a logical task (by referring less to
rhe second premise). Also, experimenter intervencions and false starts were more com-
mon in the Zambian sample.
A second source ofcross-cultural difference was that more elaboration in the expla-
nation (e.g., using more sentences and using more non-essential information from the
story to explain your answer) in Zambia was associated with more and in the
Netherlands with fewer logically correct answers. For example, in explaining her
answer to item 20 a Zambian participant said:
"Diana i.r no longer afraidof the .rtor~n. Wl7ere they are liviitg...., thit irland i.r
alu~ays baving rtorrrz. Sn sbe i.r rr.red".
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A Dutch mother explained her response in the following way:
"Diana i.r afraid of the .rtornz. The irland i.r far away. Nobody el.re live.r there".
One explanation could be that the same information is interpreted in a dífferent way
and used to explain different answers. Another explanation might be that Dutch found
answers and motivations often so obvious that only for the more difficult logical prob-
lems (which showed a higher proportion of empirical answers) more elaborate answers
were provided, while the Zambian women were more inclined to explain their answers,
irrespective of the difficulty of the items. This interpretation finds support in observa-
tions made during the test administration of the Dutch mothers; they often indicated
that the answer was so obvious that no motivation was needed.
The question has to be addressed whether there is an overall pattern to these cross-
cultural differences. We think that two observations are pertinent here. First, the propor-
tion of variance accounted for by culture was modest in the analyses, pointing to small
differences. The second observation derives from a factor analysis which showed three fac-
tors in rhe thirteen task attributes, namely: logical (vs empirical) reasoning, elaboration
of response, and communicative attributes (e.g., metacommunication abour the difficul-
ty of the task). Cross-cultural differences were only found for elaboration, with Zambians
giving more elaborate explanations. It is psychologically interesting co nore that the cross-
cultural differences on the various attributes ceased to be significant when all logic-relat-
ed attributes were combined in a single score. This finding replicates earlier conclusions
that from a cross-cultural perspective the similariries were much larger than the differ-
ences (Willemsen 8c Van de Vijver, 2000). A third indication as to how the cross-cultur-
al differences should be interpreted comes from the regression analyses. It was found that
education and age could explain performance differences in the combined samples; par-
ticipants with more education in the Netherlands and in Zambia gave more logical expla-
nations, and older participants gave more empirical explanations than younger ones.
The cross-cultural differences found in the present study seem to be related to
familiarity with testing in general and with rhe solution of problems out of any practi-
cal context rather than to any deep-rooted differences in the ability to apply reasoning
schemes. Differences in test-wiseness (Sarnacki, 1979) could be the cause of differences
between Dutch and Zambian participants.
The acceptance of premises in everyday reasoning is mainly dependent on one's
pragmatic knowledge. Simply accepting premises without any check of their truthful-
ness in order to reach a conclusion is uncommon in daily life. People often will first
enter into discussions, think of new evidence to make the premises more acceptable, or
just refuse to accept them. If you are not used to reasoning solely from the given prem-
ises, it can be a difficult rask. Evans and Over (1996) state that "the unrealistic feature
of most deductive reasoning experiments, especially in the work on belief bias, is the
requirement, thar subjects take the premises they are given as, in effect, certain and add
nothing, however relevant, to them" (p.112). One participant in our study said: "Do 1
have to an.rwer like it i.r irz the rtory, et~en if I think it r.r u~rong?"'.
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In the lirerature a distincrion has been made between formal and informal reason-
ing, which is related to the discussion about the role of pragmatic knowledge in logi-
cal problem solving. Galotti (1989) defines formal reasoning as the solving of problems
for which all premises or irems of informarion required to solve the problem are speci-
fied in advance. Moreover, the problems are self-contained, the contents of rhe problems
are often academic and problems are solved for their own sake. Informal reasoning cov-
ers the intellectual activities that compose the rhinking done in everyday lives: plan-
ning, making commitments, evaluating arguments, discovering, and choosing options.
In this type of reasoning premises tend not to be fully specified in the presentarion of
the problem; the content of the problem often has personal relevance, and problems are
often solved as a means of achieving other goals. Galotti ( 1989) argues thar there are at
least three opinions on the relationship between boch types of reasoning. The first view
holds that formal reasoning is part of everyday reasoning; for example, syllogisms can
be found in everyday conrexts. In this view, formal reasoning should be easier than
everyday reasoning, because in everyday reasoning the premises have to be generated
and evaluated and a possible emotional attachment to the premises or conclusions has
to be overcome. According to the second view, the same processes play a role in formal
and everyday reasoning, but formal reasoning involves more work (pragmatic knowledge
often has to be ignored) and thus, is more difficult. In rhe third and lasc view the two
types of reasoning are fundamenrally distinct and involve entirely different processes.
In our tasks we attempted to combine features of formal and everyday reasoning.
Both the Story-LRT and the LRT (Willemsen 8c Van de Vijver, 2000) are tasks of for-
mal reasoning dealing with everyday conrents. However, the Story-LRT has more fea-
rures of everyday reasoning than the LRT, because the stories in which the reasoning
schemes were embedded provide more information than just the premises. Embedded
icems dealing with identical reasoning schemes tended to be easier than non-embedded
items ( even when all other features of the items were controlled for, such as empirical
rrurh-value). If embeddedness can be considered as a characteristic of everyday reason-
ing, our findings are in line with the second view distinguished by Galotti. However,
in order to evaluate rhe effect ofembeddedness on reasoning, it should be kept in mind
that the everyday information in the stories of the Story-LRT was always compatible
with the logically correct solution. For example, in one of the items rhere was a girl of
one week old who could walk up the stairs. The additional information in the item
specifies that the parents soon after birth discovered the child's brightness and that
grandmother wanted to see how special her grandchild is. In all items the additional
information was in agreement with the premises. Participants used chis additional
information in their response explanation. For instance, one of them explained:
"Linda can u~alk up the ttair.r. ,rinz~ly fiecau.re .toort after her Girth the parent.r noticed
that rhe u~a.r very bright and at the age of u~eek .rhe could u~alk. She could ualk up.rtairr.
And then the grandnzother u~anted to see hou~ .rpec-ial .rhe u~a.r by ob.rerz~ing the child. She
u.anted to knou~ for .cure if the child could u~alk at one u~eek, becau.re it i.r very .rpecial. "
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If the additional information would be incompatible with the premises (e.g., the
parents thought that they had a dull child), embeddedness might inhibit logically cor-
rect reasoning. In fact, a somewhat similar effect was found in the comparison of factu-
al and counterfactual items; the latter were found to lead to fewer logically correct solu-
tions. If our reasoning is correct, the distinctions described by Galotti about the rela-
tive di~culty of formal and everyday reasoning may be an oversimplification. The rel-
ative difficulty of embedded and non-embedded problems may depend on a number of
factors: embeddedness will only facilitate logical reasoning if the pragmatic knowledge
that is evoked by the story is in line with the logically correct solution.
In studies assessing metacognition one can never be sure whether the given
response explanations or "think-aloud" responses are really describing the way partici-
pants solved the problems. Participants may not report everything they think or may
be unable to explain how they arrived at a certain conclusion (Baron, 1988). In a cross-
cultural study such differences may be amplified when the samples differ in background
characteristics that are presumably related to rhe ability to express one's thoughts, such
as educarion. In the light of this argument, it ís even more remarkable that we observed
such close cross-cultural similarities. Another limitation of the present study involves
the level of schooling our participants. Future studies will have to examine the gener-
alizability of the present findings to unschooled populations.
In conclusion, cultural differences in cognition were not basic, but referred more
to "situations to which particular cognitive processes are applied" (Cole, 1979, p. 23~);
our data strongly suggest that the differences in logical thinking of Zambian and Dutch
participants are not qualitative and far reaching, but involve rather peripheral attrib-
utes of cognition that are strongly influenced by schooling.
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Item 1 Alex and his birthday
Alex and his family live in Livingstone. Today he sits in the garden and the family cel-
ebrates his birthday. He is 1 year old now and sucks his thumb.
Which of tbe fallau~iisg is tben true:
1. Alex is 1 year old.
2. Alex is not 1 year old.
Item 2 Nursery school
Irene lives in a Lusaka and she is a very smart girl who likes to learn. If Irene is 3 years
old, then she can do additions. At a certain day the teacher of a nursery school comes to
see her. She is 3 years old now and she wants to go to nursery school.
Which of the follou~ing i.t thert true:
1. Irene cannot do additions.
2. Irene can do additions.
Item 3 A primary school in Lusaka
In a primary school in Lusaka the girls are very busy learning how to knit. At the end
of the year the teacher checks how well the girls can knit. To her surprise she finds that
the girls of 8 years old knir better than the girls of 10 years old. The girls of 10 years
old knir better than the girls of 12 years old.
Which of the fi~llou.ing i.r then true:
L In this school girls of 8 years old do not knic better than girls of 12 years old.
2. In this school girls of 8 years old knit berter than girls of 12 years old.
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Item 4 A primary school in Ndola
There is a primary school in Ndola. This school wants all children to learn to read and
write at the same time. All children who write the first words are about 7 years old. All
children who read for the first time, write the firsr words.
Which of the follou~ing i.r then true:
1. All children in this school who read for the first time, are about 7 years old.
2. No children in this school who read for the first time, are about 7 years old.
Item 5 The Chitula family
The Chitula family lives in Southern Province. The family has many children. One of
their children is called Anna. She is a bright girl. If Anna is 1 year old and she can call
herself by her own name, then she can write her own name. But even if Anna is 1 year
and she cannot call herself by her own name, then she can write her own name.
Which of the follou~fng is then trire:
1. If Anna is 1 year old, then she cannot write her own name.
2. If Anna is 1 year old, then she can write her own name.
Item 6 A primary school in Eastern Province
In a primary school in Eastern Province the children have to take lots of tests every year.
This year the teacher wants to test how well che children can write. The test shows that
children of 9 years old can write better than children of l years old. Children of l years
old can write better than children of 5 years old.
Which of the follou~irzg i.r then true:
1. Children of 9 years old write better rhan children of 5 years old.
2. Children of 9 years old do not write better than children of 5 years old.
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Item 7 Cold winters in Lusaka
Sometimes the winters in Lusaka are very cold. Miriam lives in Lusaka and she needs
some warm rlothes. She is 2 years old and knits a warm sweater.
Which of the fe~llou~ing i.r then trtre:
1. Miriam is not 2 years old.
2. Miriam is 2 years old.
Item 8 The Mwanza family
The Mwanza family in Lusaka has many children; so the mother teaches her children to
do a lot of things by themselves. All children of this family who dress without help, are
2 years old. The mother is very happy about the fact that all children who bath with-
out help, dress without help.
Whic-h of the follou~ing ir then true:
1. No children of the Mwanza family who bath without help, are about 2 years old.
2. All children of the Mwanza family who bath without help, are abour 2 years old.
Item 9 Patricia in primary school
In a primary school in Lusaka the children have to learn lots of things when they are
young. Patricia goes to this primary school. If Patricia is 9 years old and she can do divi-
sions, then she can do multiplications. But even if Patricia is 9 years old and she can-
not do divisions, then she can do multiplications.
Which of the follou~iitg is then trrre:
1. If Patricia is ) years old, then she can do multiplications.
2. If Patricia is ) years old, then she cannot do multiplications.
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Item 10 Stephen and his nephew
Stephen lives in Chipata where there is much space for children to play. Next to the
house where he lives some boys are often playing football. If Stephen is 6 years old, then
he can throw the ball. One day a nephew, who has not seen Stephen for several years,
comes to visit him. Stephen is 6 years old now and he plays football with some friends.
The nephew asks him to throw the ball.
Which of the follou~ing i.r then true:
1. Stephen can throw the ball.
2. Stephen cannot throw the ball.
Item 11 A family with many children
In a far away country lives a family with many children. The youngest son of the fam-
ily is named John. He is 1 year old now and cries because of hunger.
Which of the follou~ing ir then true:
1. John is not 1 year old.
2. John is 1 year old.
Item 12 Linda and her grandmother
In a far country there lives a little girl named Linda. Soon after her birth the parents
notice that she is very brighr. If Linda is 1 week old, then she can walk up the stairs.
Her grandmother wants to see how special her grandchild is, so she decides to visit her.
Linda is 1 week old now and she walks around.
Which of the follou~ing i.r then true:
1. Linda can walk up the stairs.
2. Linda cannot walk up the stairs.
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Item 13 A small village
There is said to be a small village somewhere in the middle of nowhere, where children
develop in a strange way. For example, in this village the children who are 3 years old
can tell better what rime ir is, than the children of C years old. The children of 6 years
old can tell better what time it is than the children of 9 years old.
Whirh of the f~lloicing is then true:
l. In this village the children of ~ years old can tell better what time it is than children
of 9 years old.
2. In this villa~;e the children of 3 years old cannot tell better what time it is chan chil-
dren of 9 years old.
Item 14 Rain and darkness
Somewhere there is a country where it seldom rains and there is only one dark night a
year. All children in this country who are afraid of the rain, are abour 4 years old. All
children who are afraid of the dark, are afraid of the rain.
Whrrh of the follou~ing i~~ then trrte..
l. No children in this country who are afraid of the dark, are about 4 years old.
2. All children in this country who are afraid of the dark, are about 4 years old.
Item 1 ~ Everywhere water
Somewhere there is a country where all people live in boats. The parents in this coun-
try are afraid that their children might drown because there is water everywhere. A
young boy named Paul, lives in this country. If Paul is 2 years old and he can dress
without help, then he can swim. But even if Paul is 2 years old and he cannot dress
without help, then he can swim.
lY~'hich nf the folloa~~ing i.r then true:
1. If Paul is 2 years old, then he can swim.
2. If Paul is 2 years old, then he cannot swim.
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Item 16 A strange country
There is said to be a country where nobody can count very well, besides the teachers in
primary school. They teach the children how to count. In this country children of 8
years old can count better, than children of 6 years old. Children of 6 years old can count
better than children of 4 years old.
Which of the follou~rng is then true:
1. In this country children of 8 years old cannot count better than children of 4 years old.
2. In this country children of 8 years old can count better than children of 4 years old.
Item 17 Smart children
There is a country where children are able to do many things as soon as they are born.
One of the families in this country has a son named Stanley. He is 1 year old and he can
dress without help.
Which of the follou~ing is then true:
1. Stanley is 1 year old.
2. Stanley is not 1 year old.
Item 18 A family living overseas
There is a family, living somewhere overseas, abouc which the story goes thac all their
children learn very fast. All children of this family who talk for the frst time, are 2 days
old. The mother is very busy looking after her children, since all children who walk for
che first time, talk for the first time.
Which of the follou~ing is then true:
1. All children of this family who walk for the first time, are 2 days old.
2. No children of this family who walk for the first time, are 2 days old.
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Item 19 Every day a party
Somewhere there is a country where they have a party every day. The children in this
counrry are taughr how to have a good time at a parry. Robert lives in this country. If
Robert is 3 years old and he can sing, then he can dance. But even if Robert is 3 years
old and he cannot sing, then he can dance.
Which of the foll~u~ing i.r theis trrre:
1. If Robert is 3 years old, then he cannot dance.
2. If Robert is 3 years old, then he can dance
Item 20 A small island
Somewhere there is a small island where it is always storming. Nobody wants to live
there, except for one Family. The family has a daughter named Diana. If Diana is 9 years
old, then she is no longer afraid of storm. One day a fisherman has problems wirh his
boat and he decides to go to the island. Diana is ) years old now and she brings the fish-
erman to her house.
Which of the follotuing rr then true:
1. Diana is no longer afraid of storm.
2. Diana is afraid of storm.
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Conclusions
In the projecc Logical Reuso~tirag ara~! Crrlttrredeductive reasoning was studied in two
differenr culrures, Zambia and the Nerherlands. The project was based on a model, in
which three elements of absrract rhinking are distinguished: ~ra~nratic krrou~led~~e, rea-
roniyrg r~l~enrer, and iaetarognitire ki7ou~ledge. The mosr important resulrs are summarized
here. The results of the study on developmental expectations are outlined fïrst, followed
by a presentarion of the logical reasoning experiments and a discussion of rhe three ele-
ments of the model of abstract thinking. Some linal comments are given at the end of
this chapter.
Developmental Expectations
In the first part of the projecr information was gathered on cross-cultural differ-
ences in pragmatic knowledge about developmental expectatíons. Data were obtained
from Zambian, Turkish-Dutch, and Durch morhers. Zambian mothers expecred the
highest ages of masrery of various developmental skills and Dutch mothers the lowest,
which confirms earlier findings that non-Western participants rend to expecr skills to
develop at later ages rhan Western participants. All three cultural groups showed only
small differences in developmental expectations berween boys and girls. For most skills
Dutch mothers indicated a lower desirability of the mastery of various skills than the
other two groups did. Assuming that desirable skills are socially valued, this finding
corresponds with the results of a cross-cultural analysis of the Lie Scale of Eysenck's
Personality Quesrionnaire, a social desirability scale, by Van Hemert, Van de Vijver,
Poortinga, and Georgas (2000). These aurhors found a strong negative relationship
between the average social desirability score obtained in a country and its Gross
National Product.
Four models were examined to explain cross-cultural differences in the patterning
and antecedents of developmental expecrations, and rhe role of parental needs. The
domain-dependence model holds that differences vary across psychological domains
such as perception and cognirion. The cumulative-differences model states that differ-
ences increase with age. The context-variables model holds that cross-cultural differ-
ences in developmental expectarions are mainly a funcrion of background variables such
as differences in parental education and number of children. The parental-need model
addresses cross-cultural differences in values associated wirh rhe skills and states that
whar parents consider to be important for a child to develop is a conseyuence of the
needs of parents that children satisfy. Each model explained part of the results, but no
model could explain all the cross-cultural variance. The differences and similarities in
expected ages were used for the next part of the project, rhe development of the logical
reasoning tasks of the LRT and the Srory-LRT.
The results of rhis study show that cross-culrural differences in developmenral
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expectation can be modeled in a meaningful way. Cross-cultural differences in develop-
mental expectations are influenced by multiple determinants, like education, number
of children, and parental needs. So far, much attention has been paid to individual dif-
ferences, but the identification and explanation of cross-cultural differences, and espe-
cially rhe explanation of the patterning of these differences, seem to provide important
insight in how parents socialize their children. In future research ir would be incerest-
ing to refine aspects of the present study or to analyze other possible factors that can
explain cross-cultural differences. For example, the information on background varí-
ables could be extended to include sources of information parents use (e.g., books,
grandparents), and social norms about the development of children (mothers may report
expected ages according to a'general' standard rather than according to their own expe-
rience).
Logical Reasoning
In the second part of the project the LRT (eighty logiral reasoning items, based on
ten different logical reasoning rules) and the Story-LRT (twenty logical reasoning
items, based on five logical reasoning rules, embedded in a story) were presenred ro
Zambian and Dutch participants. One of the most important results is that participanrs
of both countries could work well with both logical reasoning tests. Most participants
underscood what was asked from them and rhey reasoned from the premises in order to
reach a logical conclusion. The explicit instruction to assume what was written in rhe
premises and to base the answer on the content of rhe item, could have had a bearing
on this (see also Evans, Newstead, Allen, 8c Pollard, 1994, and Newstead, Pollard,
Evans, 8c Allen, 1992). Not only participants who completed higher education, but also
participants who artended only primary school showed a proportion of logically correct
answers well above chance IeveL Small cross-cultural differences in proportion of logi-
cally correct answers were mainly due to the presence of negations in the reasoning
schemes; Zambian participants showed fewer logically correct answers on logical rea-
soning rules with negations than did Dutch participants.
The influence of various contextual factors on logical reasoning was examined.
Firstly, the effect of empirical truth value. Empirically false items were the most diffi-
cult in both countries; the use of counterfactual elements decreased the proportion of
logically correct answers, borh for non-embedded (LRT) and embedded items (Story-
LRT). For example, with an item about a child of one week old who is able to walk up
the stairs, it becomes more difficult to reason from the premises, because the contents
of these premises conflict with one's daily-life experiences. This makes it hard to accept
what is written and to reason from it. This result is compatible with fïndings from
research on belief-bias, which shows that people have a tendency to judge the validity
of an argument based on the prior believabiliry of its conclusion (Evans 8c Over, 19)6).
Pragmatic knowledge can make logical reasoning easier when the contents of an item
correspond with one's own experience. Ar the same time, it can also lead to a"bias" in
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solving logical problems when the conrent contradicts one's own experience, because
one is then "reasoning hypothetically about the actual while denying rhe possibiliry of
reasoning hypothetically about the posrulated" ( Scribner, 1979, p. 232).
Contrary to expectation, no significant differences were found in proportion of log-
ically correct answers berween factual and possibly-factual items; items thar were
empirically false for one country and rrue for the orher were not harder than items that
were empirically true for both countries.
Secondly, the effect of embeddedness in a story was examined. In Zambia as well
as in the Netherlands the Story-LRT showed more logically correct answers than rhe
LRT; embeddedness of the items apparently facilitated logical reasoning. It should be
added that all stories ( including those with a counterfactual content) contained infor-
marion additional ro the premises and rhat this information was always in line with the
logically right conclusion. For example, in one ot rhe items a child of one year old can
dress without help. The story tells that this child is living in a counrry where children
are capable of doing many things as soon as they are born. When we asked participants
to give reasons for their responses, they used this information in their response expla-
nation. For ínstance, a participant, who gave the logically right conclusion, explained
her answer as follows:
"Becaa~.re in the .rtory it ray.r in thi~~ cozrntry ehildren are ahle to cIo ntany thing.r a.r .roon
at they are born. Even if Stanley i.r one year, he can do everythirtg. It.r a firnny country".
When the additional, contextual information would contradict the premises (e.g., the
story would say that in rhis country children are not so smart), logically correct solu-
tions may be less likely.
Finally, the effect of realism of story content was considered. No significant dif-
ferences berween real-world and make-belief-world srories were found.
In the third part of the project, on metacognition, participants were asked to give
reasons for rheir answers on rhe Story-LRT. These response explanations were rated on
thirteen attributes, such as logical versus empirical explanation and sufficiency of the
answer. No substantial cross-culrural differences were found in the way the Zambian
and Dutch participants motivated their answers; only five of the thirteen attributes
showed significant cross-cultural differences. Dutch participants more often gave a log-
ical explanation, referred more to the second premise of the various reasoning schemes,
and they used less non-essenrial informarion from the story than Zambian participants
did. Zambian participants more often had a false start in their explanation, meaning
they changed their answer after they started to give rhe solurion, and more interven-
tions were necessary for the experimenrer to get a clearer picture of an explanation.
Furthermore, schooling had a significant effecr on the rype of response explanation; par-
ticipants with more education gave more logical and fewer empirical explanations for
their answers.
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It can be concluded that when the content of deductive reasoning tasks refers to a
domain that is derived from everyday situations, such as the development of children,
logical reasoning is affected (facilitated or restrained) by pragmatic knowledge. From
the models mentioned in the introduction chapter, explaining the effect of conrent on
the Wason selection task, the pragntatrr rearorring.rchemarniodel (Cheng 13c Holyoak, 1985)
and the .rocial contract nzodel (Cosmides, 1989) seem to be less suitable for explaining the
effecr of pragmatic knowledge on reasoning in the present study. The first model refers
to permissions, obligations (e.g., that someone must be eighteen before he is aloud to
drink alcohol) and causations from which people reason in daily life situations. The sec-
ond model states that people judge the premises of a selection task on the base of social
contract rules, meaning that, for example, a social contract on rhe reyuired age for
drinking alcohol, facilitates reasoning with the premise If you are to drirtk aliobol, thert
you nur~t be over eighteen. In my opinion permissions and obligations, or social contracr
rules apply to the content of the premises used in the experiments with the Wason
selection task. The content of the premises used in rhis study refer to child develop-
ment; a domain where permissions and obligations, or social contract rules seem to be
less applicable. The third model, the fanriliarity~a~~ailalulrty naodel, which states that the
participant's past experience has created associations between the propositions in a con-
ditional rule, seems the more suirable. The experiences of our participants with raising
their own children and the knowledge they have gained from observation of and hear-
say about other children may well have created associations between the propositions in
the logical rules about child development The rule "If Stephen is six years old, then he
can throw balls" is easier for participants who are familiar wich this rule or can rely on
experience with similar rules, from which rhey can reason by analogy. As stated in
Chapter 3, the pragmatic knowledge abour the development of children may entail a
variety of psychological mechanisms, such as a richer semantic network and more
metacognitive knowledge (e.g., a better recognition of possible solution strategies).
These mechanisms should make it easier to separate domain and reasoning scheme;
hence, they should facilitate the formulation and testing of logically correct solutions.
The elements of the model of abstract thinking
The two cultural groups differed in ~ragnratie ,frtou~ledAe. Ic appears that abstract
thinking is quite strongly affected by the realism of the problem content; factual items
show more logically correct answers than counterfactual items. The fact that the differ-
ence was found in both countries underscores the construct validity of the distinction
between factual and counterfactual items. The adverse impact of counterfactual it~m
content on logical reasoning was also found by Grant (1965) in a srudy on performance
on syllogisms among Sourh-African nonliterate workers; counterfactual syllogisms were
even found to be harder than abstract syllogisms.
The possibly-factual items did not differ significanrly from the factual in the per-
formance in logical reasoning. The differences between factual and possibly-factual
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items may have been too subtle. For example, a child of almost two years who can eat
without help (expected age was 2.64 in the Netherlands and 1.8) in Zambia) was taken
to be empirically true for Zambia and false for the Netherlands. Alchough for Dutch
participants the age might not correspond with rheir own experience, the reality of the
premises is still quite imaginable as opposed ro an item which states that children of ~
years old can tell better what time it is than children of 9 years old (a counterfactual
item).
With regard to rhe rea.ronirrg.rchenaer no major cross-cultural differences were found.
Three of the ten reasoning schemes showed cross-cultural srore differences; all used
negations. Negations may be common in school tasks, but more uncommon in every-
day reasoning; this lower ecological validity may have induced differential previous
exposure in the two countries.
The present study not only shows that the classic belief-bias was found in two dif-
ferent cultures, but ir was also demonstrated over a wide range of logical reasoning
schemes. It was found across all reasoning schemes that participants more often gave a
logically correct answer for items that were empirical true (hence, their conclusion was
believable) than for items that were empirically false (hence, their conclusion was unbe-
lievable).
For ntetacn~nition some cross-cultural differences were found, but overall the simí-
larities were much more impressive than the differences. The domain of reasoning is
culrure-specific and will differ between societies in so far as people have different sets
of pragmatic knowledge in different cultures. The way reasoning schemes are linked to
this pragmatic knowledge, i.e., the metacognitive knowledge, is strongly affected by
schooling. People can learn how to handle a logical reasoning problem:
There is no evidence that rhe difference {berween schooled and non-schooled
groups, MW} is in terms of logical reasoning, but rather in willingness to
accept a syllogism as a contained problem from which a conclusion may be
drawn. (Rogoff, 1981, p.256)
Our study shows that Rogoff's statement also seems to hold for other reasoning schemes.
Some final comments
The results of our project have shown that subrle cultural differences in the truth-
value of the item content (the possibly-factual items) did not have an effect on the per-
formance of logical reasoning. In the possibly-factual items for the same skill the age
that was mentioned was in line with developmental expectations of either Zambian
mothers or Dutch mothers. In future research it might be interesting to use, instead of
developmental expectations, other domains of pragmatic knowledge. Domains that
show more substantial culcural differences, in order to make items wíth a content famil-
iar to participants of one culrure but hardly to the other cultural group, and vice versa.
This might make ir harder to reach a logically correct conclusion for the possibly-fac-
tual items, because for example an item empirically true for Zambia and not for the
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Netherlands would then be almost empirically false for the Netherlands and therefore
not as easily imaginable as the possibly-factual items seem to have been in this study.
The assessment of inetacognition did not show major cross-cultural differences.
Initially, metacognitive skills were going to be measured by a"Think-Aloud Method":
participants had to think aloud while solving the logical reasoning tasks. Thinking-
aloud and solving a logical reasoning task at the same time turned out to be too hard.
Therefore, participants were asked, immediately after responding to an item, to explain
how they came up with their answer. I cannot be sure whether this was really the way
a participant solved a problem or whether some explanation was generated afterwards.
I think that it will be very difficult to find ways to measure metacognitive activities
more accurately, because these processes are so subtle, quick and hard to grasp for the
participant him or herself, let alone for the researcher. This problem may be com-
pounded in cross-cultural research.
According to Piagetian theory of formal operational thinking, "real" logical rea-
soning, as part of abstract thinking, should not be affected by pragmatic knowledge;
logical reasoning is the type of cognitive activity par excellence that should be inde-
pendent of the domain in which it is applied. In this line of thinking, tasks with a con-
tent not related to daily life experience would best measure the ability for logical rea-
soning. But, how is it possible then, that people are able to reason well in daily life sit-
uations, but make many miscakes in laboratory-like test-situations? Do these logical
reasoning tests just measure the formal rules of logic and is it wrong to regard these as
normative in good reasoning ("Perfect rationality is for the angels", Johnson-Laird,
199), p. 111)? Or could logical reasoning develop from a content- and context-related
ability to a more general, reasoning ability when people are trained and schooled specif-
ically in the area of logical reasoning rules~ Research by Evans et al. (19)4) showed that
the belief-bias, although nor completely eliminated, was significantly reduced by ver-
bal instructions involving principles of reasoning. So, it appears that schooling and
training definitely affect the performance in logical reasoning tests and enhance the
capacity to reason free from content and context.
If we consider formal logical reasoning as a skill, or even as a"trick" that is learned
in school, there remains another point to consider, as far as the assessment of this skill
is concerned Evans and Over (1996, p.116) wrote:
It is naive to think that competence in reasoning can be assessed simply by
presenting a task that by structure and instructions should conform to some
normative standard of the experimenters preference and then checking
whether participants solve it or not.
Therefore, it is of more interest to gather information on the way people acrually rea-
son in daily life and in what kind of situations. This information can then be used to
develop logical reasoning tescs that agree with daily life experiences. In such a way we
are able to assess differences and similariries between cultures and extend our knowl-
edge on Logical reasoning.
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It will never be possible to find situations in daily life that require exclusively log-
ical reasoning in the sense of formal logir, as a consequence, test materials will never be
totally ecologically valid. In daily life there are no situations in which logical reasoning
is required without the involvement of elements like preference for certain solutions,
strong beliefs rhat people have, and other non-cognitive influences. As soon as daily life
aspects are brought into logical reasoning tasks, it is likely rhar reasoning according to
the rules of formal logic becomes affected, and not-only by associations (rhe familiari-
ry~availability approach), or permissions and obligations ( the pragmatic reasoning
schemas model). The domain one has to reason about influences the capacity to reason
as soon as one has, among other things, knowledge, associations, expectations, whishes,
and beliefs with regard to thar domain. So, reasoning with abstract sentences like "IfIt
tben y: li, therefrtre q", free from aspects like associations and expectations, is possible if
one knows the right " trick". Logical reasoning about for example "If it i~~ turittert irr the
Gible. then it ir trzce: it ir u~ritten in the GiGle, therefore it i~~ trrre" will be harder for people
whose beliefs do nor coincide with the first premise. In order ro reach the logically cor-
recr conclusion one's metacognitive knowledge on formal logic should be so well
trained that one is able ro put aside his or her own beliefs and take the premises as a
srarting point ro reason from.
As a more general conclusion it should be noted rhat in this project overall more
cross-cultural similarities than differences are found in logical reasoning. This supports
rhe nocion that the basic structure of logical reasoning will emerge as universal if all
participants have pragmatic knowledge on the domain they have to reason abour. Large
differences found in daily cognirion studies seem to be caused by large differences in
pragmatic knowledge and, related to rhat, differences in metacognitive knowledge,
because people in different cultures engage in and learn to deal with different problems
in daily life.
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Summary
Over the years much research have been done on logical reasoning and context. As
described in the introduction chapter of this thesis, logical reasoning and other cog-
nitive processes have been studied from two different perspecrives: the formal and the
informal tradicion. Within the forrira! tradition research is carried out with tasks that
have a closed problem space and a focus on the logical correctness of the answers. This
tradition initially did not have much eye for the context (i.e., che imbedding of a logi-
cal problem, for example in a story) and the content (i.e., rhe substantive issues referred
to) of the tasks that were presented. Studies with Wason's selection task showed that
task content does have a strong effect on logical reasoning, and that performance on log-
ical reasoning tasks is greatly enhanced when the tasks have a realistic content, while
on the other hand a priori beliefs can interfere with the logical reasoning process and
can make it harder to reason solely from the premises.
Within the infornra! traditiort tasks to be solved have an open problem space and the
focus is on the practical value of a solution. Research in this tradition focuses on cogni-
tive processes in real-lífe situations and has shown some consistent findings. There is
little or no correlation between performance on informal tasks and performance on for-
mal tests, there is little transfer of cognitive skills from familiar to unfamiliar problem
solving situations, and there are remarkable differences in the accuracy and strategy use
between respondents who are experts and respondents who are novices in the solution
of logical tasks
Research from both rraditions has shown how important the effect on logical rea-
soning is of both conrent and context, but in the first tradition most studies use a nar-
row set of logical rules and the participants are from Western cultures, and within the
second tradition studies focus on a single evenr and~or single cultural group. Therefore,
the generaliry and validity of content and context effects found in both traditions are
largely unknown.
A culture-comparative approach, combining the experimental rigor of the formal
tradition and the analysis of the role of cultural factors as studied in the informal tra-
dition, could till this gap. In the last decades a research tradition in cross-cultural psy-
chology, called "everyday cognition", has given atcention to daily-lífe experiences and
their influence on cognitive development and to the transfer of abilities developed in
daily-life tasks to more artificial rest situations. Furchermore, in cross-cultural studies
the ecological validity of stimulus material has become more important and several
studies have demonstrated that the quality of performance on cognitive tasks greatly
enhances if familiar materials are used for testing.
The present project on Logical Rearoning and Crrlturewas aimed at investigating the
role ofculrural knowledge in abstract thinking. The theoretical background to the the-
sis is provided by a model of absrract thinking. This model includes three basic ele-
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ments. The first is ~ragntatii knou~ledge, which refers to declarative, factual knowledge
about ourselves and the environment. The second element consists of rea.roning rchente.r,
which are domain-independent stimulus transformation rules. The third element is
ntetae-ogrritit~e knou~ledge, linking pragmatic knowledge and reasoning schemes. This link
starts From the recognition that the solution of a problem demands a particular reason-
ing scheme.
In the first study of the projecr pragmatic knowledge was collected, which was
used to develop logical reasoning items for the second study of the projecr. The way in
which this knowledge was collected, is discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Child
rearing was chosen as a domain for studying cognitive reasoning that is found in any
society and from which insight could be gained about pragmatic knowledge on child
development. The focus was on the timetable of expectations that parents hold for their
children: the types of competence they expect and the age at which they expect these
to be acquired. Seventy-seven skills covering a broad range of behaviors (e.g., eat with-
out help, walk without help, knitting, reading and criticize self) were presented to
Zambian, Dutch, and Turkish-Dutch mothers (N - 69, 68, and 50, respectively). The
latter group was included in order to examine potential cross-cultural differences in the
Netherlands. The mothers were asked to indicare the expected age of mastery for each
skill, gender differences in mastery and the desirability of developing the skill.
Zambian mothers expected the highest ages of mastery of various developmental
skills and Dutch mothers the lowest, which confirms earlier findings that non-Western
participants tend to expect skills to develop at higher ages than Western participants
do. All three cultural groups showed only small differences in developmental expecta-
tions between boys and girls. For most skills Dutch mothers indicated a lower desir-
ability of mastery than the other rwo groups did. Four models were examined to explain
cross-cultural differences in the patterning and antecedents of developmental expecta-
tions, and the role of parental needs. Partial support was obtained for each model. The
model which stated that differences vary across psychological domains such as percep-
tion and cognition, labelled the domain dependence model, seemed to be the most suc-
cessful in explaining cross-cultural differences.
The results of this study were of interest because differences and similarities in
pragmatic knowledge were needed for the development of logical reasoning tasks. In
Chapter 3 the question was addressed as to whether reasoning schemes as described in
formal logic can be applied by Zambian and Dutch mothers in their thinking about
children's development and what the effect would be on their logical reasoning of the
empirical truth-value of the informarion needed in the reasoning (e.g., premises of syl-
logisms). The information about developmental expectarions (described in Chapter 1
and 2) províded the contextual information for "translating" ten different logical rea-
soning schemes, such as ifp thert q: p, th. erefore q and all~.r are ~.r; al! iits are ~r. therefore all
trar are ~.r, into resr items. So, the items were designed in such a way, that the same log-
ical rules were used in both cultural groups and that the content of the items was suit-
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able for both cultures; the content referred to pragmatic knowledge on an everyday sub-
ject (i.e., the development of children), with adjustments for each cultural group.
Two tests were developed and administered to Zambian and Dutch women. Both
tests used the same reasoning schemes. In the frst test ( the LRT) the premises of the
logical reasoning rules were explicidy presenred. An example of an icem of the LRT,
representing the transitivity rule ~ ~ q: q~ tia, tberefore p~ nz, is:
Children of 9 years old u~rite better than children of l yearr old. Children of l years
old u~rite better than children of 5 years old.
In the second tesc ( the Story-LRT) the premises of the same rules were embedded in two
types of prose passages, with a real world and a make-believe content. An example of
an item of the Story-LRT embedded in a real-world prose passage:
In a~ritrtary school irr Easterrt Provenc-e the children have lots of tests every year. Thfs
year the teacher u~arrts to test hou~ u~ell the childrera can u~rite. The test shows tbat chil-
dren of ) years old can u~rite better than children of l years old. Children of l years
old can write Getter than children of 5 years old.
An example of an item embedded in a make-believe prose passage:
There is said to be a country u~here nobndy can coarnt i~ery u~ell, besides the teacherr irz
prirraary school. Tbey teacb the childrerr hou~ ta count. !n this rorrntry childrert of 8 years
old can c-ount better, than children of 6 years old. Children of 6 years old c-an rount bet-
ter than children of 4 years old.
Furthermore, the logical reasoning items varied in empirical truth-value: empirically
true for both countries ( factual items), empirically false for both countries ( counterfac-
tual items), empirically true only for Zambia, and empirically true only for the Nether-
lands (possibly factual items). An example of a counterfactual item of the LRT is:
Children of 3 years old can tell better u~hat tinre it i.r than children of G years old.
Children of 6 years old can tell better what tinte it is thart children of 9 years old.
One of the most important results in line with expectations, was that participants
of boch countries could work well with both logical reasoning tests. Most parcicipants
understood what was asked from chem and they reasoned from the premises in order to
reach a logical conclusion. Not only participants who completed higher education, but
also participants who attended only primary school showed a proportion of logically
correct answers well above chance level. Small but systematic cross-cultural differences
in proportion of logically correct answers were mainly due to the presence of negations
in reasoning schemes; Zambian participants showed fewer logically correcr answers on
logical reasoning rules with negations than did Dutch participants.
The quescion dealing with the influence of various contextual factors on logical
reasoning was examined in various ways. Empirically false items were the most difficult
in both countries; the use of counterfactual elements decreased the proportion of logi-
cally correct answers, both for non-embedded ( LRT) and embedded items (Story-LRT).
Embeddedness of items in a prose passage facilitated logical reasoning, both in the
Netherlands and Zambia.
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No effects were found for realism of story content; items embedded in a real-world
prose passages were not easier or more difficult than items embedded in make-believe
prose passages. Contrary to expectation, no significant differences were found in pro-
portion of logically correct answers between factual and possibly factual items; items
rhar were empirically false for one counrry and true for the other were not harder than
items that were empirically true for both countries. The differences berween factual and
possibly-factual items may have been too subtle. For example, the item "If Harriet i.r
alrnost 2 years old, then she can eat u~ithout help. Harrret is alnrnst 2 years old." was taken to
be empirically rrue for Zambia and false for the Netherlands, based on the signíficant
difference between in developmental expectations regarding the ability to eat without
help (expected age was 2.64 in the Netherlands and 1.89 in Zambia). Although for
Dutch participants the age mighr not correspond wirh their own experience, the reali-
ty of the premises is still yuite imaginable as opposed to an item which states thar chil-
dren of 3 years old can tell berrer whar time ir is than children of 9 years old (a coun-
rerfacrual irem).
In Chapter 4 an analysis was made of inetacognitive aspects of logical reasoning.
The same Zambian (N - 100) and Dutch (N - 74) participants as in rhe previous chap-
ter were asked to ~ive reasons for the answers they gave on the Story-LRT. These answers
were rated on thirteen attribures such as logical versus empirical explanarion, sufficien-
cy of the explanation, and references to the premise. We were interested in cross-cul-
tural differences in these atrributes and in their relarion to two item facets, namely
empirical truth-value and realism of story conrent. Cross-cultural similariries were
salient. However, Dutch mothers tended to treat the problems somewhat more as log-
ical tasks than Zambian mothers did, while Zambian morhers used more non-essential
information from the srory and referred less to the second premise. Zambian mothers
elaborared more in their explanations rhan Dutch mothers did; elaborate explanations
lead to more logically correct answers in the Zambian sample, but no such tendency was
present in the Dutch sample. In a regression analysis with the combined data sets it was
found rhar participants with more educacion gave more logical and fewer empirical
explanations. Ir was concluded that the universality of abstract thinking also exrends,
at least in schooled populations, to the meracognitive aspects.
In the final chapter, the Conclusions, rhe general resulrs and their implications are
discussed. As a final conclusion it is stated that in this project overall more cross-cul-
rural similarities than differences were found in logical reasoning. This supports the
notion that the basic structure of logical reasoning is universal, ar leasr if all partici-
pancs have pragmatic knowledge on the domain rhey have to reason about. Large dif-
ferences reported in daily cognition srudies seem ro be caused by differences in prag-
matic knowledge and, related to thar, differences in metacognitive knowledge, because




Door de jaren heen is er veel onderzoek gedaan naar logisch redeneren en de con-
text waarin logisch redeneertaken aangeboden worden. Zoals beschreven in her intro-
ductiehoofdstuk van dit proefschrift, zijn logisch redeneren en andere cognitieve pro-
cessen bestudeerd vanuit twee verschillende perspectieven: de formele en de informele
traditie. Binnen de forirlele traditie wordt onderzoek gedaan met taken die een gesloten
probleemruimte hebben en een focus op de logische correctheid van de antwoorden.
Oorspronkelijk had deze traditie niet zo veel oog voor de context (d.w.z. het inbedden
van een logisch probleem, bijvoorbeeld in een verhaal) en de inhoud (d.w.z. de onder-
werpen waar naar verwezen wordt) van de taken die werden aangeboden. Studies met
de Wason selectietaak toonden aan dat taakinhoud een sterk effect heeft op logisch rede-
neren, en dat de prestatie op logisch redeneertaken enorm verhoogd wordt als de taken
een realistische inhoud hebben, terwijl aan de andere kant a-priori "beliefs" kunnen
interfereren met het logisch redeneerproces en het moeilijker kunnen maken om alleen
vanuit de premissen te redeneren.
Binnen de irrforirzele truditie hebben de taken die moeten worden opgelost een open
probleemruimte en de focus ligr op de praktische waarde van de oplossing. Onderzoek
in deze traditie richt zich op cognitieve processen in levensechte situaties en er is een
aantal consistente resultaten gevonden. Er is weinig tot geen samenhang tussen de
prestatie op informele taken en de prestatie op formele tests, er is weinig overdracht van
cognitieve vaardigheden van bekende naar onbekende probleemsituaties, en er zijn
opmerkelijke verschillen in de accuraatheid en het strategiegebruik tussen responden-
ten die experes zijn en respondenten die nieuwelingen zijn in het oplossen van logische
taken.
Onderzoek in beide tradities heeft duidelijk gemaakt hoe belangrijk het effect van
zowel inhoud als context is op logisch redeneren, maar in de eerste traditie gebruiken
de meesre studies een beperkte set van logische regels en de proefpersonen komen van-
uir een Westerse cultuur, en binnen de tweede traditie richren de studies zich op een
enkele gebeurtenis en~of een enkele culturele groep. Daarom zijn de generaliseerbaar-
heid en de validiteit van inhoud- en contexteffecten, die gevonden zijn in beide tradi-
ties, vrijwel onbekend.
Een cultuurvergelijkende benadering, die de experimentele striktheid van de for-
mele traditie en de analyse van de culturele factoren zoals bestudeerd in de informele
tradirie combineert, zou dit hiaat kunnen vullen. In de laatste decennia heeft een onder-
zoeksrraditie in de crossculturele psychologie, genaamd "everyday cognition", aandachr
besteed aan dagelijkse levenservaringen en hun invloed op de cognitieve ontwikkeling,
en aan de overdracht van vaardigheden ontwikkeld in dagelijkse levenstaken naar meer
kunstmatige testsituaties. Bovendien is in crossculturele studies de ecologische vali-
diteit van stimulusmateriaal belangrijker geworden en verschillende onderzoeken heb-
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ben aangetoond dat de kwaliteir van prestaties op cognitieve taken sterk vergroot wordt
als er bekende materialen gebruikt worden voor het testen.
Het huidige project Logical Rea.roning and Czrltzrre was gericht op her onderzoeken
van de rol van culturele kennis in abstract denken. De theoretische achtergrond van het
proefschrift is gebaseerd op een model voor absrract denken. Dit model omvat drie
basiselementen. Het eerste is pra~nzatische kenrtir. hetgeen verwijst naar declaratieve, fei-
telijke kennis over onszelf en de omgeving. Het tweede element bestaat uit redeneertche-
naa'r, hetgeen domeinonafhankelijke stimulus transformatieregels zijn. Het derde ele-
ment is nzetacognitiez~e kenni.r, de kennis die de pragmatische kennis koppelt aan de rede-
neerschema's. De koppeling begint bij de herkenning dat de oplossing van een pro-
bleem een specifiek redeneerschema vereist.
In de eerste studie van dit project is pragmatische kennis verzameld, die gebruikt
is om logisch redeneeritems te ontwikkelen voor de tweede studie van het project. De
manier waarop deze kennis verzameld is, wordt besproken in Hoofdstuk 1 en Hoofd-
stuk 2. Als domein voor het bestuderen van cognitief redeneren werd gekozen voor kin-
deren grootbrengen, omdat dat iets is wat in iedere maatschappij aanwezig is en van waar-
uit inzicht verkregen kan worden over pragmatische kennis over de ontwikkeling van
kinderen. De focus lag bij de "timetable" van verwachtingen die ouders hebben voor
hun kinderen: de soort vaardigheden die ze verwachten en de leeftijd waarop ze ver-
wachten dat die vaardigheden verworven zijn. Zevenenzeventig vaardigheden, die een
brede range van gedragingen besloegen (bijvoorbeeld: eten zonder hulp, lopen zonder
hulp, breien, lezen, en kritiek hebben op jezel~ werden voorgelegd aan Zambiaanse,
Nederlandse en Turks-Nederlandse moeders (respectievelijk, N- 69, 68, en 50). De
laatste groep was toegevoegd, om potentiële crossculturele verschillen in Nederland te
onderzoeken. De moeders werd gevraagd om voor elke vaardigheid aan te geven op
welke leeftijd ze verwachten dar een kind die vaardigheid beheerst, of ze verschillen ver-
wachten tussen jongens en meisjes, en hoe wenselijk ze de ontwikkeling van die
vaardigheid vinden.
Voor verscheidende ontwikkelingsvaardigheden gaven Zambiaanse moeders de
hoogste leefrijd aan en Nederlandse moeders de laagste, hetgeen eerdere resultaten
bevestigt dat niet-Westerse proefpersonen geneigd zijn om de ontwikkeling van
vaardigheden op een latere leeftijd te verwachten dan Westerse proefpersonen. Alle drie
de culturele groepen toonden slechts kleine verschillen in ontwikkelingsverwachtingen
tussen jongens en meisjes. Voor de meeste vaardigheden gaven Nederlandse moeders
een lagere wenselijkheid van ontwikkeling aan dan de twee andere groepen. Vier
modellen om de crossculturele verschillen in patronen en antecedenten van ontwikke-
lingsverwachtingen, en de rol van ouderlijke behoeften te verklaren, werden onder-
zocht. Voor elk model werd gedeeltelijke bevestiging gevonden. Het model, dat stelt
dar verschillen variëren langs psychologische domeinen zoals perceptie en cognitie,
genaamd het "domain dependence model", lijkt het meest succesvol in het verklaren
van crossculturele verschillen.
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De resultaten van deze studie waren van belang omdat verschillen en overeenkom-
sten in pragmarische kennis nodig waren voor de ontcvikkeling van logisch redeneerta-
ken. In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt aandacht besteed aan de vraag of redeneerschema's zoals
beschreven in formele logica toegepast kunnen worden door Zambiaanse en
Nederlandse moeders in hun denken over de ontwikkeling van kinderen, en wat het
effect is op hun logisch redeneren van de empirische juistheid van de informarie (bij-
voorbeeld van de premissen van syllogismen) die nodig is bíj het redeneren. De infor-
matie over ontwikkelingsverwachtingen (beschreven in Hoofdstuk 1 en 2) zorgde voor
de contextuele informatie voor het "vertalen" van tien verschillende logisch redeneer-
schema's, zoals als p dan q: ~. dus q en alle ~s zijn qs. alle ms zijn ~is, dus alle nts zijn c~s, in
test items. Dus, de items werden zodanig ontworpen, dat in beide culturele groepen
dezelfde logische regels gebruikt werden, en dat de inhoud van de items geschikt was
voor beide culturen. De inhoud verwees naar pragmatische kennis over een alledaags
onderwerp (d.w.z. de ontwikkeling van kinderen), met aanpassing voor elke culturele
groep.
Twee tests werden ontwikkeld en afgenomen bij Zambiaanse en Nederlandse vrou-
wen. Beide tests gebruikten dezelfde redeneerschema's. In de eersre test (de LRT) wer-
den de premissen van de logisch redeneerregels expliciet gepresenteerd. Een voorbeeld
van een item uir de LRT, wat de transitiviteitsregel p ~ q: q~ nz, dus p~ rrr, weergeeft, is:
Kirtderen van 9 jaarsrhrijvert beter dan kinderen van 7 jaar. Kinderen van 7 jaar
schrijven beter dan kirtderen van 5 jaar.
In de tweede test (de Story-LRT) waren de premissen van dezelfde regels ingebed in
twee soorten korte verhaaltjes, met een realistische en een sprookjesachtige inhoud. Een
voorbeeld van een item uit de Story-LRT ingebed in een realistisch verhaaltje:
In een basisschoo! in Tu~ente moeten de kinderen e!k ja~ar z.~ee! tests doert. Dit jaar u-~il
de leerkracht testen hoe goed de kinderen kunrren schrijven. De test laat zien dat de kin-
deren van 9 jaar beter kunnen schrijven dan kinderen :~an 7 jaar. Kirtderen van 7 jaar
kunnen beter sehrijven dan kinderen van 5 jaar.
Een voorbeeld van een item ingebed in een sprookjesachtig verhaaltje:
Er u~ordt gezegd dat er een land is waar nienzand goed kan tellen, bebalve de leer-
kraehten in de basi.rschool. Zij leren de kinderen hne ze moeten tellen. In dit land kun-
nen kinderen van 8 jaar beter tellen dan kinderen van 6 jaar. Kinderen van 6 jaar
kunnen beter tellen dan kinderen van 4 jaar.
Verder varieerden de logisch redeneeritems in empirische juistheid: empirisch juist voor
beide landen (feitelijke items), empirisch onjuist voor beide landen ("tegenfeitelijke"
items), empirisch juist alleen voor Zambia, en empirisch juist alleen voor Nederland
(mogelijk feitelijke items). Een voorbeeld van een tegenfeitelijk item van de LRT is:
Kinderen van 3 jaar kunnen beter vertellen hoe laat het is dan kinderen t~an 6 jaar.
Kirtderen van 6 jaar krrnrterr Geter vertellen hoe laat het is. darr kirtdererr van ) jaar.
Een van de meest belangrijke resultaten in lijn met de verwachtingen, was dat de
proefpersonen van beide landen goed konden werken met beide logisch redeneertests.
13Z Logical reasoning and culture
De meeste proefpersonen begrepen goed wat er van ze werd gevraagd en ze redeneerden
vanuit de premissen om zo tot een logische conclusie te komen. Niet alleen bij proef-
personen die een hogere opleiding hadden, maar ook bij proefpersonen die alleen lage-
re school hadden genoten, was het aantal logisch correcte antwoorden boven kansni-
veau. Kleine, maar systematische crossculturele verschíllen in de proportie logisch cor-
recte antwoorden waren voornamelijk het gevolg van de aanwezigheid van ontkennin-
gen in redeneerschema's; Zambiaanse proefpersonen toonden minder logisch correcte
anrwoorden op de logisch redeneerregels met ontkenningen dan de Nederlandse proef-
personen.
De vraag die gaat over de invloed van verscheidende contextuele factoren op
logisch redeneren, werd op verschillende manieren onderzocht. Empirisch onjuiste
items bleken het moeilijkst te zijn in beide landen; het gebruik van tegenfeitelijke ele-
menten verminderde de proportie logisch correcte antwoorden, zowel voor de niet-inge-
bedde (LRT) als de ingebedde items (Story-LRT). Het ingebed zijn van de items in een
verhaaltje vereenvoudigde het logisch redeneren, zowel in Nederland als in Zambia.
Het niveau van realisme van de inhoud van het verhaaltje had geen effect; items
die ingebed waren in een realistisch verhaaltje waren niet eenvoudiger of moeilijker dan
de items in een sprookjesachtige verhaaltje. Tegengesteld aan de verwachtingen werden
er geen significante verschillen gevonden in de proportie logisch correcte antwoorden
tussen feitelijke en mogelijk feitelijke items; items die empirisch juist waren voor het
ene land en onjuist voor het andere waren niet moeilijker dan irems die juist waren voor
beide landen. De verschillen tussen feitelijke en mogelijk feirelijke items kan te subtiel
zijn geweest. Bijvoorbeeld, het item "Alr Harriët Gijna ? jaar i~, dart kari zij eterr zonder
htrlp. Harriët ir Gijna 2 jaar." werd beschouwd als een empirisch juist item voor Zambia
en onjuist voor Nederland. Dit was gebaseerd op het signifiicante verschil tussen ont-
wikkelingsverwachtingen over de vaardigheid om te kunnen eten zonder hulp ( de
gemiddelde verwachte leeftijd was 2.64 in Nederland en 1.89 in Zambia). Hoewel voor
Nederlandse proefpersonen de leeftijd misschien niet correspondeerde met hun eigen
ervaring, is de juistheid van de premissen nog sreeds voorstelbaar, in tegenstelling tot
een item waarin gesteld wordt dar kinderen van ~ jaar beter kunnen vertellen hoe laat
het is dan kinderen van 9 jaar (een tegenfeitelijk item).
In Hoofdstuk 4 is een analyse gemaakt van metacognitieve aspecten van logisch
redeneren. Dezelfde Zambiaanse (N-100) en Nederlandse (N-74) proefpersonen als in
het vorige hoofdstuk werd gevraagd aan te geven hoe ze gekomen waren tot de ant-
woorden die ze gaven bij de Story-LRT. Deze motiveringen werden beoordeeld aan de
hand van dertien kenmerken zoals logische versus empirische verklaring, toereikend-
heid van de verklaring, en verwijzingen naar de premissen. We waren geïnteresseerd in
crossculturele verschillen in deze kenmerken en in hun relatie tot twee kenmerken van
de logisch redeneeritems, namelijk empirische juisrheid en realisme van de inhoud van
het verhaaltje. Wat opviel was dat er veel crossculturele overeenkomsten waren. Echter,
Nederlandse moeders waren wel geneigd de problemen iets meer als logische raak te
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beschouwen dan de Zambiaans moeders, terwijl Zambiaanse moeders meer nier- essen-
tiële informatie van het verhaal gebruikte en minder verwezen naar de tweede premis-
se. Zambiaanse moeders weidden meer uit in hun verklaring dan Nederlandse moeders;
uirgebreide verklaringen bleken vaker tot logisch correcte antwoorden re leiden in de
Zambiaanse steekproef, maar een dergelijke tendens werd niet gevonden in de
Nederlandse steekproef. In een regressieanalyse met de ~;ecombineerde datasets werd
gevonden dar de proefpersonen mer een hogere opleiding meer logische en mindere
empirische verklaringen gaven. Er werd geconcludeerd dat de universaliceit van
abstracr denken zich ook uitstrekt tot, tenminste in geschoolde populaties, de meta-
cognitieve aspecten.
In het laatste hoofdstuk, de Conclusies, worden de algemene resultaten en hun
implicaties besproken. Als uiteindelijke conclusie wordt gesteld dat in dit project over
het algemeen meer crossculturele overeenkomsten dan verschillen gevonden zijn in
logisch redeneren. Dit ondersteunt de gedachte dat de basisstructuur van logisch rede-
neren universeel is, tenminste als alle proefpersonen pragmatische kennis hebben over
het domein waarover ze moeten redeneren. Grote verschillen die gerapporteerd worden
in "daily cognition" studies lijken veroorzaakt te worden door verschillen in pragmati-
sche kennis en, daaraan gerelateerd, doordat mensen in verschillende culturen betrok-
ken zijn bij en leren omgaan met verschillende problemen in het dagelijks leven.
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